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Abstract 
Increasingly awareness of corporate activity in developing and less 
developed economies has come under public scrutiny in terms of corporate 
voluntary disclosure and firm performance. Shareholders and a range of 
other stakeholders rely on the transparency afforded by corporate public 
disclosures and the governance mechanisms that ensure accountability. 
Therefore, studies in voluntary disclosure and firm performance that 
combine elements of corporate governance and shareholder and stakeholder 
perspectives provide insights for regulators, especially in developing 
economies competing in a global market. Accordingly, this study examines 
the determinants and effects of voluntary disclosures within Bangladesh 
after a severe share market crash in 2010. Despite being one of the poorest 
countries, Bangladesh has significant opportunities for companies in the 
future as an emerging economy experiencing significant economic 
development.  Therefore, regulators are interested in how to improve 
corporate governance to ensure transparency and promote investment. 
To understand voluntary corporate disclosure practices, three significant 
categories ‒ social, environmental and intellectual capital ‒ are used as a 
proxy for CSR and transparency. To accommodate a diverse range of 
stakeholders, the framework developed by An et al. (2011) is adapted for 
the Bangladeshi context as it combines agency, legitimacy and signalling 
theories. The investigation is conducted in two stages. First, important 
indicators of corporate governance are identified from the extant literature 
to determine the effects on the level of voluntary corporate disclosures. 
Second, the effect of these disclosures on firm performance is determined. 
The study is conducted by examining the top 200 listed firms on the Dhaka 
Stock Exchange for the years 2011 to 2013. To accommodate the lag in firm 
performance the data set is extended to 2014. This panel data is subjected 
to statistical analysis including Ordinary Least Square and Two Stage Least 
Square. Robustness tests are also applied throughout. 
The findings determine that the presence of a sub-committee, audit 
committee composition and foreign ownership have a significant positive 
relationship with voluntary corporate disclosure; on the other hand, CEO 
duality and director ownership is significantly negatively associated. In 
relation to firm performance, voluntary disclosure has a significant positive 
effect on return on assets, market capitalization, earnings per share and 
Tobin’s Q.  
While limited to the top 200 listed firms, the findings provide insights into 
how corporate governance characteristics moderate and ensure transparency 
by considering discretionary disclosures related to social, environmental 
and intellectual capital aspects to facilitate development of future corporate 
governance guidelines. It further indicates that voluntary disclosure can 
improve firm performance in Bangladesh. This offers an incentive to the 
firm to ensure greater transparency through voluntary disclosure.  
ii 
 
This study makes a further contribution to the ongoing debate regarding a 
more integrative approach by utilizing a combined theoretical framework 
dedicated to a developing country context and a diverse range of 
stakeholders.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
There is a growing interest in the voluntary disclosure of a firm’s activities 
in its annual report. Not only has this trend emerged during the last three or so 
decades amongst companies in developed countries, but it has also become a 
significant agenda in developing countries. This growing interest in voluntary 
disclosure may be due to the nature of the type of disclosures. Mandatory 
disclosures in a firm’s annual report generally cover activities of a financial nature; 
these information requirements are regulated and enforced by company law or the 
relevant accounting standards adopted by the country in which the firm operates. In 
contrast, voluntary disclosures provide additional information about a firm’s 
activities, incorporating social, ethical and environmental aspects, as well as 
potential value creation through intellectual capital; this kind of information is 
aimed at supplementing mandatory disclosure. This non-financial information is 
usually disclosed voluntarily (Garcia-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2010) with some 
exceptions.  
Given that one of the primary purposes of a firm is to improve shareholders’ 
value, the voluntary disclosure literature focuses on why a firm should adopt non-
mandatory disclosure that may incur additional cost. This study extends the prior 
literature that explores the potential determinants of voluntary disclosure as well as 
investigates whether voluntary disclosure is an explanatory factor for firm 
performance, in particular, by focusing on a developing country context. This 
context is of interest because developing regions are generally characterized by 
poor social economic conditions and social inequity. Accordingly, academics, 
policymakers, government and private organizations, and investors, to name a few, 
from both developed and developing countries, have become increasingly 
interested in exploring the determinants and effects of voluntary disclosure in 
developing countries. 
Voluntary disclosure is defined as any information that is additional to 
mandatory disclosure. While there is a wide range of voluntary disclosure 
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categories, most voluntary disclosure relates to social, environmental and 
intellectual capital aspects (Garcia-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2010). Social 
disclosure is the provision of financial and non-financial information that derives 
from the economic activity of a firm, and is discharged mainly to communicate with 
groups concerned with social activities (Aribi & Gao 2010; Gray et al. 1987; 
Guthrie & Mathews 1985), for example, information regarding staff welfare  
involvement or donations in social issues, policies on employee harassment and 
information on product safety (Cui et al. 2018; Hackston and Milne 1996; Haniffa 
and Cooke 2005; Kamal and Deegan 2013; Khan et al. 2013). Environmental 
disclosure refers to the information that derives from the interaction of a firm and 
the natural environment; for instance, any information regarding environmental 
risks, impacts, policies, strategies, targets, costs, energy savings and liabilities 
(Deegan & Gordon 1996; Sen et al. 2011; Lokuwaduge & Heenetigala 2017). 
Intellectual capital is considered as the knowledge of an organization; for example, 
any form of talent, skills from individuals and groups, including technological and 
social networks, software, culture, and intellectual property. This resource is 
considered to be a vital strategic asset with significant value creation potential 
(Akpinar & Akdemir 1999; Garanina, & Dumay 2017; Mouritsen 1998). Thus, any 
information from a firm that reflects these values or assets is considered as 
intellectual capital disclosure. Therefore, from a firm perspective, social, 
environmental and intellectual capital disclosures cover information about the 
social and environmental effects of a firm’s operations and the values derived from 
an intangible asset perspective and consequently are of interest to a wide range of 
stakeholders, not just shareholders.  
Among the many themes in the voluntary disclosure literature, one area of 
consistent attention has been the attempt to identify the determinants of voluntary 
disclosure by considering corporate governance characteristics as a potential 
determinant for stock exchange listed companies (Ali et al. 2017; García‐Sánchez 
et al. 2018; Garcia-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2010; Khlif et al. 2016; Khlif & 
Souissi 2010; Samaha et al. 2015). According to the Cadbury Report (1992), 
corporate governance is the process of administration and control within an 
organization that is directed towards ensuring the best interest of shareholders in 
regard to compliance with regulation. Accordingly, corporate governance of a firm 
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plays a significant role in the decision making process of a firm. Consistent with 
this definition, corporate governance characteristics play a significant role in 
voluntary disclosure as there is no legal enforcement to disclose additional 
information. It should also be noted that the level of voluntary disclosure varies in 
annual reports from country to country (Boesso & Kumar 2007) as well as company 
to company (Abeysekera 2007). Therefore, there is scope to extend the literature by 
exploring voluntary disclosure from a different research context. 
 A stream of research is devoted to exploring the effects of voluntary 
disclosure (Allouche & Laroche 2005; Griffin & Mahon 1997; Margolis & Walsh 
2003; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Wang et al. 2016), mostly seeking to understand how 
firms have traditionally focused on strategies to develop business operations and 
ultimately enhance profitability or improve financial performance. These effects are 
documented but are contrasted with the additional managerial emphasis and 
accompanying costs required to produce this information and pursue such strategic 
goals. Examination of the aggregate effects of voluntary disclosure therefore 
becomes a thought-provoking research agenda; and the relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and firm performance has been much debated in the literature 
(Griffin & Mahon 1997; Wang et al. 2016). This research can provide greater 
insight when considering how the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm 
performance vary from country to country. Similarly, the approach or method of 
the research used influences the results of previous studies. So while there is an 
established voluntary disclosure literature, there is still ample scope to investigate 
the relationship between voluntary disclosure and firm performance by considering 
different research settings. 
Much of the research into voluntary disclosure to date has taken place within 
developed country contexts (Ahmed & Courtis 1999; Cooke 1989; Hackston & 
Milne 1996; Hossain et al. 1995; Stanwick & Stanwick 1998). There may be less 
motivation to examine voluntary disclosure within developing countries due to 
weak social and economic conditions. Firms in underdeveloped regions have 
maintained a focus on monetary rather than social agendas and therefore do not 
emphasize voluntary disclosure, but this may be to the detriment of firm 
performance in the long term. Prior studies have suggested that voluntary disclosure 
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not only serves as a potential tool of social legitimacy but can also enhance firm 
performance (Wang et al. 2016) and the current study seeks to extend this research 
agenda. 
 While there is limited research focusing on voluntary disclosure in 
developing countries, this particular field of research is increasing (Ali et al. 2017; 
Abeysekera 2008; Ahmed Haji & Mubaraq 2012; Andrew et al. 1989; Sobhani et 
al. 2009). The bulk of this research has occurred since 2000 (Abdolmohammadi 
2005; Abeysekera & Guthrie 2005; Eng & Mak 2003; Haniffa & Cooke 2005; 
Haniffa & Cooke 2002; Ho & Wong 2001; Jusoh et al. 2017) and there are still 
many avenues to investigate. In particular, Bangladesh has received limited 
attention and insights into voluntary disclosure in Bangladesh will contribute to the 
wider literature on voluntary disclosure.  
Bangladesh is a developing country situated in the region of South Asia and 
became an independent country in 1971. Bangladesh is a unitary and sovereign 
republic known as the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. The area known as 
Bangladesh was colonized by the British in 1757. British rule led to some practices 
that continue to prevail in the corporate culture of Bangladesh. Bangladesh was 
established on the four pillars of nationalism, secularism, democracy and socialism, 
although Bangladesh was under military rule for 15 years (1976‒1991) and 
democracy was restored in 1991 (Kabeer et al. 2012; White 1992). Within 
Bangladesh, the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party are major 
political parties. From a religious perspective, the dominant religion is Islam (85% 
of total population) while other religions like Hinduism, Buddhism and Christianity 
are also present in Bangladesh. Despite being the third largest Muslim country in 
the world, sharia law is not the source of public law in Bangladesh and a democratic 
government is in place (Hasan 2011). Hence, although there are followers or 
various religions, a considerable degree of religious harmony prevails.  
It should be noted that over the last few decades, the economy of 
Bangladesh has made commendable progress, with consistent growth in GDP.1 
                                                          
1 Chapter Four presents detailed discussion on the Bangladesh economy  
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Similar to other developing countries, foreign investment plays a vital role 
in the Bangladesh economy. In particular, pressure from external authorities like 
international regulators and foreign investors play a key role for corporate 
accountability and reporting multinational firms (Belal & Owen 2007; Imam & 
Malik 2007; Islam & Deegan 2008; Muttakin & Khan 2014).  Due to a relatively 
stable economy2 and substantial progress in poverty  reduction,3 Bangladesh is 
considered a model for developing countries.4 However, Bangladesh is subject to 
criticism due to widespread povery, inefficient government (UK Border Agency 
2012; Begum et al. 2012), poor socio-cultural indicators,  corruption at varying 
levels (Azmat & Samaratunge 2009; Islam & Deegan 2008), and weak enforcement 
of the law. The Bangladeshi government is seeking to resolve these challenges by 
considering several initiatives from a social perspective5 as well as a regulatory 
context.6   
Therefore, this study will apply two significant streams of investigation into 
voluntary disclosure in a developing country context by studying the determinants 
and effects of voluntary disclosures with a focus on corporate governance 
characteristics and firm performance in Bangladesh. A foundation for this study is 
developed in the remaining sections of this chapter. It is structured as follows.  
Section 1.2 discusses the motivation for this study. Section 1.3 presents the 
research questions for this study. Section 1.4 elaborates on the contribution made 
by this study. Section 1.5 presents the framework of this thesis by giving a brief 
outline of each chapter. Finally, Section 1.6 provides a summary and conclusion of 
this chapter.  
1.2. Motivations for the Study 
In the last few decades, financial crises and corporate collapses have been 
witnessed within developed (e.g., Enron) and developing (e.g., Asian financial 
                                                          
2 http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2017/05/14/bangladesh-development-update-
breaking-barriers visited 26/03/2018 6..38 pm 
3 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/bangladesh/overview visited 26/03/2018 6..37 pm 
4 https://asiafoundation.org/2014/06/25/bangladeshs-development-surprise-a-model-for-
developing-countries/ visited 26/03/2018 6..31 pm  
5 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/bangladesh/overview visited 26/03/2018 10.08 am 
6 http://www.secbd.org/ visited 26/03/2018 9.50 am  
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crisis) regions of the world. The reasons for these crises are often attributed to poor 
corporate governance, transparency and disclosure practices (Arnold & De Lange 
2004; Gul & Leung 2004; Haniffa & Hudaib 2006; Ntim et al. 2012). Voluntary 
disclosure is considered as a means of contributing to the transparency of a firm. 
Given the importance of corporate reform in light of the financial crises and 
corporate collapses referred to above, corporate governance and voluntary 
disclosure have attracted much attention from policymakers and academics 
(Aguilera & Cuervo‐Cazurra 2009; Brown et al. 2011; Brown et al. 2006; Samaha 
et al. 2015).  
In response to a recent share market collapse, Bangladesh reformed its 
corporate governance guidelines and also reformed the Bangladesh Securities and 
Exchange Commission (BSEC) to boost the confidence of investors.7 This suggests 
corporate governance might be a significant explanatory factor to address problems 
of transparency and establish best practices relating to voluntary disclosure. While 
engaging in these agendas, the issue of maintaining firm performance is also an 
imperative that is balanced or harmonized with practices of voluntary disclosure. 
While the management and production of voluntary disclosure may incur additional 
costs, a lack of information may warrant negative responses from investors that can 
hinder a company’s ability to thrive. Investigation of these contrasting elements, 
therefore, is of interest to academics, policymakers, public and private sector 
organizations, and stakeholders. This study investigates the determinants and 
effects of voluntary disclosure with a focus on corporate governance characteristics 
and firm performance within the context of Bangladesh. This area of research has 
been selected for the following reasons. 
First, studies in the prior literature consider particular categories of 
voluntary disclosure independently and apply empirical analyses to social (Choi et 
al. 2010; Haji 2013; Haniffa & Cooke 2005; Islam & Deegan 2008; Mishra & Suar 
2010; Muttakin & Khan 2014), environmental (Halme & Huse 1997; Montabon et 
al. 2007; Rao et al. 2012), or intellectual capital disclosures (Abdolmohammadi 
2005; Abeysekera 2007; Hidalgo et al. 2011; Li et al. 2008). Others combine one 
                                                          
7 http://www.secbd.org/Order%20relating%20to%20Corporate%20Governance%20Guidelines-
9%20Jan06.9%20Jan06.pdf Visited 2/06/2015 6.20PM 
http://www.secbd.org/Revised%20of%20CG%20Guidlines%20BD.pdf Visited 2/06/2015 6.36PM 
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or two categories only (Hackston & Milne 1996; Hossain et al. 2006; Khlif et al. 
2015; Qiu et al. 2016), while some do not differentiate between categories (Chau & 
Gray 2002; Eng & Mak 2003). Limiting the focus to a particular category inhibits 
an understanding of the bigger picture. Similarly, it is argued that categorizing 
voluntary disclosure allows various stakeholders, who may have a stake in the study 
or firm, to select their own relevant types of information while ignoring others 
(Meek et al. 1995). This focus is worthwhile in given contexts but may not service 
a broader range of users and may not provide accurate guidance when it comes to 
policy development or implementation. There are limited studies that focus on 
combined social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosures within a single 
study and, in particular, no such study examines the Bangladeshi context for 
combined disclosure.  
Second, exploration of the determinants of voluntary disclosure is an 
interesting field as these practices are not enforced vigorously by policymakers and 
accounting standard-setters. By considering the monitoring and controlling role of 
corporate governance, a significant number of prior studies stress corporate 
governance characteristics as a potential determinant of voluntary disclosure. It 
should also be noted that the results of the relationship between corporate 
governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure are not yet conclusive (Garcia-
Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2010; Samaha et al. 2015). Furthermore, research from 
a corporate governance perspective is subject to limitations due to an endogeneity 
problem and this issue is not addressed widely (Larcker et al. 2007; Larcker & 
Rusticus 2007, 2010). In addition, although, there are a large number of prior 
studies that focus on corporate governance as a determinant of voluntary disclosure, 
a change in the context of the study (i.e., data selection, country and methodology) 
provides an opportunity to create a richer base of evidence (Brown et al. 2011).  
Third, as mentioned previously, examining the effects of voluntary 
disclosure on firm performance is considered to be a significant agenda. Within 
business, firms must always focus on output, profitability and innovation while not 
breaking their social licence to operate. From a purely economic perspective, the 
foremost purpose of a firm is to be profitable. The absence or neglect of voluntary 
disclosure may convey a negative message that the firm is not interested in social 
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or environmental imperatives. In contrast, managing voluntary disclosure is subject 
to additional costs and too much disclosure can reveal confidential information 
about a firm’s operations that may influence its ability to thrive in a competitive 
market. A large number of prior studies has stressed the effects of voluntary 
disclosure on firm performance and the results are not yet considered to be 
conclusive (Orlitzky et al. 2003; Qiu et al. 2016; Ribeiro Soriano et al. 2012), due 
to various factors, including the perceived limitations of  statistical analyses to 
examine the relationship between disclosure and firm performance (Al-Tuwaijri et 
al. 2004; Garcia-Castro et al. 2010) and the challenges associated with the selection 
of appropriate indicators of firm performance (Griffin & Mahon 1997; Lu et al. 
2014; Orlitzky et al. 2003). Categories of firm performance measurements (i.e., 
accounting-based, market-based and mixed) are also subject to limitations (Richard 
et al. 2009) as every indicator has distinct features. Results from one indicator might 
therefore be conflated with other indicators. Therefore, a further study that 
addresses these limitations using different contexts may provide significant insight 
and make a unique contribution to the literature. 
Fourth, it may be assumed that within developing country contexts, 
disclosures in annual reports may be less significant as poverty, corruption, social 
inequalities and mismanagement, small capital market and weak regulations 
represent significant obstacles. This perception is reinforced by the observation that 
developed countries have received much more attention in the literature than 
developing countries. However, in recent times, an increasing trend towards 
voluntary disclosure has been observed (Haji 2013; Sobhani et al. 2009). Studies 
focusing on developing countries have the potential to provide significant 
contributions for policymakers (Abeysekera & Guthrie 2005; Eng & Mak 2003; 
Haniffa & Cooke 2002) as Western concepts of accounting are not appropriate for 
less developed regions (Disu & Gray 1998). Further, most prior studies in 
developing countries are limited to a few countries, including China (Huafang & 
Jianguo 2007; Zeng et al. 2012), Malaysia (Haji 2013; Haniffa & Cooke 2005; 
Haniffa & Cooke 2002) and Singapore (Cheng et al. 2014; Cheng & Courtenay 
2006; Eng & Mak 2003).  
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Finally, among developing countries, voluntary disclosure in the 
Bangladeshi context is of greater significance than that of other developing 
countries, in particular, the three categories of voluntary disclosure mentioned 
earlier – social, environmental and intellectual capital. This is because the 
Bangladeshi economy has experienced significant growth of nearly 6% per year in 
the past decade. A recent report from the World Bank8 and PWC9 also forecasts 
that Bangladesh will be one of the emerging economies within a few decades. 
Accordingly, the Bangladeshi government is keen to improve social conditions at 
both micro and macro levels.10 As a result, firms from Bangladesh may consider 
social disclosure as a means to legitimize firm activities, especially as it attempts to 
meet the needs of a range of global stakeholders. Bangladesh also has unique 
environmental characteristics that influence its environmental disclosures as it is 
subject to many natural disasters (Belal et al. 2010), such as rising sea levels and 
frequent major cyclones. Furthermore, policymakers in Bangladesh have been 
active in initiating several activities to encourage and enforce transparency among 
firms to protect shareholders’ interests. For example, in 2006 BSEC introduced a 
new corporate governance rule enforcing mandatory corporate governance 
disclosure by the year 2012 to improve overall disclosure and protect shareholders’ 
interests. 11  Therefore, voluntary disclosure carries more significance in 
Bangladesh. However, despite this there is a dearth of studies that emphasize the 
effects of voluntary disclosure. In addition, limited studies examine the 
determinants of voluntary disclosure with a focus on a particular category (social, 
environmental and intellectual capital disclosure). It should be noted that most of 
these are limited to data before 2010 12  while very little is known after 2010. 
Moreover, most studies from Bangladesh cover a small sample limited to one 
sector. Thus, there is ample opportunity to contribute to the literature in the 
Bangladeshi context by considering data after 2010 and multiple years and sectors, 
as well as applying a rigorous statistical approach.  
                                                          
8 https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2016/04/30/bangladesh-development-update-bangladesh-
economy-requires-focus-on-sustainable-and-inclusive-growth-moving-forward 
9 http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/the-economy/assets/world-in-2050-february-2015.pdf 
10 http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/04/13/bangladesh-development-update-slower-
yet-healthy-growth-with-remarkable-development-progress  
11 http://www.secbd.org/Order%20relating%20to%20Corporate%20Governance%20Guidelines-
9%20Jan06.pdf Visited 2/06/2015 6.20PM 
12 The Bangladesh share market faced a severe share market collapse in 2009–2010. 
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 Based on the above, it is concluded that the examination of voluntary 
disclosure is important in developing country contexts, compared to developed 
countries where such practices are well established. What little is known about 
voluntary disclosure in developing contexts is compounded by the scarcity of 
studies. Therefore, there is an opportunity to contribute to the literature by 
addressing those issues and Bangladesh is a prime investigatory context.   
1.3 Research Questions  
The central research question of this study is: ‘What are the determinants 
and effects of voluntary disclosure of firms in the Bangladeshi context?’  
To address this, two sub-questions are addressed in this thesis. See Figure 
1-1 for a graphical representation of the basic research framework of this study. 
 
Figure 1-1 Research framework for this study 
 
The two research questions addressed in this thesis are as follows: 
1. To what extent do corporate governance characteristics affect voluntary 
disclosure of social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosures 
in Bangladesh listed firms? 
2. To what extent does voluntary disclosure affect firm performance in 
Bangladeshi listed firms?  
  
1.4 Contributions of this Study 
The current study seeks to understand the determinants and effects of 
voluntary disclosure by synthesizing the concepts of corporate governance, 
voluntary disclosure and firm performance located in the literature. It is expected 
that this study contributes to the literature in several ways. 
Corporate 
Governance 
Characterstics
Voluntary Dislcosure
Social 
Environmental
Intellectual Capital
Firm 
Performance 
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First, it determines the explanatory factors of voluntary disclosure whilst 
simultaneously showing the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance in 
Bangladeshi listed companies. Regarding the determinants and effects of voluntary 
disclosure, most prior studies limit the focus either to determinants (Garcia-Meca 
& Sánchez-Ballesta 2010; Samaha et al. 2015) or effects (Molina-Azorín et al. 
2009; Orlitzky et al. 2003) of voluntary disclosure. In particular, this study 
integrates three perspectives: (1) corporate governance; (2) voluntary disclosure; 
and (3) financial performance using quantitative methods. This study offers a more 
complete picture as it is presumed that during the decision-making process 
pertaining to voluntary disclosure, firms also assess the potential effect on 
performance. This warrants attention, particularly as Bangladesh seeks to move 
toward a more flexible and active economy. Thus, this study extends the literature 
by considering all three aspects – social, environmental and intellectual capital 
disclosures. In addition, this study considers data following the share market crash 
in Bangladesh. The findings of this study may have practical implications for 
regulatory authorities and policymakers, such as the Bangladesh Securities and 
Exchange Commission, the Stock Exchanges, the Institute of Cost and Management 
Accountants of Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute and the Bangladesh 
Bank. 
Second, the study contributes to the literature by adopting a combined 
theoretical framework to interpret the empirical findings and to understand the 
underpinnings of corporate governance, voluntary disclosure and firm performance 
in depth in a developing country context. In so doing, this study reviews existing 
theoretical frameworks and finds that a combination of several theories may be 
effective for guiding voluntary disclosure studies. Although, An et al. (2011) is 
considered as a pioneering study in considering interrelated concepts by developing 
a combined theoretical model, this study develops a modified theoretical framework 
by considering agency, legitimacy and signalling theory in a developing country 
context. This is the first attempt to adopt a combined theoretical framework for 
various voluntary disclosures including social, environmental and intellectual 
capital disclosure to explore the determinants and effects of voluntary disclosure in 
a developing country context.  
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Third, this study extends the voluntary disclosure literature by categorizing 
social and environmental disclosure from three different perspectives: long-term, 
short-term, and general disclosure. Prior studies have mainly concentrated on an 
assessment of disclosures by considering operational constructs (Belal et al. 2010; 
Hackston & Milne 1996; Kamal & Deegan 2013; Khan et al. 2013). Since voluntary 
disclosure is also considered as a strategic tool for the firm because it has the 
potential to develop competitive advantage (Mishra & Suar 2010), consideration of 
a strategic management view for the long or short term (Banks & Wheelwright 
1979) is a useful insight (Carroll 1991). Therefore, this study extends the literature 
by aligning strategic management concepts to the current literature on voluntary 
disclosure.  
Fourth, this study investigates the relationship between corporate 
governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure; and, by combining social, 
environmental and intellectual capital disclosures it extends the extant literature. It 
also extends the understanding of this relationship by considering other 
characteristics of corporate governance13 that have not been considered within the 
Bangladeshi context. In addition, for corporate governance-related studies, 
endogeneity is considered to be a major pitfall (Larcker et al. 2007; Larcker & 
Rusticus 2007), however this study’s approach eliminates this problem. 
Furthermore, the period of data used for this study incorporates data from after 
Bangladesh’s share market crash, which is an under-utilized data set.   
Finally, this study investigates the effects of voluntary disclosure from 
Bangladesh – an under-researched context. Three categories of firm performance 
indicators – accounting, market-based and mixed – are used, in contrast to most 
other studies that consider only one or two (Brine et al. 2007; Hossain et al. 2015; 
Lima Crisóstomo et al. 2011).This study proceeds with five indicators of firm 
performance – Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Sales (ROS), Market 
Capitalization (MCAP), Earnings per Share (EPS) and Tobin’s Q. This selection 
covers all three categories of performance indicators and reports a consistent result. 
                                                          
13 This study considers sub-committee and audit committee independence while these have not 
previously been examined within a Bangladeshi context. In addition, consideration of institutional 
ownership is also very limited within Bangladesh.  
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Thus, this study makes an important contribution to the literature based on its 
methodological approach, conceptual base and statistical techniques employed.  
1.5 Organizations of the Thesis 
Figure 1-2 illustrates the structure of the thesis. Chapter Two reviews the 
literature on voluntary disclosure, corporate governance characteristics and 
financial performance. It reviews voluntary disclosure studies within the context of 
developed, developing and Bangladeshi contexts before discussing the literature on 
the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and voluntary 
disclosure from developed, developing and Bangladeshi perspectives. After 
reviewing the literature, the significance of the characteristics of corporate 
governance are isolated and selected for this study. Finally, the literature on the 
effects of voluntary disclosures on firm performance is reviewed from developed, 
developing and Bangladeshi contexts. Some significant indicators of firm 
performance are isolated, deemed important, justified and nominated for this study.  
Chapter Three discusses the theoretical underpinnings related to the 
research questions of this study. Prior studies that involve single and combined 
theories are reviewed.  An et al.’s (2011) theoretical framework, which combines 
agency, legitimacy, stakeholder and signalling theories, is considered the most 
appropriate model.  This theoretical framework is modified by deleting stakeholder 
theory to fit the context of this study.  
Chapter Four describes the background of Bangladesh from historical, 
economic, legal and regulatory perspectives. In addition, corporate voluntary 
disclosure, capital market and corporate governance settings in Bangladesh are 
described in the chapter. Then, relevant hypotheses are developed to examine the 
determinants and effects of voluntary disclosure.  
Chapter Five elaborates on the data and methodology for this study. The 
data set considers top 200 listed firms on the Dhaka Stock Exchange. Based on data 
availability the final sample includes 134 annual reports of listed companies 
between the years 2011 and 2014. Voluntary disclosure and corporate governance 
characteristics data are based on the years 2011 to 2013 while firm performance 
covers the years 2012 to 2014. A detailed description of the measurement process 
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of the entire independent, dependent and control variables follows. Two research 
models are developed. The first model emphasizes the determinants of voluntary 
disclosure while the other focuses on the effects of voluntary disclosure.14 These 
models are addressed sequentially in Chapter Five. In addition, various statistical 
tests, including assumptions of normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, 
endogeneity and descriptive tests are outlined and applied before proceeding with 
the analysis. Pooled ordinary least squares and two stage least squares regressions 
are then discussed and applied. The chapter concludes with a discussion of 
robustness tests to ensure the rigour of the findings.  
Chapter Six presents the results of the analysis of the relationship between 
corporate governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure. Initially, it presents 
the results of descriptive statistics, normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity 
and endogeneity tests for the research model. It finds that CEO Duality and Director 
Ownership are negatively associated with voluntary disclosure while Foreign 
Ownership, Sub-committee, and Audit Committee Composition are positively 
associated. However, no significant relationship is found for Board Size, Board 
Composition or Institutional Ownership. 
Chapter Seven demonstrates the results of the effects of voluntary 
disclosure on firm performance. Consistent with the previous chapter, the results of 
descriptive statistics, assumptions of normality, multicollinearity, 
heteroscedasticity and endogeneity tests for the research model are scrutinized. It 
is found that voluntary disclosures of a firm have a positive effect on financial 
performance by considering ROA, MCAP, EPS and Tobin’s Q as relevant 
indicators. However, no significant effects are found regarding ROS. 
Chapter Eight provides a summary of the main results and discussions on 
the findings of the research in relation to the research questions. The section 
presents a discussion of the findings of this chapter and draws a comparison with 
the prior literature. It highlights the contribution of this study in the context of 
Bangladesh and the overall contribution to the literature. Finally, the conclusion 
                                                          
14 Research model 1: Relationship between corporate governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure by 
considering corporate governance characteristics as an independent variable. 
Research model 2: The effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance by considering voluntary 
disclosures as an independent variable. 
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and recommendations from the empirical analysis, along with the limitations of the 
study, are outlined. Directions for future research are also extrapolated based on 
these findings. 
 
Figure 1-2 Thesis structure 
1.6 Summary and Conclusion  
This chapter presented an introduction to the topic of investigation focusing 
on the determinants and effects of voluntary disclosure and their relationship with 
corporate governance characteristics and financial performance in the context of 
Bangladesh. The motivations, research questions and contributions of the study 
were discussed. Finally, an overview of the remaining chapters was also presented.  
Thesis Structure 
Chapter One
Introduction
Chapter Two
Literature Review 
Chapter Three
Theoretical Framework
Chapter Four
Research Context & Hypotheses Development
Chapter Five
Research Methodology
Chapter Six
Results: The Relationship between Corporate 
Governance Characteristics and Voluntary Disclosure
Chapter Seven 
Results: The Effects of Voluntary Disclosure on Firm 
Performance
Chapter Eight 
Summary and Conclusion
16 
 
There are several factors that motivate this study. First, there is a dearth of 
studies that combine significant categories of voluntary disclosures (social, 
environmental and intellectual capital) compared to studies that examine these 
categories independently. A study that combines these three categories will 
contribute to a more thorough understanding of corporate voluntary disclosure.  
Second, literature regarding the relationship between voluntary disclosures 
is contradictory at present. A further study that utilizes a more in-depth data set, 
addresses methodological limitations and considers an important context where 
there is currently a scarcity of research will extend the current literature.  
Third, research into the effects of voluntary disclosures on firm performance 
has also yielded contradictory results. As above, a study that considers a wide range 
of firm performance indicators, addresses methodological limitations and considers 
an under-researched context will extend the current literature.  
Fourth, voluntary disclosure studies have mostly focused on developed 
countries. However, an increasing focus on voluntary disclosure in developing 
countries is also required. It has been noted that, given the poor socio-economic 
context existing in certain developing nations, firms tend to ignore voluntary 
disclosure-related agendas but there may be an opportunity to put the concept into 
practice and leverage this opportunity to benefit both organizations and the society 
in which they operate.  
Finally, among various developing countries, Bangladesh carries extra 
significance for social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosures due to 
recent economic developments and share market crashes. There are limited studies 
in this area and most prior studies apply limited samples and methodological rigour. 
A data set retrieved after the share market crash that covers a wide range of sectors 
will contribute valuable findings and extend the literature.   
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this study is to investigate the determinants and effects of 
voluntary disclosure with a focus on corporate governance characteristics and firm 
performance in a developing country context. Disclosures of a firm are mainly 
categorized as mandatory and voluntary. In the context of mandatory disclosure, a 
firm must comply with the rules and regulations imposed by a range of authorities, 
including accounting standard-setters. In contrast, voluntary disclosures are at the 
discretion of firms as there is minimal regulation to guide voluntary disclosures. 
There is a lack of specific national guidelines for voluntary disclosure, therefore, 
firms’ annual reports should be considered from multiple perspectives to ascertain 
what voluntary disclosures are made and how and why firms make these 
disclosures.  
From the firm’s perspective, voluntary disclosure complements mandatory 
disclosure (Graham et al. 2005). Voluntary disclosure is considered as an effective 
way to communicate with stakeholders and also an opportunity to create a good 
impression by disclosing positive social, environmental and intellectual capital 
information. In so doing, every firm needs to consider the potential impacts of any 
negative impression created by the absence of disclosures, which could be 
interpreted as hiding or ignoring information. However, too much disclosure can 
reveal information about a firm’s operations that may influence its ability to thrive 
in a competitive advantage or bargaining power in various contexts (Admati and 
Pfleiderer 2000). Given these conditions, it can become difficult to determine a 
firm’s intentions about voluntary disclosures. 
Before conducting any investigation, it is essential to carry out a review of 
the relevant literature to extend the understanding of the relevant research agenda. 
Bruce (2001, p. 1) states that:  
Completing a literature review is usually a significant intellectual 
achievement in its own right, requiring the analysis and synthesis of 
previous work in such a manner that new understandings of that work are 
uncovered and the way is opened for new scholarship or research.  
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As has been stated in Chapter One, this study will primarily investigate two research 
questions. The first question addresses the determinants of voluntary disclosure by 
considering corporate governance characteristics as a potential influential factor. 
The second question prompts an examination of the effects of voluntary disclosure 
on firm performance. Accordingly, the literature review is conducted in three 
stages. First, prior studies pertaining to voluntary disclosure are reviewed. Prior 
voluntary disclosure studies will be further categorized into developed, developing 
and Bangladeshi contexts. Second, literature on the relationship between corporate 
governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure is reviewed and divided into 
meta-analysis studies, studies from developed/developing countries and studies in 
the Bangladeshi context. Finally, the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm 
performance are reviewed by categorizing into meta-analysis studies, studies from 
developed/ developing countries and studies in the Bangladeshi context.  
The chapter is organized in the following manner. Section 2.2 reviews the 
literature on voluntary disclosure studies. Section 2.3 reviews prior studies 
regarding the relationship between corporate governance characteristics 
(determinant) and voluntary disclosure across three areas as described above and 
summarizes the corporate governance characteristics chosen for this thesis. This is 
followed by Section 2.4, which reviews studies regarding the effects of voluntary 
disclosure on firm performance and summarizes the firm performance indicators 
considered for this thesis. Finally, the chapter summary and conclusion is presented 
in Section 2.5. 
 
2.2 Voluntary Disclosure Studies  
 Wallace and Naser (1995) assert that unregulated disclosures of financial 
and non-financial information to stakeholders are to be considered voluntary. In 
addition, voluntary disclosure is also considered an effective means of 
communication with various stakeholders. Therefore, providing extra information 
to these stakeholders that is not required by regulation is also considered to be 
voluntary disclosure. 
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Investigations of voluntary disclosure in the context of accounting research 
are not new, with the first such study of developed countries undertaken by Cerf 
(1961). However, within developing countries, attention was not given to voluntary 
disclosure until the mid-1980s (Andrew et al. 1989; Teoh & Thong 1984). Since 
then, a dramatic upsurge in voluntary disclosure studies has been witnessed in 
developed as well as developing countries. It is claimed that a lack of adequate 
disclosures was one of the significant reasons for the Asian financial crisis (Gul & 
Leung 2004) and corporate collapses, such as Enron (Arnold & De Lange 2004). 
Therefore, an increasing trend of investigating voluntary disclosures is observed.  
In the following, studies on voluntary disclosure are reviewed in three sub-sections: 
studies within developed countries in Sub-section 2.2.1, other developing countries 
in Sub-section 2.2.2 and within the Bangladeshi context in Sub-section 2.2.3. 
2.2.1 Voluntary Disclosure Studies within Developed Countries 
A significant number of prior studies has been conducted to examine 
voluntary disclosure within various developed country contexts. Developed 
countries have played a leading role in this type of research with a wide 
consideration of social, environmental and intellectual capital considered as 
significant voluntary disclosure.   
In relation to disclosure practices, Gray et al. (1995) report a substantial 
change in the pattern of social and environmental disclosures for UK firms during 
the period 1979 to 1991. Campbell (2000) provides further evidence of the growing 
trend of social disclosures after analysing data contained within the annual reports 
of the UK firm Marks and Spencer for the period 1969 to 1997. This study 
concludes that a substantial increase in social disclosures had occurred. Hartman et 
al. (2007) compare 16 multinational firms in the United States (US) and the 
European Union (EU) in regards to social reporting by focusing on language, 
citizenship, corporate accountability, and moral commitments like ethical context. 
They reported that, within US firms, the focus of voluntary disclosure was limited 
to economic terms. On the other hand, firms from the EU placed an emphasis on 
both economic and sustainability issues.  
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  For environmental disclosure practices, Deegan and Gordon (1996) 
contribute to a more detailed understanding of voluntary disclosure by considering 
firms in Australia. This study reveals three significant issues. First, firms are 
inclined to promote positive aspects of their environmental performance while 
negative disclosures are ignored. Second, an increasing trend of environmental 
disclosures has been reported from 1980 to 1991. Finally, the extent of 
environmental disclosure is positively associated with environmental lobby groups' 
concerns regarding the environmental performance of firms within particular 
industries. Studying Spanish firms, Larrinaga et al. (2002) assert that environmental 
disclosure is very low. By comparing political motives with disclosures in financial 
reporting, they also observe regulation may not motivate the development of 
environmental responsibility. This has theoretical implications for this thesis, which 
is based on the assumption that firms have a tendency to overlook formal 
accountabilities that do not contribute to a firm’s social legitimacy. Campbell 
(2004) considers environmental disclosures based on ten UK firms across five 
sectors between the years 1974 and 2000, finding further evidence for the increasing 
trend of voluntary environmental disclosures following rapid growth in the late 
1980s and continuing into the 1990s. 
 For intellectual capital practices, Guthrie and Petty (2000) assert that from 
an Australian perspective the main components were not well understood and 
managed in an efficient manner, as well as not reported within a consistent 
framework. This study also reports that the main focus for disclosures is allocated 
to human capital-related issues while other matters are given less attention. In 
contrast, Sujan and Abeysekera (2007) report an increase in intellectual capital 
disclosures in Australia. Their conclusions are based on comparison of data from 
2004 with the data used by Guthrie and Petty (2000). Abeysekera (2007) conducts 
a comparison between intellectual capital disclosures from a developing country 
(Sri Lanka) and a developed country (Australia) using data from the period 1998–
1999 to 1999–2000. It should be noted that, regarding Australian disclosure data, 
this study relies on the data set from Guthrie and Petty (2000). The results of the 
Abeysekera (2007) study suggest that the internal capital disclosure level is higher 
in Australia compared to Sri Lanka, except for human capital in which the opposite 
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is the case. It is argued that differences in economic, social, and political factors 
might cause such differences in disclosure levels.  
From the above discussion it can be extrapolated that voluntary disclosure 
(social, environmental and intellectual capital) research within developed countries 
has received significant and ongoing attention (Al-Shaer et al. 2017; Appuhami & 
Tashakor 2017; Pisano et al. 2017). 
2.2.2 Voluntary Disclosure Studies within Developing Countries  
At the earlier stage of voluntary disclosure research, developing country 
contexts were less explored (Teoh & Thong 1984). However, the limited results 
from these studies have contributed to a richer understanding of the research topic. 
It should also be noted that most of the prior studies from developing countries are 
limited to Malaysia, China and Singapore.  
 In relation to social disclosure practice, Andrew et al. (1989) examine 119 
listed firms in Malaysia and Singapore in 1983 and reveal that the focus of social 
disclosures is limited to larger firms only. In contrast, considering data from more 
recent years, Tsang (1998) suggests that a growing trend of social disclosure has 
been observed from the years 1986 to 1995 within the banking, hotel, and food and 
beverages sectors of Singaporean firms. Similarly, Haji (2013) reports an increase 
in the extent and quality of social disclosure after examining 85 Malaysian firms 
between the years 2006 to 2009. Based on a sample of firms from China, Noronha 
et al. (2013) report that the practice of social disclosure is still in its infancy and 
lags behind Western countries.  
Regarding environmental disclosures, Nik Ahmad and Sulaiman (2004) 
report that there is very limited environmental disclosure for Malaysian firms. 
Considering a later longitudinal study, Alrazi et al. (2009) assert that there is an 
increasing trend of environmental disclosures in Malaysia.  
Within the context of intellectual capital disclosures, a significant number 
of studies from various countries also report an increasing trend. Ahmed Haji and 
Mubaraq (2012) assert that intellectual capital disclosures for Nigerian firms in the 
banking sector have increased over time. This study reveals that, in terms of 
intellectual capital, a major proportion of voluntary disclosure is dominated by 
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human and internal capital. In the Malaysian context, Haji and Ghazali (2013) 
indicate that external capital-related information dominates firms’ voluntary 
disclosure practices. Abeysekera and Guthrie (2005) also conclude that there is an 
increasing trend for intellectual capital disclosures for Sri Lankan firms. This study 
considers 30 top listed firms from 1998–1999 to 1999–2000. 
Overall, consistent with developed countries, an increasing trend towards 
voluntary disclosure is observed, and the level of voluntary disclosure is increasing. 
Bangladesh represents one such developing nation with a patchy history of 
voluntary disclosure, and this is explored in the following section.  
2.2.3 Voluntary Disclosure Studies within Bangladesh  
Voluntary disclosure within the context of Bangladesh began in the late 
1990s (Belal 1997; Belal 1999; Ahmed 1996). Ahmed’s (1996) research plays a 
pioneering role in disclosure research within Bangladesh by examining the extent 
of disclosure and the relationship with firm characterstics. After comparing the 
dislcosure level for 1987‒1988 and 1992‒1993 for 118 non-financial public listed 
firms, Ahmed reports that there is a very low level of voluntary disclosure. In 
addition, it was found that the extent of disclosure had improved when comparing 
the years. Furthermore, multinational firms and firms audited by  large auit firms 
dislcose more when compared to other firms. However, no significant relationship 
was found for company size and total amount of debt. Since then, various studies 
have contributed to the literature regarding voluntary disclosure with major 
attention being placed on social disclosure. 
 In the last century, very limited social disclosure for Bangladeshi firms 
occurred and was mainly based on employees and related to ethics (Belal 1999). 
Imam (2000) investigates 40 firms for the years 1996–1997, finding that social 
disclosure was limited and insufficient for discharging social responsibilities. He 
further adds that only firms with superior performance express a clear intention to 
disclose social issues. Belal (2001) examines social disclosures and supports the 
previous findings, showing that limited social disclosure takes place in practice. 
Similarly, Kamal and Deegan (2013) report disclosures by firms in the garment 
industry falling well short of international expectations. Similarly, Khan et al. 
(2009) investigate the banking sector in Bangladesh and find only perfunctory 
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social disclosure by firms. Azim et al. (2009) also support these findings by 
demonstrating that the banking sector discloses more social issues compared to 
other industries. Similarly, Al Mamun and Kamardin (2014) report that there is an 
increasing trend for corporate voluntary disclosures within the banking sector in 
Bangladesh.  
In the context of environmental disclosures in Bangladesh, Belal (2000) 
reports limited disclosure in his examination of 30 firms in 1996. Similarly, Bala 
and Yusuf (2003) suggest that very few firms disclose environmental information 
in Bangladesh. In addition, they reveal a lack of regulation is the key reason for the 
scarcity of environmental disclosure, although the specific reasons are not 
discussed. Consistent with these findings Bose’s (2006) study of Petrobangla (a 
firm from the fossil fuel sector in Bangladesh) also reports a limited focus on 
environmental initiatives. Similarly, Belal et al. (2010) reveal limited 
environmental and climate change disclosures in their investigation of the 100 
largest firms for the year 2008. Therefore, overall there is a lower level of 
environmental disclosure within firms in Bangladesh, although Sobhani et al. 
(2009) argue that the situation had been improving.  
In regards to intellectual capital disclosures in Bangladesh, there seems to be limited 
disclosure. However, a few studies have attempted to investigate this phenomenon. 
Ali et al. (2008) examine 22 listed non-financial firms and report that minimal 
qualitative disclosures are evident. Similarly, Khan and Khan (2010) report an 
insufficient level of human capital disclosures after examining 32 manufacturing 
firms in Bangladesh. In addition, they find within human capital, employee related 
information, such as numbers of employees, training, recruitment policies and 
career related information, like career development, receives more attention than 
other categories. In addtion, it is also observed that the extent of reporting has also 
increased due to intervention from regulators. Abhayawansa and Azim (2014) find 
that intellectual capital reporting is not consistent among the 16 pharmaceutical 
firms in their sample in Bangladesh. Therefore, Bangladeshi firms lag in regards to 
managing intellectual capital, although Rashid (2013) concludes from a study of 
136 non-financial firms there appears to be an increasing trend of intellectual capital 
disclosures.  
24 
 
The above discussion indicates that voluntary disclosures, including social, 
environmental and intellectual capital disclosures, are not well documented or 
researched in the Bangladeshi context as most of the studies are limited to a small 
sample size and do not consider all industry sectors. Prior studies have indicated a 
limited but increasing trend of voluntary disclosures, suggesting they are becoming 
more significant. 
2.3 Corporate Governance Characteristics (Determinants) and 
Voluntary Disclosure Studies 
Voluntary disclosure is not enforceable and therefore relies solely on the 
willingness of management and is influenced by the desire, motive and perception 
of persons within the organization who are involved with control, monitoring and 
decision making (Garcia-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2010; Samaha et al. 2015). 
These factors are moderated by the corporate governance characteristics of the firm 
(Dalton et al. 1998; Dalton et al. 1999; Fama & Jensen 1983). Accordingly, it could 
also be argued that corporate governance characteristics play a significant role in 
decisions pertaining to voluntary disclosure. Consistent with this argument, a 
substantial number of studies documents that corporate governance characteristics 
act as an explanatory factor for voluntary disclosure (Garcia-Meca & Sánchez-
Ballesta 2010; Khlif et al. 2016; Khlif & Souissi 2010; Samaha et al. 2015).  
The Cadbury Report (1992) defines corporate governance as the system by 
which companies are directed and controlled. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) extend 
this definition and state that corporate governance is an institutional arrangement 
by the finance providers of the firm (shareholders) to secure a proper return on 
investment. There is no single comprehensive definition of corporate governance, 
but these definitions, as with other definitions, emphasize that a firm is directed and 
controlled by corporate governance. Brown et al. (2011, p. 98) elaborate the concept 
of corporate governance:  
Corporate governance is about the governance of corporations, which may 
not be a particularly revealing statement from a definitional point of view 
but it does remind us that [corporate governance] is to do with corporations 
and it is also to do with determining the activities in which they are properly 
engaged. 
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Therefore, corporate governance can be succinctly defined as the process of 
administration, monitoring and control within a firm to assist in the ongoing goal 
of efficiency and accountability. Furthermore, the above definition suggests that 
corporate governance characteristics can reinforce monitoring and controlling 
activities and lead to a reduction in information asymmetry (Fama & Jensen 1983). 
In addition, Ho and Wong (2001) argue that if a firm has an intensive monitoring 
environment it is difficult for managers to withhold information or disclose false 
information. Further, it could also be argued that the characteristics of corporate 
governance can affect accountability of a firm (Cong & Freedman 2011) due to its 
monitoring and control mechanisms. Therefore, management or boards may 
discharge (ignore) accountability by providing (avoiding) additional information 
such as voluntary disclosure.  
Consistent with the above arguments, a large number of prior studies has 
documented that corporate governance characteristics act as an explanatory 
mechanism for voluntary disclosures of a firm and the trend continues (Garcia-
Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2010; Khlif et al. 2016; Khlif & Souissi 2010; Samaha 
et al. 2015). However, the results of prior studies are contradictory; it has been 
argued that changing the context of research (i.e., data selection, country, time and 
methodology) may present findings from a different perspective (Brown et al. 
2011). The following section reviews prior studies regarding the relationship 
between corporate governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure in detail 
according to prior meta-analysis studies, studies within other countries 
(develop/developing) and Bangladesh respectively. 
2.3.1 Relationship between Corporate Governance Characteristics and 
Voluntary Disclosure Meta–analysis 
For an in-depth understanding of the literature that considers the 
relationship between corporate governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure, 
several studies combine the findings of existing studies to draw a conclusion about 
the relationship. The key findings of those studies are summarized in Table 2.1.  
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Table 2-1 Summary of Meta-analysis of the relationship between corporate governance characteristics (determinant) and voluntary disclosure 
Year Authors Reviewed 
Papers 
Considered direction Results and additional comments 
Dependent: 
Disclosure 
Independent: Corporate 
Governance Characteristics  
2010 
Garcia-Meca & 
Sánchez-
Ballesta 
27 Voluntary Disclosure Board Independence (+) 
A positive relationship between board independence and voluntary 
disclosure occurs if there are high investor protection rights within the 
research context. 
There is a very limited study to explore the effects of CEO duality, audit 
committee, insider ownership and institutional ownership to voluntary 
disclosure.  
2010 Khlif & Souissi 16 Corporate Disclosure Audit Firm Size (+) 
This study fails to find any significant relationship between ownership 
dispersion and voluntary disclosure.  
Differences in culture and the organizational environment may have an 
impact on the observed dissimilar relationships. 
2015 Samaha et al.  64 Voluntary Disclosure  
Board Size (+) 
Board Composition (+) 
 Audit Committee (+)  
CEO Duality (-) 
Geographic location acts as a moderating factor for the relationship between 
board size, board composition, CEO duality and voluntary disclosure.  
 The relationship of voluntary disclosure with CEO duality and board 
composition might be moderated by disclosure type, and differences in 
definitions of explanatory variables. 
2016 Khlif et al. 69 Voluntary Disclosure 
State Ownership (+) 
Foreign Ownership (+) 
Institutional Ownership  
Managerial Ownership (-)  
Ownership Concentration (-) 
Owners of firms might vary with wealth constraints, competence, 
preferences and non-ownership ties to the firm. Such difference might also 
affect the firm disclosure.  
The relationship between ownership structure and voluntary disclosure is 
moderated by country- and firm-level governance mechanisms. 
2017 Ali et al. 76 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) 
Disclosure 
Corporate Governance 
Mechanism has an influence on 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
Disclosure.  
The determinants of CSR disclosure vary from developed to developing 
countries. 
In developed countries, the main determinants are specific stakeholders 
including regulators, shareholders, creditors, investors, environmentalists and 
the media. 
In developing countries, the main determinants are external forces/powerful 
stakeholders such as international buyers, foreign investors, international 
media and international regulatory bodies (e.g., the World Bank) 
Public pressure is greater within developed countries compared to 
developing countries. 
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The significant characteristics of corporate governance considered by the 
studies in Table 2.1 include: board composition (independence), audit firm size, 
board size, board composition, audit committee, CEO duality, state ownership, 
foreign ownership, institutional ownership, managerial ownership, director 
ownership and ownership concentration. It should also be noted that the influence 
of corporate governance characteristics on voluntary disclosure has no unique 
research context (i.e., country, time) and contextual factors such as these may 
moderate the relationship (Ali et al. 2017; Brown et al. 2011). Accordingly, mixed 
findings (positive, negative, no relationship) between corporate governance 
characteristics and voluntary disclosures have been documented in the literature 
(Garcia-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2010; Khlif et al. 2016; Samaha et al. 2015). 
Therefore, to gain a thorough understanding regarding the relationship between the 
characteristics of corporate governance and voluntary disclosure, the following 
section reviews studies from developed and other developing countries separately.  
2.3.2 Relationship between Corporate Governance Characteristics and 
Voluntary Disclosure: Developed and Other Developing Countries 
Contexts 
 Ali et al. (2017) report that the determinants of voluntary disclosure vary 
particularly from developed to developing countries. Therefore, to find the key 
characteristics of corporate governance that act as a determinant of voluntary 
disclosure, a review of various studies is conducted below. Key findings of the 
reviewed studies are summarized in Appendix A. 
Within the existing literature, the characteristics of corporate governance 
can be categorized as internal and external mechanisms. In particular, board and 
audit committees are considered as internal mechanisms while ownership 
concentration is an external mechanism of corporate governance. Both have been 
considered as important factors for voluntary disclosure as they are the key 
mechanism for controlling, monitoring and decision-making processes (Garcia-
Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2010; Khlif et al. 2016; Khlif & Souissi 2010; Samaha 
et al. 2015). It should be noted that sevral characteristics of corporate governance, 
including CEO duality (Allegrini & Greco 2013; Hidalgo et al. 2011), board size 
(Abeysekera 2010; Akhtaruddin et al. 2009; Hidalgo et al. 2011), board 
composition (Akhtaruddin et al. 2009; Esa & Anum Mohd Ghazali 2012; Rao et al. 
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2012), audit committee independence (Haji 2015), presence of a sub-committee 
(Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007), foreign ownership (Haniffa & Cooke 2005; Huafang 
& Jianguo 2007), director ownership (Ghazali & Weetman 2006; Mohd Ghazali 
2007) and institutional ownership (Barako et al. 2006a; Ntim et al. 2012), are 
widely considered. These factors are also found to be significant explanatory factors 
for voluntary disclosure within various research contexts of both developed and 
developing countries.  
The relationship between corporate governance characteristics and 
voluntary disclosure within the Bangladeshi context is reviewed in the following 
section. 
2.3.3 Relationship between Corporate Governance Characteristics 
(Determinant) and Voluntary Disclosure: Bangladesh Context 
 Studies of the relationship between corporate governance characteristics 
and voluntary disclosure in Bangaldesh are primarily limited to social disclosures. 
Rashid and Lodh (2008) play a pioneering role by examing this relationship within 
small firms. They report that director ownership is negatively associated, and board 
compositon positively associated, with social disclosure but fail to find any 
relationship between ownership concentration and institutional ownership. By 
considering the banking sectors,  Khan et al. (2013) extend this understanding by 
considering 116 listed firms from Bangladesh to explore the determinants of social 
disclosure. They report that public ownership, foreign ownership, board 
composition from independent directors and presence of an audit committee are 
positively associated with social disclosure but negatively with managerial 
ownership. Compared to social disclosure, the relationship between corporate 
governance characteristics and other forms of voluntary disclosure, such as 
environmental disclosure and intellectual capital disclosure, has not been widely 
explored (see Hossain et al. (2006) and Muttakin et al. (2015) as exceptions). 
Hossain et al. (2006) is the only study that emphasizes environmental as well as 
social disclosure and fails to find any significant relationship with the presence of 
an international link to an audit firm. More recently, Muttakin et al. (2015) explore 
intellectual disclosure and find that foreign ownership, the proportion of 
independent directors and existence of an audit committee all have positive 
29 
 
influences on intellectual capital disclosure. It should be noted that most of the 
studies from Bangladesh consider a single year to explore relationships (Khan 2010; 
Rashid & Lodh 2008; Rouf 2011; Rouf & Al Harun 2011) with notable exceptions 
using multiple years (Khan et al. 2013; Muttakin et al. 2015; Muttakin et al. 2016). 
The key findings of prior studies from the Bangladeshi context are summarized in 
Appendix B.  
Within the limited studies in Bangladesh, some characteristics of corporate 
governance, including CEO duality (Rouf & Al Harun 2011), board size (Muttakin 
et al. 2016), board composition (Khan et al. 2013), foreign ownership (Khan et al. 
2013), director ownership (Rashid & Lodh 2008) and institutional ownership 
(Rashid & Lodh 2008), are found to be significant. It should be noted that most of 
these studies focus on only a particular category of voluntary disclosure or are 
subject to limitations including, for example, small sample size, data from the 
period of the share market collapse and limited statistical analyses. In addition, 
other important variables, such as the presence of a sub-committee and audit 
committee composition are yet to be explored from a Bangladeshi context.  
The following section discusses the characteristics of corporate governance 
that are considered to be significant factors for the decision-making, monitoring and 
controlling processes of a firm. In particular the potential explanatory factors for 
voluntary disclosure in Bangladesh are identified. 
2.3.4 Corporate Governance Characteristics Considered for this Study  
In the preceding sections, several prior studies on the relationship between 
the characteristics of corporate governance and voluntary disclosure from various 
research contexts were reviewed. It was found that both internal (CEO duality, 
board composition, audit committee independence, sub-committee) and external 
(foreign ownership, director ownership, and institutional ownership) mechanisms 
of corporate governance act as significant explanatory factors for voluntary 
disclosure.  
Within the set of corporate governance characteristics, the features of the 
board are considered to be essential elements for the decision-making process of a 
firm. These features allow firms to resolve principal–agent conflicts and stimulate 
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firm monitoring (Dalton et al. 1998; Dalton et al. 1999). Consistent with this 
argument, several features of the board play an important role (Abeysekera 2010). 
Board independence in regards to leadership or composition is a significant factor 
in resolving conflicts of interest between agent and principal to improve a firm’s 
monitoring capability (Fama & Jensen 1983). In addition, the number of persons on 
the board, or ‘board size’, allows a firm to gather together various skills that 
contribute to a cumulative knowledge of the business environment, thus 
augmenting a firm’s capabilities in a competitive marketplace. Furthermore, it is 
argued that the monitoring role of the board is facilitated by the existence or 
independence of sub-committees and this may also act as an explanatory factor for 
voluntary disclosure (Samaha et al. 2015). For instance, the audit committee is 
considered as a monitoring and controlling mechanism that governs firm disclosure 
and ensures compliance (Ho & Wong 2001; Khan et al. 2013; Li et al. 2012; 
Othman et al. 2014). Besides the presence of an independent audit committee, the 
existence of other sub-committees has also been found to be influential for 
voluntary disclosure (Allegrini & Greco 2013; Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007; 
Karamanou & Vafeas 2005; O’Sullivan et al. 2008). Internal features, such as the 
presence and independence of the various committees, are therefore observed to be 
vitally important for the discharge of formal and informal accountabilities that are 
espoused by voluntary disclosure.  
Ownership of a firm is an external feature of corporate governance and is 
closely associated with agent–principal conflict (Jensen & Meckling 1976) as well 
as the monitoring and control system of a firm (La Porta et al. 2000). Regarding 
ownership, Eng and Mak (2003), p. 326) argue that “(t)he structure of ownership 
determines the level of monitoring and thereby the level of disclosure”. Further, it 
should be noted that the preference, interest, sense of moral obligation and access 
to firm information is not unique and the preference for disclosure might vary with 
the nature of the owners. For instance, foreign investors are considered to be more 
powerful in shaping the views of a firm and might also demand compliance with 
foreign norms, thereby influencing firm disclosure policies (Imam & Malik 2007; 
Muttakin & Khan 2014). In addition, directors are able to access extra information 
compared to outsiders as directors play a vital role in firm management. They also 
play a role in the selection of appropriate disclosure policies for their respective 
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firms (Eng & Mak 2003; Jensen & Meckling 1976). As a result, director ownership 
is another important feature. Institutional investors are considered to be expert 
investors who are capable of monitoring firms and stimulating firm disclosure 
(Barako et al. 2006a) and play a significant role in firm transparency. 
Therefore, in light of the above discussions, CEO duality, board size, board 
compositions, presence of a sub-committee and audit committee independence are 
identified as the key characteristics of the internal mechanisms of corporate 
governance that influence the monitoring, controlling and decision-making 
processes. External mechanisms of corporate governance include foreign 
ownership, director ownership and institutional ownership. The relationship 
between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure is contradictory, and 
studies in Bangladesh are subject to several limitations, such as data from a single 
year, the inclusion of a period of market collapse, or limited statistical analyses. 
Therefore, a study within Bangladesh will provide valuable insights.  
 
2.4 Voluntary Disclosure and Firm Performance (Effects) Studies 
Within voluntary disclosure studies, a relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and firm performance has been observed. However, the results of such 
studies are still contradictory (Allouche & Laroche 2005; Das & Bhunia 2016; Lu 
et al. 2014; Margolis et al. 2009; Margolis & Walsh 2003; Mathews 1997; Molina-
Azorín et al. 2009; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Qiu et al. 2016; Wang et al. 2016), requiring 
further investigation. Voluntary disclosure is an effective medium of 
communication. It helps to reduce information asymmetry and also acts as a 
signalling mechanism for stakeholders (Anam et al. 2011; Qiu et al. 2016; Ribeiro 
Soriano et al. 2012). Accordingly, it could be argued that voluntary disclosure may 
also influence firm performance.  
A significant number of prior studies has explored the effects of corporate 
voluntary disclosure on firm performance in both developed and developing 
countries. However, limited attention has been given to Bangladesh and the existing 
literature is still contradictory (Lu et al. 2014; Mathews 1997; Orlitzky et al. 2003). 
The following review of the literature examines the effects of corporate governance 
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and firm performance. In so doing, meta-analysis studies are considered in Sub-
section 2.4.1. Studies in developed and developing countries are then reviewed, 
followed by studies in the Bangladeshi context. Inferences for this study are then 
made in Sub-section 2.4.4 . 
2.4.1 Effects of Voluntary Disclosure on Firm Performance: Meta-analysis  
To understand the relationship between corporate governance 
characteristics and voluntary disclosures in more depth, several meta-analyses have 
taken place. In particular, the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance 
have been identified by aggregating several studies. The key findings and additional 
comments are summarized in Table 2.2 
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Table 2-2 Summary of Meta–analysis: Relationship between voluntary disclosure and firm performance 
Year Authors Reviewed 
Papers 
Considered directions Results and Additional comments 
Dependent: Firm 
Performance 
Independent: Disclosure 
1997 
Griffin & 
Mahon 
51 Firm Performance 
Corporate Social 
Performance  
There is a mixed finding among prior studies.  
Considering multiple firm performance indicators are advised.  
Industry is also important for such relationships while it is recommended to consider several 
years for investigation. 
2003 Orlitzky et al. US studies Firm Performance 
Corporate Social 
Performance  
Corporate Social Performance appears to be more highly correlated with accounting-based 
measures of CFP than with market-based indicators 
2003 
Margolis & 
Walsh 
109 Firm Performance 
Corporate Social 
Performance 
Positive, negative, non-significant and mixed findings have been reported by 54, 7, 28,20 
prior studies respectively. 
2005 
Allouche & 
Laroche 
Total 82 
 (64 firm 
performance 
dependent) 
Firm Performance 
Corporate Social 
Performance  
It is advisable to include firm size as control variable. 
Regarding social performance all the categories do not affect financial performance. 
It is advisable to use Structural Equation model, Two or Three Stage Least Square 
regression model for an effective result. 
2009 Margolis et al. 251  Firm Performance 
Corporate Social 
Performance  
Overall there is a positive effect from corporate social performance to firm performance. 
2009 
Molina-Azorín 
et al. 
32 
Financial 
Performance 
Green Management 
Mixed results, mostly environmental management has a positive influence on firm 
performance. 
There are various statistical methods used while regression analyses are mostly considered.  
Various firm performance indicators have used with an extensive consideration of ROA and 
Tobin’s Q.  
2014 Lu et al. 
84 studies 
between 
2002-2011 
Firm Performance 
Corporate Social 
Performance  
Although there is a positive association between corporate social performance and firm 
performance, the relationship between social disclosure and firm performance is 
insignificant.  
2016 Wang et al. 
42 studies 
between 
2003-2012 
Firm Performance 
Corporate Social 
responsibility (+) 
Overall there is a positive effect from social responsibility to firm performance.  
Following year firm performance is associated with prior year social responsibility. 
However, no evidence is supported for the reverse direction. The relationship between 
social reporting and firm performance is more visible in developed countries compared to 
developing countries.  
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As seen in Table 2.2, the meta-analysis studies report that voluntary 
disclosure positively influences firm performance. In addition, to explore the 
relationship several firm performance indicators are used. Therefore, the selection 
of firm performance indicators can moderate the result. In addition, it is also 
documented that the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance might not 
be consistent between developed and developing countries. To gain a more in-depth 
understanding of the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance the 
following review includes studies from both developed and developing countries. 
2.4.2 Effects of Voluntary Disclosure on Firm Performance: Developed and 
Developing Country Contexts 
A major contribution in the literature comes from studies in developed 
countries and these key findings are summarized in Appendix C.  
Within the prior studies, three types of findings are documented. First, a 
positive effect is identified from voluntary disclosure to firm performance 
(Abdolmohammadi 2005; Chen & Wang 2011; Choi et al. 2010; Khlif et al. 2015). 
This is consistent with the argument that by considering voluntary disclosure a firm 
may receive a positive impression from various stakeholders that may influence 
firm performance. Second, a negative effect of voluntary disclosure on firm 
performance (Li et al. 2016; Lima Crisóstomo et al. 2011; Mathuva & Kiweu 2016) 
is identified, consistent with the argument that voluntary disclosure is subject to 
additional costs and the information may not be accepted positively by 
stakeholders. Third, no significant effect of voluntary disclosure on firm 
performance (Aras et al. 2010; Brine et al. 2007) is found. It should also be noted 
that, although the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance are explored 
by considering internet-based disclosures, key performance indicator disclosures 
and research and development disclosures (Basah & Khairi 2015; Elzahar et al. 
2015; Garay et al. 2013; Kim et al. 2013; Uyar & Kılıç 2012), a large number of 
studies are limited to social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosures. In 
addition, firm performance measurement also varies as a wide range of indicators 
has been considered. Detailed results of the effects of social, environmental and 
intellectual capital disclosure on several firm performance indicators are discussed 
below.   
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 From a social disclosure perspective, the effect on firm performance is also 
mixed, with studies finding positive effects (Choi et al. 2010; De Klerk et al. 2015; 
Murray et al. 2006; Prado-Lorenzo et al. 2008; Reverte 2016; Verbeeten et al. 2016; 
Veronica  & Bachtiar 2010), negative effects (Malarvizhi & Matta 2016) and no 
significant relationship (Aras et al. 2010; Brine et al. 2007). In addition, firm 
performance indicators such as ROA, return on equity (ROE), ROS, sales growth, 
share price, Tobin’s Q, and EPS are widely considered for prior studies.  
Consistent with social disclosures, a mixed result has been reported 
regarding the effects of environmental disclosure on firm performance. For 
instance, positive (Chen et al. 2016; Khlif et al. 2015; Nor et al. 2016; Qiu et al. 
2016) as well as negative (Li et al. 2016; Mathuva & Kiweu 2016) effects from 
environmental disclosure have been found in the literature. In addition, consistent 
with the studies from social disclosure, ROA, ROE, ROS, return on investment 
(ROI), sales growth, share price, Tobin’s Q and EPS are widely considered as firm 
performance indicators for prior studies. 
Compared to social and environmental disclosures, the effects of intellectual 
capital disclosure are examined in a limited manner and mostly positive effects have 
been found (Abdolmohammadi 2005; Anam et al. 2011; Ribeiro Soriano et al. 
2012). In addition, as a firm performance indicator, MCAP, ROA and market to 
book value ratio are considered.   
The following section compares the limited evidence from the Bangladeshi 
context to that from developed and other developing countries. 
2.4.3 Effects of Voluntary Disclosure on Firm Performance: Bangladesh Context 
It has already been mentioned that there is a paucity of studies that explore 
the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance within the Bangladeshi 
context. Nonetheless, some useful insights have been established (see Appendix D 
for a summary). Recently, Hossain et al. (2015) have reported that corporate social 
disclosure has a positive impact on firm performance for Bangladeshi firms. They 
consider 131 listed firms in Bangladesh by excluding Treasury Bonds and Mutual 
Funds for the period 2008 to 2012. Consistent with prior studies from other 
countries, ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q are considered indicators of firm performance. 
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In light of legitimacy theory, their study suggests that corporate social disclosure 
influences firm performance positively (ROA and ROE) but fails to find effects 
using Tobin’s Q.  
In addition, there are other studies that investigate the effects of social 
reporting on firm performance by considering other measures of disclosure. Islam 
and Rahman (2016) report that corporate social reporting has a significant effect on 
firm performance for the Dutch Bangla Bank in the years 2010 to 2014. For the 
social reporting variable, expenditure on corporate social reporting was considered 
while as an indicator of firm performance several variables, including Dividends 
Per Share (DPS), Net Profit After Tax (NPAT), Economic Value Added (EVA), 
Market Value Added (MVA), EPS, ROA, ROE and ROI, are considered. The 
results show that CSR expenditure has a positive effect on firm performance. In 
addition, Ahmed et al. (2012) examine the effect of social reporting on firm 
performance after considering five banks in their sample. The study uses a survey 
to assess social reporting. However, they are not able to find a significant effect on 
ROA, EPS or price earnings ratio. Further, Ahmed and Habib (2015) and Ahmed 
(2016) also investigate the effects of social reporting by considering 25 and 30 
banks in Bangladesh but are unable to find a significant effect. It is worthwhile 
noting that most of the prior studies in Bangladesh are limited to social disclosures. 
Therefore, within the Bangladeshi context, the effects of environmental and 
intellectual capital disclosure are not known. In addition, these studies are limited 
to small sample sizes and include the period when the Bangladesh share market was 
facing a severe market collapse. In addition, less sophisticated statistical methods 
were used. Therefore, to explore the effects of voluntary disclosure with a larger 
sample, different period and several statistical methods will contribute to a more 
robust understanding.  
2.4.4 Considered Firm Performance Indicators for this Study 
The preceding sections reviewed several prior studies on the effects of 
voluntary disclosure on firm performance from various research contexts, finding a 
large number of firm performance indicators have been applied. In particular, ROA, 
ROE, ROS, ROI, sales growth, share price, MCAP, EPS and Tobin’s Q were used 
extensively. Therefore, consistent with prior studies, this study selects five widely 
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used indicators of firm performance. The accounting-based indicators selected for 
use are ROA and ROS. Market-based indicators are MCAP and EPS. Tobin’s Q 
has been selected as a mixed indicator. These indicators are further discussed in the 
research methodology (Chapter Five).   
2.5 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the relevant literature on voluntary disclosure, the 
relationship between corporate governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure, 
and the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance.  
A literature review was conducted and separated into three sections. First, 
voluntary disclosure studies were reviewed within developed, developing and 
Bangladeshi contexts. An increasing trend towards voluntary disclosure was 
observed within all the contexts. Second, studies regarding the relationship between 
corporate governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure were reviewed by 
considering several meta-analyses in developed, developing and Bangladeshi 
contexts. Factors including CEO duality, board size, board compositions, sub-
committee, audit committee independence, foreign ownership, director ownership 
and institutional ownership were considered to examine their respective 
relationships with voluntary disclosure. Finally, studies regarding the effects of 
voluntary disclosure were reviewed by considering several meta-analyses in 
developed, developing and Bangladeshi contexts. After reviewing the prior studies 
ROA, ROS, MCAP, Earnings per Share and Tobin’s Q were selected to investigate 
the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance for the purposes of this 
study. 
After conducting a detailed literature review, a theoretical framework is 
required to guide the study. Thus, in the following chapter the development of a 
theoretical framework for this thesis will be discussed.  
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Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Introduction 
Collis and Hussey (2013) argue that, for any study, it is essential to make 
the theoretical stance(s) explicit because it underpins the methodology and research 
perspective. Theoretical positions relating to corporate governance underpin and 
provide insight into what disclosures are made and why firms disclose corporate 
social, environmental and intellectual capital information in annual reports (or 
elsewhere). Prior research indicates that the reasons for voluntary disclosure are 
considered to be multifaceted (Collett & Hrasky 2005). For example, a firm may 
decide to voluntarily disclose information to create a ‘good’ impression, however, 
too much disclosure can reveal confidential operational information. In addition, 
managing extra information is subject to increased cost. In contrast, an absence of 
disclosures could be interpreted as hiding or ignoring information. This implies that 
the selection of any particular theoretical framework is significant.  
Although there is a growing interest in corporate governance and voluntary 
disclosures, there is no uniform theoretical framework providing a full explanation 
for the determinants and effects of voluntary disclosure of a firm. However, there 
are several theoretical stances that have been adopted in prior studies examining the 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and corporate governance characteristics 
(Abeysekera 2010; An et al. 2011; Haji 2015; Watson et al. 2002) and the effects 
of voluntary disclosure on firm performance (Anam et al. 2011; Hossain et al. 2015; 
Platonova et al. 2016) using differing contexts. Theories that are commonly used15 
include the following: agency theory (Barako et al. 2006a; Chau & Gray 2002; 
Haniffa & Cooke 2002); legitimacy theory (Khan et al. 2013; Khan 2010; Momin 
& Parker 2013); stakeholder theory (Azim et al. 2009; Islam & Deegan 2008; 
Reverte 2009); signalling theory (Watson et al. 2002; Whiting & Miller 2008; Xiao 
et al. 2004); political economy theory (Abeysekera & Guthrie 2005; Buhr 1998; 
Guthrie & Parker 1990); resource dependency (Abeysekera 2010; Haniffa & Cooke 
                                                          
15 While there are a multitude of theoretical approaches, only the most commonly used in 
accounting studies of voluntary disclosure that are relevant to this thesis are discussed.   
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2005); and institutional theory (Baldini et al. 2016). Several theories mentioned 
here, including agency, legitimacy, stakeholder and signalling, have been widely 
considered in the literature (Alves 2012; An et al. 2011; Chan et al. 2014; Haji 2013; 
Watson et al. 2002).  
It has been argued that a firm’s disclosures are complex phenomena and 
cannot be explained by a single theory (Cormier et al. 2005; Tagesson et al. 2009). 
Tagesson et al. (2009) further argue that, to adequately investigate voluntary 
disclosure, several theories may need to be employed simultaneously. Accordingly, 
voluntary disclosure studies that use multiple theories have typically combined 
agency, legitimacy, stakeholder and signalling theories (An et al. 2011; Haji 2013; 
Watson et al. 2002). However, the assumptions of any single theory may weaken 
or contradict the idea of other theories. Therefore, it is necessary to consider 
interrelated theoretical concepts when a combined theoretical framework is 
proposed. A weakness of prior studies is that the interrelationships between theories 
are rarely discussed. For example, Haji (2013) explores corporate social disclosure 
using three theories, agency, legitimacy and signalling theory, but does not discuss 
the interrelations. Similarly, Xiao et al. (2004) investigate voluntary disclosure by 
considering agency and signalling theories in combination but fail to show the 
theoretical interactions. 
In contrast, An et al. (2011) develop a combined theoretical framework for 
the voluntary disclosure of intellectual capital information involving four theories, 
including agency, stakeholder, legitimacy and signalling theories, and incorporate 
discussion of the interrelationship. While the study used only intellectual capital 
disclosures, they argue that their framework “can be extended to explain other 
voluntary disclosure practices of information” (p. 81). However, the An et al. 
(2011) theoretical framework is not without limitations. Therefore, an extension of 
their theoretical framework may provide the opportunity to apply combinations of 
theories to voluntary disclosure studies in multiple contexts to offer a more 
comprehensive explanatory rationale. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Theoretical 
frameworks that have been adopted in prior research into voluntary disclosures will 
be reviewed in Section 3.2 including both single and combined theories. This is 
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followed by a review of the combined theoretical framework developed by An et 
al. (2011). Section 3.3 begins with a discussion of the omission of stakeholder 
theory in a developing country context, followed by agency, legitimacy and 
signalling theories, including how they are integrated and why the theoretical 
framework is used. A chapter summary and conclusion is presented in Section 3.4. 
 
3.2 Theoretical Frameworks Used in Voluntary Disclosure Studies  
Voluntary disclosure in annual reports is influenced by several factors 
(Ahmed & Courtis 1999; Garcia-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2010; Khlif et al. 2016; 
Samaha et al. 2015). Similarly, the effects of voluntary disclosures are diverse 
(Orlitzky et al. 2003; Qiu et al. 2016). Several theories have been adopted by prior 
voluntary disclosure studies. The following section presents a brief review of the 
different theories frequently used in voluntary disclosure studies.  
3.2.1 Single Theory Studies   
Within voluntary disclosure studies a number of theories have been 
considered, including agency theory (Barako et al. 2006a; Chau & Gray 2002; 
Haniffa & Cooke 2002), legitimacy theory (Khan et al. 2013; Khan 2010; Momin 
& Parker 2013), stakeholder theory (Azim et al. 2009; Islam & Deegan 2008; 
Reverte 2009), signalling theory (Watson et al. 2002; Whiting & Miller 2008; Xiao 
et al. 2004), resource dependency theory (Abeysekera 2010; Haniffa & Cooke 
2005) and political economy theory (Abeysekera & Guthrie 2005; Buhr 1998; 
Guthrie & Parker 1990). Each of these theories offers a single lens from which to 
explore the complexities of voluntary disclosure. Therefore, each approach will 
inevitably have limitations.  
Agency theory focuses on the agent and principal conflict between 
ownership and control of a firm. From a general perspective, the agent is nominated 
to maximize the interest of the shareholders through control of the firm (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976). According to agency theory, in order to reduce the conflict 
between the agent and principal, an agent may use voluntary disclosures to inform 
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the principal. This is particularly relevant since agents have better access to 
information and the firm decision-making process (Hossain et al. 1995)  
Legitimacy theory is based on the view that a social contract exists between 
the firm and society. According to legitimacy theory, firms continually seek to 
ensure that their operational activities are considered within the constraints and 
norms of their relevant public. From this theoretical perspective, voluntary 
disclosure can be used to show a firm’s compliance with societal norms (Deegan et 
al. 1996; Deegan & Gordon 1996; Guthrie et al. 2006).  
Stakeholder theory focuses on how firms operate and deal with their 
stakeholders. Firms are able to use natural and other resources, including human 
resources, to produce goods, services and sustainable waste, on the condition that 
these are in stakeholders’ interests (García-Sánchez et al. 2013; Mathews 1993). In 
other words, stakeholder theory focuses on the relationship between an organization 
and various stakeholders in society. Organizations may use voluntary disclosure to 
address stakeholders’ concerns.   
Institutional theory focuses on the relationship between the environment 
and firm and the incorporation of institutionalized norms and rules to achieve 
stability. Dillard et al. (2004) explain that institutional theory focuses on a firm’s 
interactions with the political and economic institutional environment. In addition, 
institutional theory also emphasizes the impact of external pressures on a firm and 
how these influence the alignment of organizational practices. 
Signalling theory suggests that a firm may reduce information asymmetry 
by providing additional information as a signal to receive positive feedback from 
interested parties (shareholders and policymakers) (An et al. 2011; Morris 1987; 
Whiting & Miller 2008). As a result, a firm may try to consider voluntary disclosure 
as a medium of effective communication to create a good image of the firm among 
stakeholders.   
Resource dependency theory focuses on how the external resources of a firm 
may affect the behaviour of an organization. To understand organizational 
behaviour, it is essential to know the ecology of the organization (Pfeffer & 
Salancik 1978). Accordingly, resource dependency theory places an emphasis on 
the strategic actions of a firm, including maintaining the resource requirements 
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within the firm and interdependence with other firms (Mustakallio 2002; Muttakin 
et al. 2016). Therefore, resource dependency theory posits that firm actions are 
related to available resources.  
Political economy theory emphasizes the socio-economic and political 
contexts that influence firm’s disclosure. Guthrie and Parker (1990, p. 166) state 
that,  
(t)he political economy perspective perceives accounting reports as social, 
political and economic documents. They serve as a tool for constructing, 
sustaining and legitimizing economic and political arrangements, 
institutions, and ideological themes which contribute to the corporation’s 
private interests. Disclosures have the capacity to transmit social, political 
and economic meanings for a pluralistic set of report recipients.   
In addition, Hopwood and Miller (1994) note that political economy theory 
“emphasizes the fundamental interrelationship between political and economic 
forces in society” (p. 16). This approach posits that firm disclosure can satisfy 
individual stakeholders and explain the firm’s economic and political arrangements 
(van der Laan 2009). 
Of the theories discussed, the concept of agency theory is used most 
frequently for voluntary disclosure studies within the context of both developed 
countries (Campbell et al. 2001; Cooke 1989, 1992; Hossain et al. 1995; Li et al. 
2008; Lim et al. 2007; Meek et al. 1995) and developing or emerging countries 
(Barako et al. 2006a, 2006b; Eng & Mak 2003; Ho & Wong 2001; Huafang & 
Jianguo 2007). This suggests that the agent and principal conflict perspective plays 
a vital role in voluntary disclosure. In addition to agency theory, legitimacy theory 
is widely used within the context of developing or emerging countries (Haniffa & 
Cooke 2005; Khan et al. 2013; Khan 2010; Nurhayati et al. 2016). The concept of 
legitimacy theory is also important for voluntary disclosure because it demonstrates 
firms’ intent to reflect, rhetorically or otherwise, that their operational activities are 
aligned with the norms of society. However, this approach may vary by country, 
according to national, historical and cultural contexts (Deegan 2002); (Islam & 
Deegan 2008; Lindblom 1994). In a developing country, societal norms may 
include the expectations of the global community, including international buyers, 
investors, media and regulatory bodies (Ali et al. 2017; Imam & Malik 2007; 
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Muttakin & Khan 2014), and, therefore, the concept of legitimacy is perhaps more 
applicable to a developing country context.  
Signalling theory is applied in studies of both developed and developing 
countries (Lan et al. 2013; Leventis & Weetman 2004; Watson et al. 2002). 
Although it is not used widely, it is considered useful for exploring the effects of 
voluntary disclosure. In particular, disclosures from a firm may act as a signal; 
accordingly a firm may consider voluntary disclosures as conveying a message to 
the market or stakeholders for implementing a firm’s goals.  
3.2.2 Combination Theory Studies  
Various studies of voluntary disclosures have considered a combination of 
several theories to better explain the phenomena (Alves et al. 2012; An et al. 2011; 
Chen & Roberts 2010; Haji 2013; Leventis & Weetman 2004; Reverte 2009; 
Watson et al. 2002; Whiting & Miller 2008). The use of a combined theoretical 
framework is justified because voluntary disclosure is a multifaceted and complex 
issue. Thus, the use of a single theory is not always sufficient to fully explain 
complex situations (Chen & Roberts 2010) and allow comprehensive investigation 
(An et al. 2011; Leventis & Weetman 2004; Tagesson et al. 2009). Therefore, a 
combination of theories may provide more detailed and comprehensive 
explanation.  
However, no single theory is free from limitations. Hence, combining 
several individual theories without considering their interrelatedness may introduce 
conflicts and contradictions. Table 3.1 reviews combined theoretical frameworks 
that have been considered in prior studies of voluntary disclosure. 
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Table 3-1 Summary of combined theoretical frameworks 
 
Study 
Research Objective 
Interrelated 
Concept between 
Theories 
AGT** LGT** SHT** ST** RDT** PET** IT** Others** 
(Anam et al. 2011) 
Examining the effects on market capitalization of 
intellectual capital disclosure in the annual 
reports of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia  
Not considered    Y Y    
(Haji & Ghazali 
2013) 
Examining the relationship between corporate 
attributes and intellectual capital disclosure based 
on Malaysian firms. 
Not considered Y    Y    
(Alves et al. 2012) 
Examining the determinants of voluntary 
disclosure based on Portuguese and Spanish 
firms. 
Not considered Y Y  Y     
(An et al. 2011) 
Develop a comprehensive theoretical framework 
for interpreting voluntary intellectual capital 
disclosure 
Yes, Considered Y Y Y Y     
(Anam Ousama et al. 
2012) 
Examining the determinants 
 of intellectual capital disclosure in the annual 
reports of Malaysian listed companies. 
Not considered Y Y  Y     
(Baldini et al. 2016) 
Examining the determinants 
 of environmental, social, and governance 
disclosure based on 42 countries data. 
Not considered  Y     Y  
(Branco & Rodrigues 
2008) 
Examining the influencing factor for corporate 
social responsibility for Portuguese firms. 
Not considered  Y   Y    
** AGT= Agency Theory, LGT=Legitimacy Theory, SHT= Stakeholder Theory, 
ST= Signalling Theory, RDT= Resource Dependency Theory, PET= Political Economy Theory, 
 IT= Institutional Theory, CT= Competition Theory, IMT= Information Theory and Y=YES 
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Table 3-1 Summary of combined theoretical frameworks (Continued) 
 
Study 
Research Objective 
Interrelated 
Concept between 
Theories 
AGT** LGT** SHT** ST** RDT** PET** IT** Others** 
(Chan et al. 2014) 
Examining the relationship between corporate 
governance quality and CSR disclosure based on 
Australian Firms. 
Not considered  Y Y      
(Chen & Roberts 
2010) 
To analyze the overlapping perspective of 
legitimacy, institutional, resource dependency,  
and stakeholder theory.  
Not considered  Y Y  Y  Y  
(Farook et al. 2011) 
Developing and testing a theoretical model of the 
determinants of Islamic banks’ social disclosures 
based on 14 countries. 
Not considered Y Y Y   Y   
(Haji 2013) 
Examining the trend and determinants of CSR 
disclosure based on Malaysian firms.  
Not considered Y Y  Y     
(Ho & Wong 2001) 
Examining the relationship between corporate 
governance and voluntary disclosure based on 
Hong Kong firms.  
Not considered Y       IMT 
(Li et al. 2008) 
Examining the relationship between corporate 
governance and intellectual capital disclosure 
based on UK firms 
Not considered Y    Y    
(Leventis & 
Weetman 2004) 
Examining the relationship between firm 
characteristics and voluntary disclosure based on 
the Athens stock exchange  
Not considered Y   Y     
** AGT= Agency Theory, LGT=Legitimacy Theory, SHT= Stakeholder Theory, 
ST= Signalling Theory, RDT= Resource Dependency Theory, PET= Political Economy Theory, 
 IT= Institutional Theory, CT= Competition Theory, IMT= Information Theory Y=YES 
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Table 3-1 Summary of combined theoretical frameworks (Continued) 
 
Study 
Research Objective 
Interrelated 
Concept between 
Theories 
AGT** LGT** SHT** ST** RDT** PET** IT** Others** 
(Muttakin et al. 
2016) 
Examining the effect of directors’ human and 
social capital on CSR disclosure based on 
Bangladeshi firms.  
Not considered Y    Y    
(Reverte 2009) 
Examining the relationship between firm 
characteristics and CSR disclosure based on 
Spanish firms. 
Not considered Y Y Y      
(Ribeiro Soriano et 
al. 2012) 
Examining the effect of human capital disclosure 
on firm performance based on firms from 
Taiwan.  
Not considered   Y Y     
(Haniffa & Cooke 
2002) 
Examining whether corporate governance, 
culture and firm characteristics acts as a 
determinant of voluntary disclosure based on 
Malaysian firms. 
Not considered Y    Y    
(Verbeeten et al.) 
2016 
To investigate whether corporate social 
responsibility 
(CSR) disclosures are associated with firm value 
Not considered  Y Y     ECT 
(Watson et al. 2002) 
Examining the relationship between firm 
characteristics and voluntary disclosure based on 
UK firms 
Not considered Y Y  Y     
** AGT= Agency Theory, LGT=Legitimacy Theory, SHT= Stakeholder Theory, 
ST= Signalling Theory, RDT= Resource Dependency Theory, PET= Political Economy Theory, 
 IT= Institutional Theory, CT= Competition Theory, ECT= Economic  Theory and Y=YES 
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As noted in Table 3.1 agency, legitimacy, stakeholder and signalling 
theories are predominantly considered in combined theoretical frameworks and 
single theory studies of voluntary disclosure. It is noteworthy that, among the use 
of combined theoretical frameworks, only a few studies have considered 
interrelated concepts. In particular, An et al. (2011) develop a combined theoretical 
framework for voluntary disclosure by demonstrating the relationship between 
agency, legitimacy, stakeholder and signalling theory with an emphasis on 
intellectual capital disclosure. This thesis provides further empirical support by 
adopting this framework and extending it to include social and environmental 
disclosures.  
3.2.3 An et al. (2011) Theoretical Framework  
The theoretical framework proposed by An et al. (2011) demonstrates how 
agency, stakeholder, legitimacy and signalling theories interact within the context 
of voluntary intellectual capital disclosure. They relate these theories to voluntary 
disclosure because they are considered to reduce information asymmetry, discharge 
accountability and signal legitimacy to stakeholders. The relationship is 
summarized in Figure 3-1. 
 
 
Figure 3-1 Interrelated concepts of the considered theories, Source: An et al. (2011), p.  580 
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The relationship between agency theory and stakeholder theory is explained 
by An et al. (2011, p. 578).  
Stakeholder theory expands agency theory which primarily focuses on the 
manager-shareholder relationship. This can be seen as an advancement of 
stakeholder theory. However stakeholder theory does not utilize the concept 
of information asymmetry. Therefore in explaining the voluntary disclosure 
practices of IC, both theories need to be integrated.  
Therefore, from a voluntary disclosure perspective (intellectual capital disclosure), 
an integration of agency and stakeholder theory may explain information 
asymmetry and the principal–agent relationship as well as the relationship with 
other stakeholders.  
An et al. (2011) argue that the concept of legitimacy and stakeholders is 
closely tied because legitimacy theory focuses on the firm and society while 
stakeholder theory focuses on firm accountability towards various stakeholders. 
Therefore, a connection between stakeholder and legitimacy may extend our 
understanding of voluntary disclosure (intellectual capital disclosure). 
Furthermore, An et al. (2011) argue that a firm intends to legitimize 
operational activities by the disclosure of information voluntarily, therefore 
signalling theory acts as an explanatory tool. Accordingly, the concept of legitimacy 
and signalling theory complement each other in the context of voluntary disclosure 
(intellectual capital disclosure). 
Moreover, An et al. (2011, p. 579), also argue that “(s)ignalling theory deals 
with how to address problems arising from information asymmetry (e.g., adverse 
selection and moral hazard) and, thus, it is closely linked to agency theory” 
Therefore, a firm may consider voluntary disclosure as a more effective means of 
communication both in signalling that information is available and in reducing 
information asymmetry.  
The relationship mentioned above, and the interactions among the 
theoretical concepts, provide a strong base for empirical studies of voluntary 
disclosure. However, while this integrated theoretical framework is able to provide 
a more comprehensive understanding, it is also subject to limitations. The 
limitations and potential ways of overcoming these are discussed below.  
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First, the theoretical framework does not explicitly consider the research 
context (i.e., a developed or developing country). The research context is important, 
as a change in the environment may influence the relevance of the study (Brown et 
al. 2011) because socio-economic conditions and culture impact on the issue to be 
researched. Islam (2010) has noted that earlier studies from a developing country 
context do not provide a notable contribution from a theoretical perspective. Thus, 
there is a need for a theoretical framework with an explicit emphasis on a 
developing country context. 
Second, the An et al. (2011) framework focuses on a particular category of 
voluntary disclosure: intellectual capital. However, as An et al. (2011, p. 581) 
assert: 
... the framework can be extended to explain other voluntary disclosure 
practices of information. Corporate social reporting (CSR) is a good 
example for this application because the three drivers for voluntary IC 
disclosure are also applicable to CSR. Although there have been many 
theoretical traditions interpreting CSR, the current framework could be a 
beneficial supplement.  
This thesis applies the An et al. (2011) theoretical framework to include a broader 
range of voluntary disclosures by incorporating social and environmental disclosure 
in addition to intellectual capital.  
Finally, An et al. (2011, p. 581) highlight that “… the framework is not 
justified by any empirical evidence so that we do not know whether it does work or 
not in the real practice”. 
Therefore, this thesis extends the An et al. (2011) theoretical framework to 
address these limitations. It should also be noted that prior studies have considered 
agency, legitimacy and signalling theory in a combined theoretical framework 
(Alves et al. 2012; Anam Ousama et al. 2012; Farook et al. 2011; Haji 2013; Reverte 
2009). This provides an alternative method for understanding and exploring the 
determinants and effects of voluntary disclosures. The following section presents 
the process of constructing the theoretical framework for this study. 
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3.3 Theoretical Framework  
The preceding section presents the An et al. (2011) theoretical framework 
as a combination of agency, stakeholder, legitimacy and signalling theories. 
However, stakeholder theory may not be suitable for voluntary disclosure studies 
within a developing country because individual stakeholders might not be 
considered of equal importance and the focus of disclosure limited to a few groups 
of important stakeholders (Islam & Deegan 2008) where firms are keen to consider 
voluntary disclosure as an element of legitimacy. By complying with the social 
contract a firm can attract investors, customers, employees and others (Deegan 
2006). Accordingly, from a developing country perspective, legitimacy theory is 
more applicable because firms are keen to legitimize their activities rather than 
focus on individual stakeholders and stakeholder groups. In prior studies into 
voluntary disclosure, Gray et al. (1995) has stated that stakeholder and legitimacy 
theories overlap but legitimacy theory is preferred over stakeholder theory (Chen 
& Roberts 2010; Deegan et al. 2002; Deegan et al. 2000; Gray et al. 1996). 
Therefore, this study develops a combined theoretical framework by including 
agency, legitimacy and signalling theory and excludes stakeholder theory as not 
relevant for this study.  
Adopting the theoretical framework developed by An et al. (2011), this 
study constructs a combined theoretical framework that includes agency, legitimacy 
and signalling theory. The following section discusses the concepts and application 
of the individual theories in the context of voluntary disclosure.  
3.3.1 Concepts and Application of Considered Theories in Voluntary 
Disclosure Studies  
Agency, legitimacy and signalling theories have similar philosophical 
underpinnings and overlapping concepts. However, they vary according to some 
underlying assumptions. For example, agency theory is based on the premise of 
maximizing the benefit to shareholders while resolving agent–principal conflicts. 
In contrast, legitimacy theory focuses on macro-level issues in society to legitimize 
a firms’ activities among various stakeholders (Reverte 2009; Woodward et al. 
1996) instead of limiting the focus to shareholders only. Signalling theory 
articulates the concept that firms send a signal to stakeholders about firm activity 
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and reduce information asymmetry among stakeholders. Therefore, although 
agency, legitimacy and signalling theory have some similarities, they are not 
identical. The following section discusses the definitions and key concepts and their 
application pertaining to voluntary disclosure including the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance.  
3.3.1.1 Agency Theory  
To reiterate, agency theory deals with the conflicting relationship between 
the agent and the principal and it also suggests that the agent should act in the best 
interests of shareholders. However, this is challenging since the activities of the 
agent have consequences for several stakeholders and may not be aligned with the 
goal of shareholders (Shapiro 2005).  
Agency theory was originally developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 
308) who defined this relationship as “… a contract under which one or more 
persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some 
service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making authority 
to the agent”. Within the context of the firm, the agent acts on behalf of the principal 
(shareholder) and the welfare of the principal is affected by the decisions of the 
agent (Jensen & Meckling 1976). From the perspective of agency theory, the agents 
(managers) have better access to firm information and may consider providing extra 
information as voluntary disclosure to reduce information asymmetry between the 
principals (shareholders) and their agents (managers) (Hossain et al. 1995). Agency 
theory focuses on the conflict between agent and principal and the potential issues 
that may arise when shareholders appoint an agent to manage the firm. The firm’s 
decision-making process and regime of corporate governance is therefore a core 
consideration in understanding this conflict (Dalton et al. 1999). This point is 
reinforced by the Cadbury Report (1992), which outlines that corporate governance 
is about directing, managing and controlling the systems of a firm. In line with the 
concept of agency theory, the corporate governance of a firm is a vital factor in 
influencing the firm’s decisions relating to voluntary disclosure to reduce 
information asymmetry.  
Within the literature, agency theory is a widely used theory to focus on the 
instruments of corporate governance and identify the determinants of voluntary 
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disclosure (Akhtaruddin et al. 2009; Allegrini & Greco 2013; Barako et al. 2006b; 
Cheng & Courtenay 2006; Donnelly & Mulcahy 2008; Eng & Mak 2003; Muttakin 
et al. 2015). The concept of principal–agent conflict in agency theory allows 
researchers to develop several inferences regarding these determinants. 
First, as Healy and Palepu (2001) and Botosan and Plumlee (2002) have 
argued, along with mandatory disclosure, the provision of additional disclosure may 
overcome, to some extent, the information asymmetry problem. Separation of 
ownership from control, one of the antecedents of agency theory, suggests that 
board independence is key to reducing the conflict between agent and principal. 
This insight seeks a resolution to the question posed by Jensen and Meckling (1976, 
p. 306): “why accounting reports would be provided voluntarily to creditors and 
stockholders”? It follows that a firm may disclose more information when the 
interests of the owners and board do not overlap. Board independence and a better 
monitoring system can ensure that an unscrupulous attitude towards disclosure does 
not exist. The internal mechanisms of corporate governance also reduce 
opportunistic disclosure policies, thereby further reducing information asymmetries 
and limiting the self-interest of agents. Overcoming information asymmetry is an 
essential tenet of a strong corporate governance regime in both developed and 
developing countries but is considerably more relevant for developing countries 
where corporate governance systems have not reached maturity (Claessens & Fan 
2002). 
Second, as already mentioned, corporate governance is the centre of 
decision making, control processes and management of conflict in a firm. As a 
result, decisions pertaining to voluntary disclosure are outcomes of these processes. 
So, voluntary disclosure provides an excellent opportunity to examine corporate 
governance through the lens of agency theory.  
Third, managing voluntary disclosure of a firm is also subject to extra costs. 
The additional cost may be justified in a principal–agent relationship, which seeks 
to minimize information asymmetries, but this justification must be communicated 
to the shareholder to whom the agent is responsible. The additional costs will 
therefore tend to influence the agent–principal conflict and will subsequently have 
an effect on decisions regarding voluntary disclosure.  Wright et al. (1996) argue 
53 
 
that “The nonfinancial rewards (or costs) are subject to consumption only by 
insiders, with shareholder consumption not possible”.  
Finally, the agent and principal relationship may also vary based on 
differences between the monitoring systems in place. These monitoring systems are 
based on the company’s preferred corporate governance structure. From the 
Bangladeshi perspective, reformation of the security exchange commission may 
also stimulate firms to disclose, particularly voluntary disclosures. Therefore, the 
concept of agency theory is also closely related to the research context of this study.  
  In summary, corporate governance mechanisms have been widely 
considered as vital determinants of voluntary disclosure. For instance, board, 
ownership and audit committee structures (Garcia-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2010; 
Khlif et al. 2015). These variables have been selected for the determinant of 
voluntary disclosure during the analysis phase of this research. 
3.3.1.2 Legitimacy Theory  
Within legitimacy theory, emphasis is placed on social acknowledgment, 
that is, a firm’s relationship with society or the ‘social contract’. This includes firm 
behaviour within a social framework (Nasi et al. 1997). The concept of legitimacy 
theory is outlined by Suchman (1995, p. 574) as a “ … generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”. 
Deegan (2006) elaborates on this issue by highlighting that firms should comply 
with the legal requirements imposed by society while simultaneously maintaining 
the social contract. The concept of a social contract addresses how a firm should 
operate within society by respecting the values and norms of that society. Failure 
to comply may lead to negative legal and social ramifications. Therefore, legitimacy 
theory considers how a firm should operate by satisfying the expectations of 
society, thereby legitimizing its operational activities (Deegan et al. 1996; Deegan 
& Gordon 1996; Guthrie & Parker 1989; O’Donovan 2002). In other words, 
legitimacy theory is grounded in the view that a firm should focus (or be perceived 
as focusing) on meeting its social expectations, by doing ‘the right thing’. The 
concept of ‘rightness’ in this context is based on social norms and the consequences 
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of not doing the right thing (Dowling & Pfeffer 1975; Scott 1977; Suchman 1995) 
may not be necessarily established by laws.  
Voluntary disclosure has been widely explored through the lens of 
legitimacy theory in the literature (Deegan 2002; Guthrie et al. 2006; Khan et al. 
2013; Khan 2010; Muttakin & Khan 2014; O’Donovan 2002) and their relationship 
can be identified by the following features.  
First, according to legitimacy theory, legitimizing firm activities are those 
in which a firm seeks to comply with the social values of the society in which it 
operates, and also acknowledges its activities through firm disclosures (Dowling & 
Pfeffer 1975). As a result, firms may be encouraged to focus on voluntary 
disclosures (Deegan 2002). Hence, the firm’s legitimizing efforts and voluntary 
disclosure policies may be closely related.  
Second, it has been demonstrated that a firm’s activities have a significant 
impact on its image and this can translate to increases or decreases in firm value. 
Through voluntary disclosure, firms try to communicate with stakeholders to 
maximize their wealth. So, firms continually seek to legitimize operational actions 
through various channels of communication (Deegan 2002; Deegan et al. 2002; 
Guthrie et al. 2006; O’Donovan 2002). For instance, firms focus on convincing 
stakeholders that they are adhering to the social contract in regards to their 
operational activities and that they are not doing harm to society. 
Finally, legitimacy theory emphasizes that the mechanisms of legitimacy 
may differ as the basis of a firm’s legitimacy varies according to the country 
context, community and attitudes (Deegan et al. 2000). Since context is more 
important for voluntary disclosure as it is not enforced by regulation, these factors 
must be identified and examined to unveil the most significant operational activities 
that contribute to the firm’s social contract.  
3.3.1.3 Signalling Theory  
Signalling theory, originally constructed by Spence (1973), has been used 
to explain labour market behaviour. Morris (1987) argues that the concept of 
signalling theory is applicable in any market to explore information asymmetry. An 
et al. (2011) note that a firm may reduce information asymmetry by considering 
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extra information (mostly positive information) as a signal. This extra information 
may also have an impact on stakeholders’ perceptions towards the firm and affect 
firm performance (Whiting & Miller 2008). By considering an effective signal, 
information asymmetries can be reduced, and insufficient signals may worsen 
information asymmetry problem.  
The concept of signalling and information asymmetry is closely associated 
with accounting research, particularly for voluntary disclosure issues. For instance, 
it could be argued that better signalling contributes to a firm’s performance as it 
would encourage stakeholders to reassess the value of the firm, and thus make 
decisions more favourable to the firm (Whiting & Miller 2008), and expedite 
operational activities by reducing the cost of capital (Botosan 1997; Botosan & 
Plumlee 2002; Dhaliwal et al. 2011) and cost of debt (Sengupta 1998). Therefore, 
a firm may minimize operational costs through voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, 
by disclosing voluntarily, signals about operational activities, social commitment 
and sustainability may stimulate other positive impressions of the firm thereby 
creating a good reputation. Consequently, this positive image and reduction in 
information asymmetry also leads to better performance (Anderson & Frankle 
1980; Shane & Spicer 1983).  
Therefore, based on the concept of signalling theory, voluntary disclosure 
may act as a signal. That signal may then have an effect on firm performance. 
Accordingly, this study will explore the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm 
performance using signalling theory within a combined theoretical framework. 
3.3.2 Interrelated Concepts Among the Theories  
The concepts of the considered theories (agency, legitimacy and signalling) 
overlap to provide understandings as discussed below. 
3.3.3.1 Interrelated Concepts of Agency and Legitimacy Theory 
Agency theory mainly focuses on monitoring opportunistic behaviour 
within a firm with regard to the principal and agent relationship. The goal is to 
overcome conflict by ensuring the maximum interest of the principal while 
affirming other stakeholders’ interests. In this scenario, voluntary disclosure may 
provide extra information to a range of stakeholders. This extra information may 
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encompass social, environmental and financial aspects to create real or perceived 
value for the relevant stakeholder. However, agency theory leans towards the 
creation of wealth as the resolution of conflict. This can attract significant costs and 
the interests of the principal, as the name suggests, comes first. Non-monetary 
considerations, which are no less able to be voluntarily disclosed, may not be 
addressed properly (Cormier et al. 2005). In contrast, legitimacy theory focuses on 
the macro-level, specifically the firm’s social contract.  
There appears to be some conflict between the theories. Nevertheless, an 
argument can be constructed that links the two. An establishing premise posits that 
a firm should respect social norms and values while operating. Under the concept 
of agency theory firms should primarily reduce information asymmetry and 
maximize shareholder value while managing several stakeholders. At the same 
time, ignoring social contract issues and avoiding voluntary disclosure may create 
a perception that the firm is avoiding its social obligations, thus reducing social 
welfare and jeopardizing its legitimacy. As a result, failure to voluntarily disclose 
may affect the firm’s reputation negatively and increase litigation costs. The 
satisfaction of shareholders’ interest may not be possible in this situation.  
Therefore, the concept of agency theory interacts with the concept of 
legitimacy theory. In other words, the ideas of one theory complement the power 
of another theory to shed light on a given research topic more effectively. 
 
3.3.3.2 Interactions between Legitimacy Theory and Signalling Theory 
Based on the concept of legitimacy theory, to comply with the social 
contract, a firm should respect the social values and norms. Thus, firm will focus 
on more disclosure to reflect the compliance with the society. This approach 
interacts with the concept of signalling theory. For instance, a firm that is focused 
on reducing information asymmetry may provide sufficient signals to distinguish 
itself from another firm that achieves average performance. The signalling 
mechanism can create a positive impression of the firm among stakeholders (Chau 
& Gray 2002; Watson et al. 2002). Therefore, the concepts of both theories suggest 
that firms disclose extra information for facilitating and justifying operational 
activities. Legitimacy theory focuses on voluntary disclosure as a matter of 
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accountability whilst legitimizing its operational activities. Signalling theory also 
considers the reaction from the signal receiver as a part of the interpretive 
framework in explaining information asymmetries.  
Therefore, despite having a different perspective on the role of disclosures, 
legitimacy and signalling theories both emphasize the consequences of the firm’s 
actions. For example, legitimacy theory considers the consequences of managing 
the social contract, which is also considered as a signal of the reaction from 
stakeholders.  
 
3.3.3.3 Interactions between Signalling and Agency Theory 
Signalling theory addresses information asymmetry and the probable effects 
of voluntary disclosure. For instance, under signalling theory, firms reduce 
information asymmetry by sending an effective signal to stakeholders for justifying 
their operational activities, as well as creating a positive impression. In particular, 
voluntary disclosure may reduce information asymmetry and moderate the 
approach of maximizing shareholders’ interest (firm performance) by influencing 
the cost of debt (Sengupta 1998) and capital (Botosan 1997; Botosan & Plumlee 
2002; Dhaliwal et al. 2011). Thus, by reducing information asymmetries, firms may 
ensure the maximum interest of shareholders. This concept is closely associated 
with agency theory as the reduction of information asymmetry is a common feature. 
Therefore, a combination of both theories is also helpful to guide the effects of 
voluntary disclosure. For instance, based on the nature of the signal (voluntary 
disclosure), there might be an effect on firm performance (shareholder interest). 
Therefore, from an agency theory perspective, considering agent‒principal conflict, 
the monitoring and controlling aspect, and maximizing shareholder value 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Fama 1980; Fama & Jensen 1983), an effective signal may 
facilitate a reduction in information asymmetry (Connelly 2011). Accordingly, 
voluntary disclosure may play a crucial role as a signal for moderating firm 
performance. On the other hand, the interaction and overlap between agency and 
signalling theory have already been documented in the literature (Morris 1987; 
Watson et al. 2002). In particular, due to the agent‒principal conflict, a firm may 
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consider voluntary disclosure as a medium for reducing information asymmetry and 
hence the conflict. In relation to this Morris (1987, p. 52)  states: 
Given the consistency of signalling and agency theories, it is conceivably 
possible to combine them to yield predictions about accounting choices not 
obtainable from either theory alone.  
Therefore, integration of agency and signalling theory may also guide exploration 
of the determinants of voluntary disclosure and its possible effects. 
3.3.3 Theoretical Framework for this Study 
The theoretical framework for this thesis is an adaption of An et al. (2011) 
using a combination of agency, legitimacy, and signalling theories. In the preceding 
sections, voluntary disclosure is discussed in its respective theoretical contexts and 
the interactions among the theoretical concepts are also presented as summarized 
in Figure 3-2: 
 
Figure 3-2 Integration of interrelated concepts 
The combination of agency, legitimacy and signalling theory is discussed in order 
to outline the way in which An et al.’s (2011) theoretical framework has been 
adapted.  
First, the concept of agency theory interacts with the concept of legitimacy 
theory. The idea of agency theory focuses on maximizing shareholders’ interest, 
reducing conflicts of interest and information asymmetry, while the concept of 
legitimacy theory emphasizes management of the social contract. Separately and 
independently, these two theories have been widely applied in relation to 
organizational decision making. As a result, in regard to the decision to make 
voluntary disclosures, firms act in accordance with legitimacy theory, as well as 
applying the decision-making concepts of agency theory. The complementary 
Agency Theory 
-Principal and agent conflict
-Managing stakeholders           
-Maximizing shareholders interest 
-Information asymmetry
Legitimacy Theory 
-Legitimize firm's activities 
-Social contract
- Accountablity
Signalling Theory
-Information Asymmetry
-Signalling shareholders 
other stakeholders 
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concepts that inform these respective theories are therefore integrated in the 
theoretical framework for this study. This enables a more thorough interpretation 
of data during the data capture and analysis phase of this thesis. 
Second, the concepts of legitimacy theory and signalling theory integrate as 
both theories concentrate on communicating or giving a signal to stakeholders via 
voluntary disclosure. This integration allows for the effects of voluntary disclosure 
to be more deeply explored. 
Finally, the concepts of signalling and agency theory integrate since, by 
giving a signal, a firm also intends to reduce information asymmetry. Therefore, in 
regards to the determinants of voluntary disclosure, a firm’s signalling approach 
may also be influential. 
Therefore, the integration of agency, legitimacy and signalling theory is 
associated with this study as it focuses on the examination of the determinants and 
effects of voluntary disclosure. In particular, during the decision-making process of 
voluntary disclosure, a firm should consider issues, such as, the maximization of 
shareholder interest, principal and agent conflict, information asymmetry and the 
social contract, as these issues may also have a direct effect on a firm’s operation. 
Accordingly, the integration of agency and legitimacy theory guides research 
question one to explore at what extent corporate governance characteristics act as 
an explanatory factor for voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, a firm’s attitude 
towards society and non-financial disclosure may act as a signal and affect 
perceptions of the firm for stakeholders. This perception may also have an impact 
on the operational context of a firm. Accordingly, the integration of legitimacy 
theory and signalling guides research question two to explore the effects of 
voluntary disclosure on firm performance. Finally, the effect of voluntary 
disclosure is also a significant agenda for the decision-making or controlling 
process to maintain operational activities. This context is aligned with the 
integration of signalling and agency theory. As a result, by considering the 
integration of agency, legitimacy and signalling theory, a more complete picture of 
voluntary disclosure is drawn. The key concepts of the theoretical framework for 
this study, along with the integration of considered theories and interrelated 
concepts are shown in Figure 3- 3 
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Figure 3-3 Combined theoretical framework 
 
3.4 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter review the existing theoretical frameworks within voluntary 
disclosure studies and develops a combined theoretical framework for examining 
the research questions for this study. 
The development of an appropriate theoretical framework for this study 
involves two steps. At the initial stage, individual theories were examined and 
reviewed and the combined theoretical framework elucidated. After reviewing 
various theories, the An et al. (2011) theoretical framework was found to be most 
suitable for this study, despite its limitations. At the final stage, the theoretical 
framework for this study has been constructed by following four steps. First, the 
limitations of the An et al. (2011) theoretical framework have been addressed. 
Second, the concepts of all the considered individual theories (agency, legitimacy 
and signalling) have been discussed within the context of voluntary disclosure. 
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Third, the interrelationships between agency, legitimacy and signalling theories 
have been elaborated and applied in the context of voluntary disclosure. Finally, a 
combined theoretical framework for this study has been developed. The developed 
theoretical framework provides robust guidance to investigate the determinants and 
effects of voluntary disclosure within Bangladesh, a developing country context. 
Bangladesh’s historical, regulatory, social, corporate and environmental context is 
discussed in the next chapter. This will provide a solid foundation from which to 
develop hypotheses, also discussed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Four: Research Context and Hypotheses 
Development 
4.1 Introduction 
n Chapters Two and Three the relevant literature was reviewed and a 
theoretical framework was developed to guide the selection of appropriate 
hypotheses and variables for statistical analysis. Development of a literature review 
and theoretical framework are indispensable components of a research project as 
they represent antecedents to the development of valid conclusions Kumar (2005). 
Since accounting and governance practices do not occur inherently and uniformly, 
a detailed examination of the research context is also necessary. The aim of this 
chapter is to investigate the research context from a national perspective and, by 
drawing comparisons, illustrate the nature of corporate governance principles and 
practices therein.  
Bangaldesh is the research context and the two research questions relate to 
an exploration of the determinants of voluntary disclosure by considering corporate 
governance characterstics as a potential explanatory factor and the effects of 
voluntary disclosure on firm performance. In light of the research framework, 
literature review and research context, relevant hypotheses are developed to explore 
these research questions.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides information on 
Bangladesh as the research context, including a general overview of Bangladesh in 
which the historical, economic, legal and regulatory structures are described in Sub-
section 4.2.1. Sub-sections 4.2.2, 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 introduce corporate voluntary 
disclosure reporting, the corporate governance setting and capital market status. 
Section 4.3 presents a brief discussion of the key aspects of the research setting of 
this thesis. Section 4.4 expands on the research framework by investigating the 
widely used variables that were identified in the literature review and theoretical 
framework in Chapters Two and Three.  
Section 4.5 develops hypotheses for the first research question. The 
hypotheses explore the potential determinants of voluntary disclosure by 
emphasizing corporate governance characteristics including CEO duality, board 
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size, board composition, presence and structure of sub-committees, audit committee 
independence, foreign ownership, director ownership, and institutional ownership. 
Section 4.6 presents the hypotheses related to the potential effects of voluntary 
disclosure on firm performance . A chapter summary and conclusion is presented 
in Section 4.7.   
4.2 Background of Bangladesh  
This section outlines cultural, social and other environmental factors unique 
to Bangladesh. This overview is necessary because cultural, social and other 
environmental factors influence and guide business practices (Scholtens & Dam 
2007; Husted 2000), including the historical, economic and regulatory conditions.  
4.2.1 Historical Overview 
Bangladesh is a developing country situated in the region of South Asia with 
an area of 147,570 square kilometres and a population of 161 million people (World 
Bank 2017).16 The area now known as Bangladesh was initially part of Bengal 
along with the state of West Bengal, which was a part of India (Smillie 2009). In 
1757, the British company, the East India Company, seized power from 
independent Muslim monarchs and progressively colonized what is now present-
day Bangladesh as part of a broader effort to colonize India. In 1947, a significant 
anti-colonial movement by the indigenous people of India, coupled with internal 
tensions between Hindus and Muslims, prompted the British to segregate India 
(Chowdhury 2004) thereby creating two different countries, namely India and 
Pakistan. The segregation meant that Bengal became part of Pakistan. In 1971, 
following nine months of fighting and internal political struggle, Bangladesh 
became an independent country.   
Bangladesh has a common language, Bengali, and culture. Bengali is the 
only language in the world that a country has fought to defend and many Bengali 
speakers sacrificed their lives to retain it as their official language. As Bengali was 
enshrined as the national language on 21 February 1952, the date is now known as 
                                                          
16 Source: World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/country/bangladesh Visited 5/06/17 2.07 PM 
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‘International Mother Language Day’.17 Besides Bengali, English is also widely 
spoken in Bangladesh. Islam is followed by 85% of the population; other religions 
in Bangladesh include Buddhism, Hinduism and Christianity.  
4.2.2 Economic Overview 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) locates Bangladesh as the 43rd 
largest economy in the world (in purchase-price-parity terms) with an inspiring 
track record of progress. In particular, the Bangladeshi economy has maintained 
greater than 6% growth over the decade and reached 7.1% growth in 2015/2016 
allowing it to achieve the status of a lower middle-income country in 2014 (World 
Bank 2017). 18  Due to this significant economic growth, Bangladesh is often 
considered as a new Asian tiger (Business Insider 2017).19 The growth rate of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) also shows significant potential for economic 
development in Bangladesh ( see Figure 4-1). 
 
 
Figure 4-1 GDP growth rate of Bangladesh. Source: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics20 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 Source: UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/strengthening-education-
systems/languages-in-education/international-mother-language-day Visited 5/6/2017 2.43 pm 
18 Source: World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/bangladesh/overview#1 Visited 
7/6/2017, 12.05 pm  
19 Source: Business Insider,https://www.businessinsider.com.au/bangladesh-is-the-new-asian-
tiger-2017-4?r=US&IR=T Visited 5/6/2017, 2.48 pm  
20 Source: Bangladesh Bureu of Statistics, http://www.bbs.gov.bd/site/page/dc2bc6ce-7080-48b3-
9a04-73cec782d0df/Gross-Domestic-Product-(GDP) Visited 7/6/2017 1.53 pm 
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Despite economic development, Bangladesh remains a relatively poor 
country and many people, particularly those in isolated and rural areas, still suffer 
deprivation from basic human needs; while there has been substantial progress in 
poverty reduction, the proportion of poverty is still high.21 Furthermore, income 
inequality pervades the social landscape and, when compared with other South and 
South-East Asian nations, it is considered alarming.22 Therefore, despite substantial 
economic growth, Bangladesh seeks to leverage areas where it maintains an 
economic advantage and stimulate foreign investment23 to augment the well-being 
of its citizens.  
4.2.3 Legal and Regulatory Structure Overview 
Bangladesh is regarded as a common law country and the underpinnings of 
the current legal and judicial system are based on British law (Ferdous et al. 2014; 
Panday & Hossain Mollah 2011). Panday and Hossain Mollah (2011, p. 6) indicate 
that the judicial system in Bangladesh has,  
… passed through various stages and the process of evolution has been 
partly indigenous and partly foreign and the legal system of the present day 
emanates from a mixed system which has structure, legal principles and 
concepts modelled on both Indo-Mughal and English law.  
 However, the legal system is also affected by sociocultural values and 
religious guidelines that vary from English law. Significant corporate legislation 
includes: the Companies Act 1994; the Bank Companies Act 1991; the Financial 
Institutions Act 1993; the Bangladesh Bank Order 1972; the Bankruptcy Act 1997; 
the Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969; the Securities and Exchange 
Commission Act 1993; the Securities and Exchange Rules 1987; the Insurance Act 
1938; Insurance Corporations Act 1973; and the Income Tax Ordinance 1984. 
 Besides these legal and government regulations significant regulatory 
bodies also play a crucial role in the corporate landscape of Bangladesh. Most 
notable are the BSEC, the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies and Firms (RJSC), 
                                                          
21 Source: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/bangladesh/overview Visited 10/6/2017 11.44 am  
22 Source: http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/2017/01/27/60297/Inequality:-A-wake-up-call-
for-Bangladesh Visited 7/6/2017 7.59 pm  
23 Source: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/06/05/bangladesh-needs-a-
proactive-strategy-to-address-increasing-jobs-challenges-world-bank-ilo-workshop Visited 
7/6/2017, 8.10pm 
66 
 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB), the Stock Exchanges, 
The Institute of Cost and Management Accountants of Bangladesh (ICMAB), 
Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI), and Bangladesh Bank (BB) (Arif & Tuhin 
2013; Reaz & Arun 2006; Solaiman 2006). 
 The BSEC is the primary government regulator concerned with corporate 
governance (Siddiqui 2010) and is designed to oversee capital market activities. 
The BSEC was established in 1993 when it replaced the office of the Controller of 
Capital Issues (CCI), which was formed in 1947. In particular, the BSEC 
emphasizes protection of the interests of investors, establishment of fair, transparent 
and efficient securities markets, and ensuring appropriate issuance of securities and 
compliance with securities laws.24 The Chairman and members of the BSEC are 
selected by the Government and the institution is attached to the Ministry of 
Finance. The Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969 provides the legal 
framework for the securities market.  
 The RJSC is responsible for registering companies under the Companies 
Act 1994 (Arif & Tuhin 2013). Registered firms in Bangladesh are required to 
submit all financial and non-financial information to the RJSC. It is administered 
by the Ministry of Commerce and responsible for monitoring a firms’ compliance 
with the Companies Act 1994. 
The ICAB is one of the two main professional accountancy bodies in 
Bangladesh. It was created under the Bangladesh Chartered Accountants Order in 
1973. The ICAB regulates the accountancy profession, supervises professional 
ethics and codes of conduct of its members, and provides specialized training and 
professional expertise.25 The ICAB also holds the right to conduct any disciplinary 
action against ICAB members for violation of the regulation. In 1999, the ICAB 
adopted International Accounting Standards (IASs), International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRSs), and International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) as 
Bangladesh Accounting Standards (BASs), Bangladesh Financial Reporting 
Standards (BFRSs) and Bangladesh Standards of Auditing (BSAs) respectively. It 
                                                          
24 http://www.secbd.org/ 
25 http://www.icab.org.bd/webGeneralContent/view/14245 Visited 30-11-2017 at 3.04 pm 
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should be noted that these initiatives were commenced as an outcome of a World 
Bank Grant. In regards to this grant Zaman and Shiraz (2005, p. 826) state, 
 
The IASs adoption process was initiated in August 1999 following a 
US$200,000 World Bank grant to the Bangladeshi Government for the 
development of Accounting and Auditing Standards in Bangladesh. The 
World Bank’s Institutional Development Fund (IDF) grant was targeted at 
enhancing the institutional capacity of the ICAB for the adoption of IASs in 
the country. On its part, the ICAB was required to provide the additional 
US$20,000 required to help accomplish this task. The Government then 
delegated the process to the BSEC as the main institution responsible for 
overseeing the process.  
The ICMAB is the other major professional accountancy body in 
Bangladesh and an independent professional body under the Ministry of Commerce 
of Bangladesh. This body offers professional qualifications in Cost and 
Management Accountancy, with a focus on accounting for business. 
The BEI is another private organization that focuses on corporate 
governance regulations in Bangladesh. In the year 2000, the BEI was established as 
a non-profit organization and mainly relies on funding from donors. In 2004, the 
BEI developed a code for corporate governance.  
The BB is the Central Bank of Bangladesh and was established in 1972. It 
operates under the provisions of the Banking Companies Act 1991, as amended in 
2003 and 2013, and the Financial Institutions Act 1993. The BB is also responsible 
for promoting and developing the domestic financial market. Banking and finance 
companies are regulated by the BB. 
 
4.3 The Research Setting – Voluntary Disclosure, Governance and 
Market Conditions 
This thesis examines the determinants and effects of voluntary disclosure 
with a focus on corporate governance characteristics and firm performance. Thus, 
corporate voluntary disclosure reporting, capital markets and corporate governance 
are important and discussed in the following sections.  
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4.3.1 Corporate Voluntary Disclosure Reporting in Bangladesh 
The awareness of, and importance attributed to, voluntary disclosures has 
increased in the Bangladesh corporate context in this century (Azim et al. 2009; 
Sobhani et al. 2009). In particular, as mentioned in Chapter One, voluntary 
disclosure of social, environmental and intellectual capital carries extra significance 
within the Bangladeshi context. There are several factors that explain firms’ 
voluntary disclosures. First, there are external pressures, such as those from 
international regulators and multinational firms (Belal & Owen 2007; Islam & 
Deegan 2008), as foreign ownership is one of the dominant factors driving the 
Bangladeshi capital market (Imam & Malik 2007). Second, firms may be subject to 
a threat to their reputation (Azim et al. 2009) as voluntary disclosure may stimulate 
positive returns and bolster a firm’s reputation. As a fast growing developing 
country, firms from Bangladesh are comparably more keen to provide additional 
information as a business strategy. This is advantageous as Bangladesh is anxious 
to promote foreign investment and a sound corporate reputation can enhance these 
possibilities. Subsequent foreign investment may also stimulate corporate 
accountability and reporting, thereby increasing the demand for transparency in 
business practices (Belal & Owen 2007; Muttakin & Khan 2014). Third, local 
regulators in Bangladesh have started to appreciate voluntary disclosure. For 
instance, Khan (2010, p. 85) states, 
Recently, BB encourages commercial banks to take part CSR activities 
enthusiastically, which might pave the banking sectors way to become more 
structured on the ideas of CSR issues. BB also advised banking and other 
financial institutions to move towards implementation of CSR programme.  
Fourth, firms place an emphasis on voluntary disclosure for fear of a reputational 
threat from stakeholders’ perceptions of firms (Azim et al. 2009). Therefore, by 
considering voluntary disclosures, firms may discharge formal and informal 
accountabilities and thereby reflect the imperatives of Western social values and 
norms. Finally, although the Bangladesh economy is developing, it is also subject 
to criticism for poor socio-cultural indicators and corruption at varying levels 
(Azmat & Samaratunge 2009; Islam & Deegan 2008). For issues such as poverty, 
human rights breaches, ineffective corporate governance and the impacts of climate 
change, firms may choose to emphasize voluntary disclosures (Moyeen & West 
2014).  
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 Voluntary disclosures of firms have therefore progressed as an important 
issue within Bangladesh. Many firms have already adopted voluntary disclosure in 
a bid to distinguish themselves from other firms and receive positive attention both 
locally and internationally, whilst simultaneously achieving enhanced economic 
benefit.  
4.3.2 Capital Market of Bangladesh  
In recent times, Bangladesh has significantly expanded economically with 
the number of securities, trade volume and market capitalization increasing. 
However, two significant capital market debacles have occurred. In 1996, 
regulatory failure allowing for fraudulent activity was considered as the main 
reason for a market collapse. 26  Accordingly, after the 1996 market crash, 
Bangladesh introduced a significant number of regulatory reforms to protect 
investors. Solaiman (2006, p. 203) states: 
The disaster came as a blow to investors and regulators alike. The 
government became more concerned about the market, which 
prompted the authorities to bring about further reforms in securities 
regulation.  
In 2010, a further share market collapse occurred. Among various reasons for this 
collapse was the weak enforcement capacity of the BSEC. Weak corporate 
governance mechanisms may also have contributed.27 Accordingly, further reform 
and regulations were put into place with the intention to ensure the interests of 
investors. These two events have significantly influenced Bangladeshi corporate 
regulations.   
There are two stock exchanges in Bangladesh: the Dhaka Stock Exchange 
(DSE) and Chittagong Stock Exchange (CSE). The Stock Exchanges are also 
considered as important corporate governance and firm disclosures in Bangladesh.  
The DSE was established in 1954 as the East Pakistan Stock Exchange 
Association Ltd. It started formal trading in 1956 and was renamed the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange Ltd in 1964. Due to the war for independence, trading on the DSE was 
discontinued in 1971 and resumed in 1976. The DSE is registered as a public limited 
                                                          
26 Source: http://www.thedailystar.net/law/2006/10/01/fmr.htm Visited 19/06/2017 10.31 am 
27 Source: https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/45253-002-sd.pdf 
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company, and its operations are regulated by its articles of association, along with 
the Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969, Companies Act 1994, and Securities 
& Exchange Commission Act 1993. The DSE regulations must be approved by the 
BSEC. As at December 2016, total market capitalization for the DSE was 
3412441.493 (BDT Million).28 A summary of firms listed on the DSE is presented 
in Table 4.1. 
Table 4-1 Summary of DSE listed firms 
Industry Number of firms  
Bank 30 
Cement 7 
Ceramics Sector 5 
Corporate Bond 2 
Debenture 8 
Engineering 33 
Financial Institutions 23 
Food & Allied 18 
Fuel & Power 18 
Insurance 47 
IT Sector 7 
Jute 3 
Miscellaneous 12 
Mutual Funds 35 
Paper & Printing 2 
Pharmaceuticals & Chemicals 28 
Services & Real Estate 4 
Tannery Industries 6 
Telecommunication 2 
Textile 48 
Travel & Leisure 4 
Treasury Bond 221 
Total Companies: 563 
           Source: http://www.dsebd.org/by_industrylisting1.php 
The CSE started operations in 1995. Similar to the DSE, CSE regulations 
are also subject to approval by the BSEC. It should also be noted that most of the 
securities traded on the CSE are listed on the DSE. As at December 2016, total 
market capitalization for the CSE was 2,741,343 (BDT Million)29. A summary of 
CSE firms is presented in Table 4.2. 
 
 
                                                          
28Source :  http://www.dsebd.org/recent_market_information.php Visited 10/6/2017 1.38 pm 
29Source : http://www.cse.com.bd/historical_market.php Visited 10/6/2017, 1.37 pm 
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Table 4-2 Summary of CSE listed firms 
Industry Number of firms  
Bank 29 
Cement 7 
Ceramics Sector 5 
Corporate Bond 2 
Energy 16 
Engineering & Electrical 27 
Food & Allied 12 
General Insurance 30 
ICT  7 
Life Insurance 12 
Miscellaneous 14 
Mutual Funds 35 
Paper & Printing 4 
Pharmaceuticals & Chemicals 23 
Services & Property 7 
Telecommunication 2 
Textile & Clothing 43 
Leather & Footwear 6 
Leasing & Finance 22 
Total Companies: 303 
Source: http://www.cse.com.bd/company_by_industry.php 
 
4.3.3 Corporate Governance in Bangladesh  
While Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that corporate governance 
mechanisms do not exist in less developed countries, it can be argued that this is no 
longer the case, with Bangladesh contributing to this turnaround by actively 
pursuing the adoption of international standards of corporate governance practices 
(Rashid et al. 2010).  
From a country perspective, a major aim of adopting corporate governance 
is to enhance investors’ confidence in the capital market and facilitate transparency. 
Within Bangladesh, the focus on corporate governance was prompted by the share 
market collaspes in 1996 and 2010. In particular, after the first stock market crash, 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) provided funding of $80 million as part of the 
Capital Market Development Program (CMDP). The purpose of this project was to 
improve the transparency and efficiency of the capital market and restore investor 
confidence. Furthermore, the BSEC adopted corporate governance guidelines in 
2006 (BSEC order No. BSEC/CMRRCD/2006-158/Admin/02-08, dated 20 
February 2006). In addition, other steps were initiated by international financial 
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institutions (IFI), funded by the private sector and the BEI (Sobhan 2014). The BEI 
issued the corporate governance code in 2004. At the same time, the ICAB also 
introduced a series of corporate governance principles and rules (Muzumdar 2006).  
 In 2010, the effectiveness and implications of corporate governance 
practices was questioned. In response, the BSEC reformed corporate governance 
guidelines of Bangladesh. In 2012, an amendment to the corporate governance 
guideline was made, addressing seven important issues, including: a focus on the 
number of directors; a requirement for a propotion of independent directors; 
qualifications for independent directors; addressing CEO duality; and the 
requirement for directors to report to shareholders. The 2012 guideline also 
addresses the appointment of a chief financial officer and the formation of an audit 
committee and a description for its role of its members. Moreover, reporting 
requirements and compliance issues were addressed to comply with Western 
corporate governance structures, as well as ensuring transparency to stimulate 
investor confidence. The key features of the BSEC’s corporate governance 
guidelines for 2012 are summarized in Table 4.3.  
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Table 4-3 Brief summary of the key feature of Bangladesh Security Exchange Commission Corporate Governance Guidelines 
Description 
BSEC’s Corporate Governance Guidelines (2012) 
 
  
BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
1.1 Board Size Board should have minimum 5 members with maximum members of 20. 
1.2 Board Composition 
At least one-fifth (1/5) of the total number of Directors shall be Independent Directors. The criteria for being an 
independent director is also prescribed by BSEC. 
1.3 Qualification of 
Independent Director 
Independent director shall be a knowledgeable individual with integrity who is capable of ensuring significant issues 
including compliance with financial, regulatory and corporate laws and can make a meaningful contribution to the 
business. 
1.4 Chairman of the board and 
chief executive officer 
Chairman of the board and chief executive officer should be filled by two different people. 
1.5 The Directors’ Report to 
Shareholders 
BSEC prescribed information should be included in Directors statements in the Directors' Report prepared under section 
184 of the Companies Act, 1994 (Act No. XVIIIof 1994). 
 
CHIEF FINANCIAL 
OFFICER (CFO), HEAD 
OF INTERNAL AUDIT 
(HIA), AND COMPANY 
SECRETARY (CS) 
2.1 Appointment 
Firm should appoint CFO, HIA, CS and also define their respective roles, responsibilities. 
 
2.2 Requirement to attend the 
Board Meetings 
The CFO and the CS shall attend the meeting of the Board of Directors 
  
AUDIT COMMITTEE 
3.1 Constitution of the Audit 
Committee 
Firm should have an Audit committee as a sub-committee and there should be minimum 3 members 
3.2 Chairman of the Audit 
Committee 
 
An independent member should chair the audit committee. 
3.3 Role of Audit Committee Audit committee should oversee the BSEC set roles  
3.4 Reporting of the Audit 
Committee 
Audit committee should report to the board of directors, authorities, the shareholders and general Investors 
  
EXTERNAL/STATUTORY AUDITORS 
The issuer firm should not engage its external/statutory auditors to perform the BSEC set services of the company. 
  
SUBSIDIARY COMPANY 
For a subsidiary company, BSEC set guidelines for board compositions holding company ruling is applicable. 
For a subsidiary company, at least one independent director should be from the holding company.  
The audit committee of holding firm should also review the financial statement of the subsidiary firm. 
DUTIES OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER (CEO) AND 
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER (CFO) 
The CEO and CFO should certify that they reviewed the financial statement and as on their best knowledge there are no 
transactions that involved fraudulent, illegal or violation of the company’s code of conduct. 
REPORTING AND COMPLIANCE OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
The company shall obtain a certificate from a practicing Professional Accountant/Secretary (Chartered Accountant/Cost 
and Management Accountant/Chartered Secretary) regarding compliance of conditions of Corporate Governance 
Guidelines of the Commission and shall send the same to the shareholders along with the Annual Report on a yearly basis 
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4.4 Research Framework 
For any research, a coherent and robust framework that seeks effective 
outcomes is essential. Kumar (2005, p. 94) emphasizes the significance of research 
design (framework) by stating that,  
research design is a procedural plan that is adopted by the researcher to 
answer questions validly, objectively, accurately and economically … you 
will need to detail in your research design the rationale and justification for 
each decision that shapes your answers to the ‘how’ of the research journey. 
In presenting your rationale and justification you need to support them 
critically from the literature reviewed. You also need to assure yourself and 
others that the path you have proposed will yield valid and reliable results.  
This thesis will focus on examining the determinants and effects of 
voluntary disclosure within the Bangladeshi context. For voluntary disclosure, three 
dimensions, including social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosure, are 
considered. In addition to exploring the determinants of voluntary disclosure, this 
study relies on the characteristics of corporate governance as a core aspect of a 
firms’ decision making and monitoring process. In light of the literature and 
theoretical guidelines, this study considers ten characteristics of corporate 
governance including: CEO duality, board size, board composition, existence of 
sub-committee, audit committee composition, foreign ownership, director 
ownership and institutional ownership. Furthermore, to explore the potential effect 
from voluntary disclosure, firm performance is central to the second phase of this 
research and must therefore be adequately conceptualized. This study considers 
indicators from three different approaches including: ROA, ROS, MCAP, EPS and 
Tobin’s Q. The research framework of this study is shown in Figure 4-2.  
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Figure 4-2 Research framework with the variables 
 
4.5 Hypothesis: The Relationship between Corporate Governance 
Characteristics (Determinants) and Voluntary Disclosure  
 Based on the research framework of this study (Figure 4-2) and evidence 
from the literature (refer to Chapter Two), the characteristics of corporate 
governance are considered to be used as an explanatory factor for the voluntary 
disclosure of a firm. The following sub-sections will briefly set out the central 
theoretical guideline along with existing literature relevant to each corporate 
governance characteristic and voluntary disclosures for developing hypotheses. 
4.5.1 CEO Duality 
CEO duality refers to the dual leadership structure of a firm where one 
individual performs the role of CEO and chairperson of the board (Rechner & 
Dalton 1991). In other words, CEO duality denotes the existence of dominant 
personalities (Ho & Wong 2001), who play two crucial leading roles 
simultaneously and may dominate decision making.  
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Agency theory suggests that having the same person as CEO and board 
chairman may lead to opportunistic decision making (Jensen & Meckling 1976). 
For example, the CEO may have additional information compared to other non-
executive directors. As a result, having CEO duality may provide the opportunity 
to use internal information for one’s own benefit instead of making decisions for 
the benefit of shareholders or other stakeholders. In addition, Jensen (1993) and 
Blackburn (1994) argue that CEO duality might emasculate the monitoring power 
of the board. Furthermore, it could also be claimed that it ‘opens the gate’ for the 
CEO to influence board members.  
In line with agency theory, a large number of studies posit that CEO duality 
distorts transparency as well as weakens the monitoring power of a board, for 
instance, regarding the relationship between voluntary disclosure (Allegrini & 
Greco 2013; Huafang & Jianguo 2007), intellectual capital disclosures (Cerbioni & 
Parbonetti 2007) and social disclosure (Giannarakis 2014b). These studies concur 
that CEO duality reduces the independence of the board. After considering a meta-
analysis, Samaha et al. (2015) further confirms the negative association between 
CEO duality and voluntary disclosure.  
 However, it has also been argued that CEO duality provides the benefit of a 
unified leadership structure by reducing information sharing costs and conflict of 
interest between the CEO and the board chairman (Anderson & Anthony 1986; 
Samaha et al. 2015). Thus, there could be a positive relationship between CEO 
duality and voluntary disclosure. Hidalgo et al. (2011) report a positive relationship 
(by considering nonlinear relationships) between CEO duality and intellectual 
capital disclosure after examining 100 Mexican firms. They note that the benefits 
of CEO duality outweigh the costs and that CEO duality provides the opportunity 
of effective communication in situations where it may otherwise be absent.  
In contrast, Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Cheng and Courtenay (2006), and 
Barako et al. (2006a) report no significant relationship with voluntary disclosure. 
They argue that a CEO is more concerned about his or her own performance in the 
two different roles. In addition, the CEO might be motivated to be less accountable 
to the interests of all stakeholders. Thus, the emphasis is on regular firm activities 
and mandatory disclosure rather than focusing on voluntary issues.   
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Within the Bangladeshi context, after examining 116 manufacturing firms 
from the years 2005–2009 no significant relationship between social (Khan et al. 
2013) and intellectual capital disclosure (Muttakin et al. 2015) was identified. As a 
possible reason for this finding, both studies claim that within Bangladesh the CEO 
and chairperson are very often from the same family and thus CEO duality may 
have any impact. However, after considering 155 listed firms and considering data 
from after the 2010 market collapse, Muttakin et al. (2016) reports a significant 
negative association of CEO duality with social disclosure. Their study reports that 
additional powers were conferred upon a CEO due to CEO duality and that CEO 
preferences were prevalent. Furthermore, it was noted that other directors supported 
or were otherwise influenced by the CEO’s decisions.  
  Consistent with this recent study from Bangladesh, it can be argued that 
due to extra power, a CEO may ignore criticism or negative views from other board 
members regarding voluntary disclosure items and may be more concerned about 
the operational efficiency of a firm (Muttakin et al. 2015). Thus, monitoring and 
transparency of a firm turn is less effective when CEO duality is in place (Gul & 
Leung 2004). Within the Bangladeshi context, the relationship between CEO 
duality and voluntary disclosure is not well documented, and most of the focus is 
limited to social disclosure. The results of these limited studies are also 
contradictory. Thus, further investigation involving a more comprehensive list of 
variables may provide a more in-depth understanding and situate the current study 
as a significant contributor to our understanding of corporate governance practices.  
Therefore, considering mixed findings in the literature and lack of 
documentation within Bangladesh, Hypothesis 1(a) is developed as follows:  
H1(a): CEO duality is associated with voluntary disclosure. 
 
4.5.2 Board Size  
Board size refers to the total number of directors on the board. Board size is 
a vital factor for the monitoring system of a firm and is widely considered as an 
important feature of corporate governance (Fama & Jensen 1983; Giannarakis 
2014a; Lee & Chen 2011).  
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Based on the concept of agency theory, interested parties (e.g., shareholders, 
policymakers, local stakeholders) expect adequate information (disclosure) from 
the board of directors since they are nominated to represent their interests 
(Davidson et al. 1996). This implies that a diverse and larger board can contribute 
to the production of adequate information. A larger board size can accumulate 
greater experience, knowledge (Haniffa & Cooke 2002) and expertise based on the 
various backgrounds of individual members. Given this relationship, a larger board 
provides an opportunity to improve the decision-making processes of a firm by 
utilizing the values, skills and experience of directors, which can potentially lead to 
the improvement of voluntary disclosure practices. Brown et al. (2006) advocate 
larger board size. They suggest that ethics, social values and the will to perform 
certain activities (such as donations for social events or helping poor people in the 
community) vary from person to person, and that larger boards offer the scope to 
have social values represented on the board.  
A significant number of prior studies investigating this issue has suggested 
that a larger board size is positively associated with voluntary disclosure, including 
social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosures. Allegrini and Greco 
(2013) assert that a larger board may offer a wider ownership representation and 
may therefore place emphasis on a broader range of stakeholders. Akhtaruddin et 
al. (2009) put forward the idea that the collective expertise and experience of larger 
boards facilitates the improvement of corporate control, transparency and value 
creation. Transparency, in particular, implies that firms may be more attentive to 
voluntary disclosure. In addition, regarding social disclosure, Esa and Anum Mohd 
Ghazali (2012) suggest that larger board size contributes to a diversity of experience, 
knowledge and skills. This diversity may stimulate transparency and a concern for 
social issues, thereby leading to an augmented civic approach by the company. The 
upshot of this scenario is that the company may be more attuned to the concerns of 
a wider range of stakeholders and may, therefore, disclose a broader set of 
information voluntarily. This perspective is further evidenced by Giannarakis 
(2014b), who explains that a larger board stimulates board monitoring. There is also 
support for the larger board in relation to intellectual capital disclosures. 
Abeysekera (2010) put forward that a larger board has the potential to bring in the 
various resources needed to meet global challenges more effectively. Moreover, 
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after applying a meta-analysis of 64 studies, Samaha et al. (2015) strongly supports 
the positive association between board size and voluntary disclosure in relation to 
environmental issues, similar to that presented by Esa and Anum Mohd Ghazali 
(2012) 
In contrast to the supporting arguments presented above, a larger board is 
criticized for a potential lack of communicative ability as it is challenging to 
manage effective communication among a large number of people. Jensen (1993, 
p. 865) asserts that having a small board is more efficient at monitoring and control 
of the CEO. In addition, John and Senbet (1998) indicate that, due to complicated 
communications, the benefit of the larger board may be outweighed by delayed 
decision making. Chen (2008) further criticizes larger boards by arguing that 
smaller boards encounter fewer obstacles. Furthermore, Vafeas (1999) advocate for 
a smaller board since, due to poor communication, an overbearing CEO may 
dominate a larger board. Consistent with the argument that a larger board may lead 
to poor monitoring, for environmental disclosure, Rao et al. (2012) argue that 
disclosure decisions require significant involvement and coordination, which may 
be difficult to achieve with a larger board. Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) write that 
a larger board is negatively associated with intellectual capital disclosure. Similarly, 
Veronica  and Bachtiar (2010) report a negative relationship with social disclosure. 
However, it can also be argued that board size is not significantly associated 
with voluntary disclosure. For example, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) report no 
significant relationship after considering 104 firms listed on the Singapore Stock 
Exchange (SGX) in 2000. In addition, after considering 91 Spanish firms in 1999, 
Arcay and Vazquez (2005) report the same result.  
Within the context of Bangladesh, the relationship between board size and 
voluntary corporate disclosure is not well documented. After considering 120 listed 
firms Rouf (2011) reports a positive relationship with voluntary disclosure. 
Muttakin et al. (2016) further find a positive relationship with social disclosure.  
Based on the above discussion, it appears that there is support for the idea 
that larger board size provides an opportunity for a firm to gather expertise, 
experience and knowledge that is vital for the functions of monitoring and control. 
Furthermore, due to the presence of a more diverse range of people on the board, 
80 
 
the values and intentions inherent in larger boards varies. This may lead to a push 
for greater transparency thereby encouraging voluntary disclosure. Such positive 
attitudes are tempered by another, perhaps smaller, group of researchers who 
present the argument that having more people causes communication problems and 
disagreement with regard to items of voluntary disclosure.  
Within the Bangladeshi context, the relationship between board size and 
voluntary disclosure is not well documented. With the paucity of research in this 
context, it is difficult to predict how board size will influence voluntary disclosure. 
The perspective adopted in the following hypothesis is consistent with the larger 
group of researchers who suggest that increased board size leads to greater 
transparency, which leads to the production of more voluntary disclosure  
Therefore, considering mixed findings in the literature and lack of 
documentation within Bangladesh, hypothesis 1(b) is developed as follows:  
H1(b): There is an association between board size and voluntary disclosure. 
4.5.3 Board Composition   
Board composition refers to the proportion of independent directors as well 
as the gender and nationality of board members. For this aspect, the proportion of 
non-executive directors is considered to be the most significant factor having an 
impact on decision making and control (Dalton et al. 1998).  
This topic can be viewed in light of agency theory, which suggests that the 
management of the firm is in the hands of directors who are potentially 
opportunistic and can manipulate accounting numbers for their own interest 
(Shleifer & Vishny 1997). It is argued that the presence of independent directors on 
the board may improve monitoring and also reduce agency conflicts and subsequent 
costs (Fama & Jensen 1983). It is further argued that the augmented monitoring 
function may enhance corporate transparency by encouraging voluntary disclosure 
and further reduce agency costs (Healy & Palepu 2001). Taken together, these 
arguments imply that greater transparency, coupled with the potential increase in 
voluntary disclosure, means that independent directors facilitate the reduction of 
information asymmetry (Allegrini & Greco 2013; Porta et al. 2002). Furthermore, 
independent directors emphasize the development of a positive reputation, whether 
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artificially projected, genuine or perceived. In this scenario, voluntary disclosure 
becomes the mechanism used to relay a signal of effective management (Patelli & 
Prencipe 2007). It is expected that the presence of independent directors on the 
board may therefore have a major role in policymaking regarding voluntary 
disclosure.  
A significant number of studies consider board composition, and the 
presence of independent directors in particular, as an important factor that 
contributes to the voluntary production and communication of certain social, 
environmental and intellectual capital disclosures. Of these studies, many propose 
that the presence of independent directors is positively associated with voluntary 
disclosure. Cheng and Courtenay (2006) base their exploratory study on a data set 
of 104 firms from the Singapore stock exchange for the years 1998 and 2000 and 
find a positive relationship. Lim et al. (2007) also present evidence that board 
composition and the presence of independent directors, in particular, is positively 
related to the preparation of voluntary disclosures. After applying a meta-analysis 
of 27 studies, Garcia-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta (2010) report that voluntary 
disclosure increases as the proportion of independent directors increases. Samaha 
et al. (2012) have a similar finding from their examination of 100 Egyptian listed 
firms. This positive association is further confirmed by Samaha et al. (2015) in their 
meta-analysis of 64 studies. These findings support the argument that an increased 
proportion of independent directors increases the monitoring capability of a firm 
and stimulates transparency. 
However, it could also be argued that independent directors are more 
concerned with firm performance and keen to reduce any additional cost to increase 
profitability. Thus, independent directors may ignore any additional disclosure for 
cost-efficiency reasons. Accordingly, Eng and Mak (2003) and Barako et al. (2006b) 
report a negative relationship between independent directors and voluntary 
disclosure. In addition, Esa and Anum Mohd Ghazali (2012) suggest a negative 
relationship between independent directors and social disclosure after examining 
27 Malaysian firms for the years 2005 and 2007. This study asserts that independent 
directors might be more concerned with firm financial performance while social 
issues are not a priority.  
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Aside from these positive and negative correlations, some studies report no 
significant relationship between independent directors and voluntary disclosure. 
Alves et al. (2012) report an insignificant relationship after examining 140 Iberian 
Peninsula (38 Portugal and 102 Spain) firms for the year 2007. Similarly, Ho and  
Wong (2001) and Hidalgo et al. (2011) report no significant relationship after 
examining 97 Hong Kong firms for the year 1997 and 100 Mexican firms for the 
years 2005 to 2007 respectively.   
 In the Bangladeshi context, Muttakin et al. (2016) consider board 
independence as a control variable and assert a positive relationship between the 
proportion of independent directors and social disclosure. Khan et al. (2013) have 
similar findings in their longitudinal study over the years 2005 to 2009 from a data 
set of 116 manufacturing firms. This study asserts that independent directors are 
utilized by Bangladeshi firms to manage social issues and are inserted as a 
functioning element of the monitoring mechanism. Similarly, Khan (2010) also 
reports a positive relationship between board composition and social disclosure 
after examining 30 banks for the period 2007–2008 and determines that non-
executive directors are keen to legitimize firm activities by considering social issues. 
In addition, Rashid and Lodh (2008) document a significant positive relationship 
for social disclosure. Regarding intellectual capital disclosures, Muttakin et al. 
(2015) report a positive relationship with independent directors after examining 116 
non-financial firms for the period 2005 to 2009.  
The majority of studies above suggest that the presence of independent 
directors increases the monitoring ability of a firm and stimulates the desire for 
transparency. A smaller group argues that independent directors are more keen to 
demonstrate their aptitude for operational efficiency whilst ignoring optional 
agendas related to voluntary disclosure. From the limited set of prior studies in 
Bangladesh, it was argued mainly that board composition, specifically the amount 
of independent directors, is significant for monitoring and legitimizing firm 
activities and that presence of independent directors is positively associated with 
voluntary disclosure.  
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Therefore, considering mixed findings in the literature, hypothesis 1(c) is 
developed as follows: 
H1(c): There is a relationship between board composition and voluntary 
disclosure. 
4.5.4 Sub-committee   
A sub-committee facilitates the monitoring activity of a firm. From the 
perspective of agency theory, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that audit, 
nomination and remuneration sub-committees perform specific responsibilities in 
the decision-making, as well as the control process, of a firm. Therefore, the 
operational activities of firms can be monitored more intensively. This may, in turn, 
stimulate voluntary disclosure and reduce information asymmetries (Collier 1993; 
Fama 1980; Vafeas 2000).  
Carson (2002) describes the role of the audit, nomination and remuneration 
committees. The audit committee plays a key role for firm monitoring and 
regulatory compliance. The nomination committee considers directors’ skills and 
reviews the performance of the board on a regular basis. The remuneration 
committee focuses on the terms and conditions of remuneration offered to senior 
management of a firm. A firm may consider utilizing sub-committees to ensure that 
monitoring activities are conducted in an efficient manner, to enforce better control 
and transparency, and to reduce information asymmetry.  
Consistent with the concept of agency theory, prior studies have also 
documented that sub-committees play a key role in decisions relating to voluntary 
disclosure, with the audit committee, in particular, considered an important factor. 
Forker (1992) argues that the existence of audit committees improves internal 
control and leads to better disclosure in an examination of UK firms, reporting a 
positive but weak association between the existence of an audit committee and 
share-option disclosure. Consistent with this argument, Ho and Wong (2001) 
explore 98 Hong Kong firms and report that the existence of an audit committee 
had a significant positive relationship with voluntary disclosure. Barako et al. 
(2006b) finds support for this positive relationship based on a study of Kenyan 
firms. Consistent with such results, Arcay and Vazquez (2005) also report that the 
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existence of an audit committee is positively associated with the voluntary 
disclosure of a firm. Allegrini and Greco (2013) further argue that having sub-
committees, including a nomination, audit and compensation committee, provides 
the opportunity to set strong internal controls and monitoring presence thereby 
ensuring that the interests of all stakeholders are considered. A positive relationship 
has been documented by O’Sullivan et al. (2008) based on a sample of Australian 
firms.  
In the context of Bangladesh, there is no regulatory requirement to establish 
sub-committees, such as a nomination or remuneration committee. In the absence 
of these committees, the audit committee has been the primary focus of Bangladeshi 
studies. The 2006 guidelines30 (p. 4) from the BSEC highlights the audit committee 
issue by stating that, 
The Audit Committee should assist the Board of Directors in ensuring that 
the financial statements reflect a true and fair view of the state of affairs of 
the company and in ensuring a good monitoring system within the business. 
A further guideline was established regarding the formation of an audit committee 
in 2012 (Amendment to the Corporate Governance Guidelines). This guideline was 
developed by the BSEC. Consequently, a research agenda focusing on the audit 
committee has emerged. Rouf (2011) argues that firm monitoring is more effective 
with the existence of an audit committee. After examining 120 non-financial firms, 
this study provides evidence of a positive correlation with voluntary disclosure. 
Khan et al. (2013) further suggest that the existence of an audit committee is 
positively associated with corporate social disclosure.  
Based on the above discussion it is argued that the presence of a sub-
committee increases the monitoring capability and transparency of a firm. 
However, within Bangladesh, the relationship between sub-committees, 
particularly the nomination and remuneration committees, and voluntary 
disclosure, are not explored adequately. To fill this gap, this study considers the 
existence of two sub-committees and their respective impacts on voluntary 
disclosure.  
                                                          
30 http://www.secbd.org/Order%20relating%20to%20Corporate%20Governance%20Guidelines-
9%20Jan06.pdf Visited 2/06/2015 6.20PM 
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Therefore, considering limited documentation in the Bangladeshi context, 
hypothesis 1(d) is expressed as follows: 
H1(d): There is an association between the presence of sub-committees and 
voluntary disclosure. 
4.5.5 Audit Committee Composition  
Audit committee composition refers to the proportion of independent 
directors present, as well as the gender and nationality of committee members. The 
proportion of independent directors on the board is considered to be the more 
important issue as prior studies demonstrate that their presence is a more effective 
mechanism for stimulating monitoring and internal control and subsequent 
voluntary disclosure of a firm (Fama & Jensen 1983; Madi et al. 2014) 
 Agency theory suggests that the establishment of an audit committee is a 
catalyst for a reduction in information asymmetry and opportunistic behaviour by 
managers, and also improves disclosure quality (Akhtaruddin & Haron 2010; 
Chung et al. 2004). Fama and Jensen (1983) further argue that the existence of 
independent directors facilitates the effective monitoring of management behaviour. 
Within contemporary corporate governance systems, it is expected that the function 
of audit committees is reinforced by the presence of independent directors (Haji 
2015). Independent audit members are expected to be more effective as they are 
likely to be free from influence and pressure from management (Abbott et al. 2000; 
Jun Lin et al. 2008) as they do not have a conflict of interest.  
In prior studies, the existence of an audit committee and its relationship with 
voluntary disclosure practices is widely explored (Alves et al. 2012; Arcay & 
Vazquez 2005; Barako et al. 2006b; Ho & Wong 2001). Other studies extend this 
understanding by considering the effects of audit committee composition on 
voluntary disclosure practices. Akhtaruddin and Haron (2010) report that having 
independent directors is positively associated with voluntary disclosure after 
examining 124 Malaysian firms for the year 2003. They argue that having 
independent directors on the audit committee helps to achieve an effective 
monitoring system and reduces agency problems, as well as opportunistic 
behaviours by owners. Consistent with this argument Madi et al. (2014) provide 
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evidence of a positive association between audit committee composition and 
voluntary disclosure after examining 146 Malaysian firms for the year 2009. Haji 
(2015) further supports the finding that audit committee composition has a positive 
relationship with voluntary disclosure.  
However, Li et al. (2012) report no significant relationship between audit 
committee composition and intellectual capital disclosure after examining 100 
listed firms on the London Stock Exchange for the year 2005. A similar 
insignificant relationship has been reported by Othman et al. (2014). They examine 
the top 100 Malaysian firms for the year 2011.  
Within the context of Bangladesh, the relationship between audit committee 
composition and voluntary disclosure is not yet documented. It should be noted that 
a limited set of studies considers the effects of audit committee existence on 
disclosure (Khan et al. 2013; Muttakin et al. 2015; Rouf 2011) but audit committee 
composition has not been the focus of Bangladeshi studies. The BSEC emphasized 
audit committee composition in its 2012 corporate governance guidelines. Based 
on this, it could be argued that audit committee composition may play a vital role 
in improving firm transparency within the Bangladeshi context. 
The limited studies above suggest that there may be a positive association 
between audit committee composition and voluntary disclosure. In particular, 
having independent directors may facilitate the reduction of information asymmetry 
and augment the monitoring system of a firm. However, within the Bangladeshi 
context, this relationship is not known yet.  
Therefore, considering mixed findings in the literature and a lack of 
documentation within Bangladesh, this study forms the following hypothesis:  
H1(e): Audit committee composition is associated with voluntary 
disclosure. 
4.5.6 Foreign Ownership  
Foreign ownership is the proportion of a firm owned by foreign investors. 
Regarding this form of ownership, firms have to emphasize effective 
communication with stakeholders to reduce information asymmetry as language 
might act as a barrier (Haniffa & Cooke 2002; Huafang & Jianguo 2007).  
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From the context of agency theory, Mangena and Tauringana (2007) and 
Young and Guenther (2003) argue that foreign investors require more information 
to have a better understanding of firm activities. Higher agency costs may therefore 
be expected as foreign ownership increases. To ensure transparency, more 
disclosure is required from the firms with foreign ownership.  
Suchman (1995, p. 574) approaches this concept from the perspective of 
legitimacy theory, which he summarizes neatly as: 
Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.  
Firms with foreign owners must pay extra attention to information asymmetry in an 
environment where language, values and norms differ between countries. Haniffa 
and Cooke (2005) reinforce this, suggesting that the existence of foreign investors 
may result in an increased legitimacy gap. As a result, a firm must use voluntary 
disclosure to legitimize operational activities, satisfy foreign investors and attract 
investment capital. Therefore, in line with agency and legitimacy theories, firms 
emphasize reducing information asymmetry and legitimizing operational activities. 
 Consistent with agency and legitimacy theories, a large number of prior 
studies argue that foreign ownership positively influences firms’ voluntary 
disclosure policies. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) suggest foreign ownership is 
positively associated with voluntary disclosure and argue that the monitoring 
function is a pivotal reason for this focus. Barako et al. (2006a) report similarly and 
argue that, due to the geographical separation of owners and management, firm 
management might be motivated to disclose more information. Huafang and 
Jianguo (2007) use a data set of 599 Chinese firms to lend further weight to the 
positive association between voluntary disclosure and foreign ownership.  
In contrast, Laidroo (2009) argues that firms with foreign investors are 
mainly controlled by foreign interests where local investors have less influence on 
firm decision making. As a result, there is a negative association between foreign 
ownership and voluntary disclosure as there is less incentive to maintain a positive 
reputation. Laidroo considers the years 2000 to 2005 for 52 firms from three 
European emerging capital markets in the Baltics – the Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius 
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Stock Exchanges. A negative relationship between foreign ownership and voluntary 
disclosure was reported.  
Veronica  and Bachtiar (2010) do not find any significant relationship 
between foreign ownership and voluntary disclosure after examining 87 listed firms 
on the Indonesian Stock Exchange for the year 2003. The design of this study may 
be the primary reason as the proportion of foreign investors may not have been 
enough to influence the results.  
 Within the context of Bangladesh, Khan et al. (2013) report a positive 
association between foreign ownership and social disclosure after examining 116 
manufacturing firms from 2005 to 2009. They argue that firms are keen to satisfy 
foreign investors, thereby maintaining legitimacy by disclosing social issues. More 
recently, Muttakin et al. (2015) report a positive association between foreign 
ownership and intellectual capital disclosure with the argument that foreign 
investors are uncertain about emerging markets like Bangladesh. As a result, extra 
disclosure is demanded. This study considers 135 manufacturing firms from the 
years 2005 to 2009. 
The above suggests that prior studies have contradictory findings, with one 
group of researchers arguing that foreign ownership stimulates firm monitoring and 
positively influences firm performance, while the other argues that foreign 
ownership has less influence and negatively influences voluntary disclosure.  
Therefore, considering mixed findings in the literature, hypothesis 1(f) is as 
follows: 
H1(f): Foreign ownership is associated with voluntary disclosure. 
4.5.7 Director Ownership  
Director ownership refers to the proportion of shares owned by the board of 
directors of a firm. The board of directors is closely associated with the formation 
of the firm’s policies, and individuals on the board are collectively involved in 
developing the overall strategic vision of the firm. These individuals therefore play 
an important role in the controlling and decision-making processes of a firm (Eng 
& Mak 2003; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Khan et al. 2013).  
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In the context of agency theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that 
director ownership ensures that the interests of the directors and shareholders are 
aligned. Consistent with this view, it can be argued that due to director ownership 
a firm may promote transparency by considering additional information. Ideally, in 
an environment where shareholders voice concerns about social issues, this may 
contribute to the value of a firm. However, McConnell and Servaes (1990) argue 
that directors may use information asymmetries to maximize their own benefit 
instead of the best interests of the firm. For instance, directors have better access to 
internal information. As a result, opportunistic directors may limit available 
information to gain a benefit from ownership. Thus, director ownership may, in fact, 
reduce the amount of relevant voluntary disclosure offered to stakeholders.  
Leung and Horwitz (2004) find a mixed relationship between board 
ownership and voluntary disclosure after studying 376 Hong Kong firms for the 
year 1996. They report that low director ownership (less than 25%) is positively 
associated with voluntary disclosure but that this relationship is negative when 
director ownership is higher (more than 25%). Other studies reported positive 
relationships between managerial ownership and voluntary disclosure After 
examining 100 Chinese firms, Li and Qi (2008) report a positive relationship. In 
addition, Jiang and Habib (2009) reveal a positive association after examining 467 
samples in a longitudinal study for the period 2001 to 2005.  
Other empirical studies support a negative relationship between director 
ownership and voluntary disclosure. Eng and Mak (2003), for instance, report a 
negative association between managerial ownership and voluntary disclosure, 
concluding that director ownership leads to agency conflicts and monitoring 
problems. Ghazali and Weetman (2006) also report a negative relationship after 
examining Malaysian listed firms for the year 2001. Mohd Ghazali (2007) further 
report on this negative association from a social disclosure perspective, finding that 
director ownership may lead to an agency problem. For instance, having director 
ownership means there is relatively low interest from outsiders. Accordingly, there 
is decreased firm accountability due to less pressure from external stakeholders. As 
a result, directors may not be motivated to incur extra costs for the outsider. 
Therefore, there is a negative relationship between director ownership and 
voluntary disclosure of a firm. 
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 In contrast, Gul and Leung (2004), Huafang and Jianguo (2007), and 
Samaha et al. (2012) fail to find any relationship between director ownership 
(managerial) and voluntary disclosure after examining 385 Hong Kong, 559 
Chinese and 100 Egyptian firms respectively.  
In the Bangladeshi context, Khan et al. (2013) report a negative correlation 
between social disclosure and managerial ownership. They argue that this form of 
investor is more powerful compared to others and, thus, they ignore social 
accountability. In a further analysis, they find within export oriented firms that 
director ownership is positively associated with social disclosure. They argue that 
Western stakeholders may exert pressure on firms to consider social issues. While 
findings such as these present a reasonable base from which to develop further 
studies, it should be also noted that the relationship between director ownership and 
voluntary corporate disclosure has not been investigated widely within the context 
of Bangladesh. For instance, the relationship between director ownership and 
environmental and intellectual capital voluntary disclosure has not yet been 
examined. 
The above discussion demonstrates that there are mixed findings regarding 
the relationship between director ownership and voluntary disclosure within the 
literature. Results from the Bangladeshi context are limited to those pertaining to 
social disclosure and there is no investigation that has delved into environmental or 
intellectual capital issues. The current research agenda represents a step towards 
filling this research gap. The following hypothesis, once tested, will provide 
evidence and contribute to a much richer understanding of corporate social 
disclosure in the Bangladeshi context.  
Therefore, considering mixed findings in the literature and lack of 
documentation within Bangladesh, the hypothesis linking director ownership and 
voluntary disclosure is as follows:  
H1(g): Director ownership is  associated with voluntary disclosure. 
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4.5.8 Institutional Ownership  
 Institutional ownership refers to investors of a firm that are financial 
institutions including banks, corporations, mutual funds and superannuation funds 
(Farrar 2008). In regards to firm ownership structure, institutional ownership is 
considered to be an important factor as these investors have the capability and 
resources to access more information compared to smaller shareholders (Smith 
1976). Furthermore, as professional investors, institutional shareholders are more 
suited to interpreting information because of their expertise in the field. Their 
combined voting power provides further privilege (Bos & Donker 2004; Chung et 
al. 2002; Donnelly & Mulcahy 2008). Therefore, institutional investors may 
demand detailed information and play an important role in the monitoring process 
of a firm as well as potentially contributing to the transparency of a firm’s actions 
(Aggarwal et al. 2011; Barako et al. 2006a). 
 Based on the concept of agency theory, a firm’s monitoring process is a 
significant factor in reducing agency–principal conflict (Jensen & Meckling 1976). 
Institutional owners play a significant role in the monitoring process and can 
potentially reduce monitoring costs because of their expertise, which can be applied 
in a scaled fashion. A corollary to this is that institutional investors may place 
greater emphasis on voluntary disclosure thereby reducing information 
asymmetries (Diamond & Verrecchia 1991; Haniffa & Cooke 2002).  
 Regarding social and environmental disclosure, Solomon and Solomon 
(2006) argue that active engagement and representation of institutional investors 
enhances corporate governance mechanisms and encourages the firm to focus on 
social, ethical and environmental areas. Boone and White (2015) support this view 
and claim that higher institutional ownership reduces information asymmetry, 
which reduces monitoring costs and the subsequent trading costs of a firm. 
Similarly, Barako et al. (2006a) assert a positive association after investigating 43 
Kenyan firms from the years 1992 to 2001. This study presents the argument that 
institutional investors positively influence voluntary disclosure through their role 
as an effective monitor and through their expert and active engagement with firm 
governance. Similarly, Ntim et al. (2012) suggest a positive association after 
conducting research on 169 South African firms for the period 2002 to 2006. 
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Laidroo (2009) reports a positive relationship, arguing that institutional owners are 
more powerful and demand additional information when compared to other 
investors. Khlif et al. (2016) lend further strong support in favour of the positive 
association between institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure after 
reviewing 69 prior studies.  
Conversely, institutional investors are often most concerned with 
maximizing short term financial returns and it could be argued that institutional 
investors are more likely to have direct access to the required information from a 
firm; thus firms may not emphasize voluntary disclosure. In addition, the expected 
return from institutional investors is not typically achieved or observable through 
the discharge of informal accountabilities such as those espoused by voluntary 
disclosure, hence this type of information is not the focus of institutional investors. 
Consistent with these arguments, Jiang and Habib (2009) report a negative 
relationship with voluntary disclosure.  
 In contrast, several studies report that there is no significant relationship 
between institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure. For example, Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002) and Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) report an insignificant 
relationship after examining 167 Malaysian and 51 Irish firms respectively.  
Within the context of Bangladesh, Farooque et al. (2007, p. 131) state that, 
“… the institutional setting for ownership structure in Bangladesh has unique 
features, an appreciation of which is important to understanding the governance 
mechanisms and processes that have evolved in Bangladesh”. However, the 
relationship between institutional ownership and voluntary corporate disclosure has 
not been investigated widely. Institutional investor ownership and its relationship 
with other forms of voluntary disclosure, like environmental and intellectual capital 
disclosures, have not been explored. Regarding social disclosure, Rashid and Lodh 
(2008) considered 21 firms for the periods 2003–2004 and 2006–2007 and reported 
that there is no significant relationship between institutional ownership and social 
disclosure. They outline possible future research agendas and encourage further 
study for the post 2006 period. Despite these early and insightful attempts, 
contemporary analyses on this topic are lacking and the relationship between 
institutional ownership and corporate voluntary disclosure is not well documented.   
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Therefore, considering mixed findings in the literature and lack of 
documentation within Bangladesh, the present study considers the following 
hypothesis: 
H1(h): There is an association between institutional ownership and 
voluntary disclosure. 
4.6 Hypothesis: The Relationship between Voluntary Disclosure 
and Firm Performance (Effects)  
Besides the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and 
voluntary disclosure, the research framework (Figure 4-2) also presents evidence 
from the literature (refer to Chapter Two) that voluntary disclosure of a firm may 
affect firm performance. Based on the concept of signalling theory, voluntary 
disclosure of a firm is a medium of communication and acts as a signal from a firm 
to stakeholders. Depending on the quality of the signal, a firm may reduce 
information asymmetry and establish effective communication. Accordingly, based 
on the nature of the signal (voluntary disclosure) there might be an impact on the 
operational cost and reputation of a firm (Anderson & Frankle 1980; Shane & 
Spicer 1983), which may subsequently affect firm performance. Legitimacy theory 
is also relevant here as voluntary disclosure reflects a firm’s compliance with the 
social contract, including the norms and values of a firm. By considering voluntary 
disclosure, a firm may overtly display compliance with the social contract. Such 
compliance may create a positive image, which may add value to a firm, thereby 
positively affecting firm performance. 
Within the literature, a significant number of studies has considered the 
above phenomenon. There have been mixed findings between countries and the 
time periods and methods adopted have varied quite significantly (Griffin & Mahon 
1997; Margolis et al. 2009; Margolis & Walsh 2003; Molina-Azorín et al. 2009; 
Orlitzky et al. 2003; Wang et al. 2016). By reviewing prior studies concerning the 
effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance, three types of effect are 
identified: positive, negative and neutral. 
A large number of prior studies report that voluntary disclosure has a 
positive effect on firm performance and these positive findings are supported by 
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various arguments (Griffin & Mahon 1997; Margolis & Walsh 2003; Molina-
Azorín et al. 2009; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Wang et al. 2016). For instance, it has been 
argued that, by considering voluntary disclosure, firms may receive a positive 
response regarding product or premium price (Bhattacharya & Sen 2003). Also, 
some studies find that by considering voluntary disclosure (intellectual capital), 
firms intend to convey good news, such as value-related information, to 
stakeholders and this may lead to an increase in market capitalization (Anam et al. 
2011; Uyar & Kılıç 2012). This argument suggests that voluntary disclosure acts as 
a signal to convey good news to stakeholders. It is further argued that voluntary 
disclosure (social disclosure) can be leveraged as a strategic mechanism used to 
generate profit by complying with the expectations of different stakeholders, 
thereby adhering to social imperatives (Chen & Wang 2011; Cheng et al. 2016).  
It is also reported that firms with objective or extensive voluntary disclosure 
are more likely to have lower financing costs (Aerts et al. 2008; Cormier & Magnan 
2007), which may lead to better firm performance. Also, by disclosing voluntarily, 
firms may retain quality employees and increase productivity, which may lead to a 
reduction of costs (Cormier et al. 2011; Qiu et al. 2016; Siegel 2009). Voluntary 
disclosure may also facilitate the reduction of information asymmetries. In addition, 
voluntary disclosure is considered a potent rhetorical mechanism used to deflate 
public pressure within the social/political context and demonstrate compliance with 
social norms and values, (Gray et al. 1995; Patten 2002; Suchman 1995). Voluntary 
disclosure may therefore act as a signal, ensuring better communication between 
the firm and stakeholders (Lin et al. 2012). This signalling device may help a firm 
create a better image and/or reputation (Miles & Covin 2000) ultimately leading to 
better firm performance. A significant number of prior studies provide empirical 
evidence that supports this line of reasoning and shows that voluntary disclosure 
has a positive effect on firm performance (Abdolmohammadi 2005; Anam et al. 
2011; Chen & Wang 2011; Cheng et al. 2016; Chi 2009; Choi et al. 2010; Garay et 
al. 2013; Khlif et al. 2015; Montabon et al. 2007; Prado-Lorenzo et al. 2008; Uyar 
& Kılıç 2012). 
Although the majority of prior studies report the positive effects of 
voluntary disclosure on firm performance, a significant number of studies report a 
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negative effect (Griffin & Mahon 1997; Margolis & Walsh 2003; Molina-Azorín et 
al. 2009; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Wang et al. 2016). To explain these results, it has 
been argued that the shareholder may perceive financial performance as more 
important than voluntary disclosure and that too much emphasis on voluntary 
activities will reduce the profitability of the firm (Li et al. 2017; Lima Crisóstomo 
et al. 2011). It is also argued that voluntary disclosure is subject to extra costs that 
lead to reduction of the competitiveness of a firm as well as financial performance 
(Friedman 1970; Mathuva & Kiweu 2016). In addition, some stakeholders may 
ascribe little importance to social information; thus voluntary disclosure may have 
a negative influence on firm performance (Lima Crisóstomo et al. 2011) due to the 
extra costs involved. In line with these arguments various prior studies report that 
voluntary disclosure has a negative effect on the firm performance (Chen et al. 
2016; Li et al. 2017; Lima Crisóstomo et al. 2011; Mathuva & Kiweu 2016). 
Besides the positive and negative effects of voluntary disclosure on 
performance, it is also reported that there is no significant effect from voluntary 
disclosure to firm performance (Griffin & Mahon 1997; Margolis & Walsh 2003; 
Molina-Azorín et al. 2009; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Wang et al. 2016). For example, 
Aras et al. (2010) argue that voluntary disclosure is a broad issue and perhaps not 
sufficiently related to firm financial and economic performance from a developing 
country perspective. Cormier and Magnan (2007) report that voluntary disclosure 
has a significant effect on market value in Canada; however, there is no significant 
effect for Germany and France. To explain these results, authors have argued that 
due to a varied socio-economic context, the significance of disclosure might be 
different among users. It is further argued that investors may not rely on these 
disclosures to make a decision. In particular, investors might be more concerned 
with financial return than social information. 
Very little investigation has taken place within the context of Bangladesh. 
Hossain et al. (2015) only investigate the effects of various categories of social 
disclosure on firm performance by considering three indicators: ROA, ROE and 
Tobin’s Q. They report a significant positive effect on return on asset and return on 
equity, explaining that voluntary disclosure may act as a competitive advantage for 
firms. Whilst this study offers significant findings, there is a major limitation as the 
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data set (2008 to 2012) is located within the period of the 2010 share market 
collapse. As a result, the findings may be skewed. This type of study is rare in the 
Bangladeshi context and focused on social comparators. The impact of other forms 
of voluntary disclosure, that is, environmental and intellectual capital, on firm 
performance is also scarce.  
Based on the above discussions, there are mixed finding regarding the 
effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance. However, it is worthwhile 
noting that the majority of studies investigating the relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and firm performance report a positive effect. Very few studies focus on 
the Bangladeshi context. The present study attempts to address this gap by 
formulating hypotheses that have not yet been considered in the Bangladeshi 
context. The hypotheses are consistent with other models found in the literature and 
hypothesis two is developed as follows:  
H2: Corporate voluntary disclosure is positively associated with firm 
performance.  
Prior studies have considered several indicators of firm performance. The 
indicators of firm performance are categorized as accounting, marketing and mixed. 
It should be noted that a wide range of firm performance indicators considered in 
the literature are potential contributors to mixed results. For a broader 
understanding, this study considers indicators from each main category. 
Accordingly, the significant and widely used five indicators,31 including Return on 
Asset, Return on Sales, Market Capitalization, Earning per Share and Tobin’s Q, 
are considered for this study. Therefore, hypothesis two is sub-categorized into five 
sub-hypotheses as follows: 
H2(a): Corporate voluntary disclosure is positively associated with return on asset 
H2(b): Corporate voluntary disclosure is positively associated with return on sales 
H2(c): Corporate voluntary disclosure is positively associated with market capitalization  
H2(d): Corporate voluntary disclosure is positively associated with earnings per share 
H2(e): Corporate voluntary disclosure is positively associated with Tobin’s Q 
                                                          
31 Further justification for considering these firm performance indicators are provided in Chapter 
five. 
97 
 
4.7 Summary and Conclusions  
The purpose of this chapter was to explore the research setting, provide the 
research framework, and develop relevant hypotheses for this thesis. Consistent 
with the research agenda this chapter exposes the key issues and a general overview 
of Bangladesh, including historical, regulatory and environmental perspectives. 
The status of corporate voluntary disclosure reporting and the capital market in 
Bangladesh was also discussed. A brief review of corporate governance 
mechanisms in Bangladesh and their relationship with the regulatory structure was 
provided. 
The research framework was informed by relevant models in similar 
research contexts found in the literature. The development of a detailed research 
framework was described, in particular, the way in which several significant 
characteristics of corporate governance including CEO duality, board size, board 
composition, sub-committee, audit committee independence, foreign ownership, 
director ownership and institutional ownership may be considered as potential 
determinants of voluntary disclosure. In addition, to explore the effect of voluntary 
disclosure, return on assets, return on sales, earnings per share, market 
capitalization and Tobin’s Q were considered as indicators of firm performance. . 
To explore the determinants of voluntary disclosure, hypotheses were 
developed by considering eight significant corporate governance characteristics. 
An additional hypothesis was also constructed to examine the effects of voluntary 
disclosure on firm performance, including five sub-hypotheses with relevant 
indicators of firm performance. The following chapter sheds light on the research 
design for this thesis. In particular, Chapter five will describe sample design, source 
of data, the measurement of the dependent, independent and control variables, 
research models and the statistical techniques employed to test the hypotheses 
articulated in this chapter.  
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Chapter Five: Research Methodology and Method 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the research method selected to investigate the 
hypotheses developed in Chapter Four. The selection of an appropriate research 
approach (method) is essential to achieve reliable results (Kothari 2004). The 
significance of the research method is articulated by Kumar (2005, p. 41): 
An extremely important feature of research is the use of appropriate 
methods. Research involves systematic, controlled, valid and rigorous 
exploration and description of what is not known and establishment of 
associations and causation that permit the accurate prediction of outcomes 
under a given set of conditions.  
The first requirement of a quantitative approach is to select an appropriate 
sample for the study. The top 200 firms (based on market capitalization) from 
Bangladesh provide the sample for this study since firms with higher market 
capitalization are considered more proactive in making voluntary disclosures 
(Abeysekera 2010; Mohd Ghazali 2007). Data is collected for three years (2011 to 
2013) from the sampled firms for voluntary disclosure practices. The year 2011 was 
chosen because, after the Bangladesh share market collapse in 2010, significant 
changes were made, including the Dhaka stock exchange reformation and 
introduction of new guidelines to increase transparency. This study considers 
annual reports of firms to investigate voluntary disclosure as they are widely 
considered to be reliable (Abeysekera & Guthrie 2005; Botosan 1997; Khan et al. 
2009). In addition, this study relies on a lag year of voluntary disclosure and collects 
data for firm performance from the years 2012 to 2014. The Bloomberg database is 
used to collect financial performance data as market-related information is not 
available in annual reports. 
To quantify voluntary disclosure data, a voluntary disclosure index was 
constructed based on the disclosure items and rationales of pioneering studies. 
Consistent with the literature, unweighted content analyses of annual reports have 
been conducted to measure and quantify index items, eight significant corporate 
governance characteristics, and five widely used indicators of firm performance. In 
addition, consistent with the literature, Firm Size, Leverage, Industry and Current 
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Year Firm Performance are considered as control variables and act as moderating 
factors in this study 
This study consists of two research models. Model One investigates the 
determinants of voluntary disclosure by considering voluntary disclosure as the 
dependent variable and corporate governance characteristics as the independent 
variables. Model Two investigates the effect of voluntary disclosure by considering 
voluntary disclosure as the independent variable and firm performance as the 
dependent variable. 
To analyse the data, several statistical analyses are applied. First, 
descriptive statistics are conducted to find the mean, median and standard deviation 
of variables. Second, tests of error including normality, multicollinearity, 
heteroscedasticity and endogeneity are conducted as these are essential before 
proceeding with statistical analysis (Rashid 2015a). Third, panel data analysis by 
applying pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used to investigate the 
research questions. To confirm the results, two stage least squares (2SLS) 
regression is applied. Finally, to ensure robustness, two different tests have been 
considered for each research model: an additional endogeneity test, considering 
alternative measurement for corporate governance characteristics, by replacing the 
classification of voluntary disclosure with three special categories (social, 
environmental, intellectual capital).  
The remainder of Chapter Five is organized in the following manner. 
Section 5.2 outlines the sample design, sources of data and collection process for 
this study. Section 5.3 elaborates on the voluntary disclosure measurement process. 
The measurement process of corporate governance characteristics is examined in 
Section 5.4. Section 5.5 presents the measurement process of firm performance 
variables. Section 5.6 presents the measurement process of the control variables for 
this study. Section 5.7 presents the research models for this study. Section 5.8 
discusses the statistical analyses that are applied in this study. Finally, the 
conclusion of the chapter is provided in Section 5.9.  
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5.2 Sample Design and Sources of Data  
According to Kothari (2004, p. 56), a “(r)esearcher must select/prepare a 
sample design which should be reliable and appropriate for his research study”. 
Details of sampling design and sources of data for this study are outlined below.  
5.2.1 Firm Selection  
The reason for exploring the determinants and effects of voluntary 
disclosure for the top 200 listed firms (based on market capitalization at 31 
December 2013) on the Dhaka Stock Exchange is that it is expected that the top 
firms voluntarily disclose financial and non-financial information proactively 
(Belal 2001). In addition, firms with higher marker capitalization are considered to 
have extra resources compared to other firms (Adams et al. 1998; Andrew et al. 
1989) and this allows them to focus on voluntary disclosure. This is particularly 
relevant for firms in a developing country context. Furthermore, sampling based on 
the market capitalization approach is consistent with prior studies (Belal 2001; 
Guthrie & Parker 1990; Rashid & Lodh 2008).  
Within the top 200 firms, there are a few sectors, including the bond, 
insurance and mutual funds sectors, which have significantly different reporting 
structures. Thus, the data (financial performance) may not be consistent with other 
sectors. As a result, the bond, insurance, and mutual funds sectors are excluded 
from this study, leaving 157 top firms (77% of total market equity and 67.0% of 
total sample). In addition, 23 firms have been omitted due to missing information. 
Therefore, the final sample consists of 134 firms (68% of total market equity and 
45.0% of total sample). Sectorial sampling information along with sectorial 
disaggregation is shown in Table 5.1.  
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Table 5-1 Sectorial sample details 
             * (77% of Total Market Equity & 67% of Total Sample Size), ** (68% of Total Market Equity &    
           45% of Total Sample Size) 
 
5.2.2 Year Selection  
Within the Bangladeshi context, the years 2011 onwards are considered to 
be significant for two reasons. First, the BSEC suffered a severe stock market 
collapse due to a price bubble in 2010 (Barua et al. 2014). The stock market adjusted 
and returned to normal in 2011. As a result, considering data from 2011 onward 
avoids distortions from the share market collapse.  
Second, following the share market collapse, the Bangladeshi government 
initiated reform of the SEC and introduced various guidelines to improve firm 
transparency.32 It should also be noted that very few studies on voluntary disclosure 
have considered the years 2011 and onwards.  
 Finally, most prior studies within the Bangladeshi context are limited to a 
particular year (Belal 2000, 2001; Khan et al. 2009). However, studying multiple 
periods can produce stronger findings (Akhtaruddin & Haron 2010). To explore the 
effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance, a lag year concept has been 
                                                          
32 http://www.secbd.org/AR2010-2011English.pdf.P. 16 
Sector Total Firms 
Firms within 
Top 200 
Firms Included 
in Sample 
Bank 30 30 30 
Cement 7 7 6 
Ceramic 5 3 3 
Engineering 26 18 12 
Food & Allied 17 9 8 
Fuel & Power 15 13 12 
IT 6 2 1 
Miscellaneous 9 6 4 
NBFI 23 22 19 
Pharmaceutical 24 19 16 
Service & Real Estate 3 3 3 
Tannery 5 3 3 
Telecommunication 2 2 2 
Textile 31 18 13 
Travel & Leisure 3 2 2 
Bond 3 2  0 
Insurance 46 31  0 
Mutual Fund 41 10  0 
Paper & Printing 1 0  0 
Jute 3 0  0 
Total 300 200*  134** 
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considered to avoid a causality problem between voluntary disclosure and firm 
performance (Chen & Wang 2011; Waddock & Graves 1997) as it could be argued 
that disclosure might not effect firm performance immediately. It should also be 
noted that consideration of a lag year for disclosure is consistent with the research 
design adopted in prior studies (Chen & Wang 2011; Cheng et al. 2016; Veronica  
& Bachtiar 2010). Therefore, to explore the effects of voluntary disclosure, firm 
performance data are collected from the years 2012 to 2014.  
Based on the selected 134 firms, a final sample yielded 402 firm-year 
observations. The summary of the sampling years is presented in Table 5.2.  
 
Table 5-2 Summary of sampling period 
Variables Period 
Voluntary Disclosure Data collection period 2011 to 2013. 
Corporate Governance Characteristics Data collection period 2011 to 2013. 
Firm Performance as Effect Data collection period 2012 to 2014. 
Control Variables Data collection period 2011 to 2013. 
 
5.2.3 Sources of Data 
This study relies on secondary data from two different sources including 
annual reports and information retrieved from the Bloomberg Database. In the 
following, sources are discussed along with justification for their use.  
5.2.3.1 Annual Report as a Source of Data 
This study considers annual reports as a source of voluntary disclosure. 
There are some significant reasons to consider the annual report as a source of data. 
First, the annual report is a common and trusted source of both financial and non-
financial information from a firm (Botosan 1997) where significant issues and 
concerns are expressed comprehensively (Abeysekera & Guthrie 2005; Khan et al. 
2009). Second, the annual report is readily available as a source of reliable 
information (Unerman 2000), both in hard copy and electronically. Finally, the 
measurement of voluntary disclosure in this study is achieved through content 
analysis. Voluntary disclosure that is published in other forms (i.e., web) is not 
helpful for content analysis as it is quite difficult to retrieve the publication date. 
Furthermore, online publications encompassing voluntary disclosures are not 
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commonly used within every sector in Bangladesh (Michelon & Parbonetti 2012; 
Rashid 2015a). Within the context of Bangladesh, annual reports are considered to 
be the most extensive and recognized document for a firm’s communication on a 
regular basis (Belal 2000; Khan & Ali 2010; Khan et al. 2009).  
 Nonetheless, the annual report does not necessarily encompass all aspects 
of firm performance indicators and pertinent information on financial performance, 
for example, market-related indicators, in particular, may not be included.  
5.2.3.2 Bloomberg Database as a Source of Data 
The Bloomberg Database is used to gather firm performance data as it 
provides access to current and historical financial information, including 
accounting and market-based data for local and international firms. 
5.3 Voluntary Disclosure  
 There are various ways to identify and measure a firm’s voluntary 
disclosures. According to Hassan and Marston (2010, p. 9):  
... we present measures of disclosure provided in prior studies classified into 
two approaches. The first approach includes proxies for disclosure, which 
are not directly based on examining the original disclosure vehicle(s). The 
second approach provides measures of disclosure obtained by inspecting the 
original disclosure vehicle(s).  
The first approach does not assess the original disclosure and is dependent on the 
perceptions of an individual or group regarding the disclosure. A disclosure index 
is widely considered as appropriate within the literature (Cerf 1961; Guthrie et al. 
2004; Haniffa & Cooke 2002; Khan et al. 2013; Lim et al. 2007; Marston & Shrives 
1991; Muttakin et al. 2015). Moreover, Marston and Shrives (1991, p. 195) state: 
One research instrument that has been used in numerous publications is an 
index of disclosure of particular information in company reports. Such an 
index aims to show the level of disclosure in a set of company accounts.  
Therefore, consistent with the literature, this study also considers a disclosure index 
as a measurement process of voluntary disclosure as discussed in the following 
section.  
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5.3.1 Voluntary Disclosure Index 
Implementing the measurement of the level of disclosure is a scientific 
approach. To describe the disclosure index Coy et al. (1993,p. 122 ) states: 
A qualitative-based instrument designed to measure a series of items, which 
when aggregated, gives a surrogate score indicative of the level of 
disclosure in the specific context for which the index was devised.  
Measuring disclosures by considering a disclosure index was first introduced by 
Cerf (1961). It should be noted that, for the construction of a voluntary disclosure 
index, no ingrained or agreed upon theoretical direction has been established, 
therefore, the development of a new index should be based on the objectives of a 
research problem (Artiach & Clarkson 2011; Samaha et al. 2015).  
There are two different procedures for gathering items that comprise a 
voluntary disclosure index. One approach is to construct an entirely new index. The 
other approach is to develop an index in light of existing index items (used in prior 
studies) and possibly alter these based on methodological requirements and a 
particular research context (Vu 2012). Developing an index in light of an existing 
index is a procedure that is widely considered (Anam et al. 2011; Barako et al. 
2006a, 2006b). On the other hand, development of an entirely new index can be 
risky in terms of the researcher’s time constraints and may be subject to criticism. 
Therefore, this study employs and tailors an existing voluntary disclosure index that 
has been deemed to measure voluntary disclosure reliably (Abeysekera 2007; Belal 
et al. 2010; Clarkson et al. 2008; Hackston & Milne 1996; Haniffa & Cooke 2005; 
Kamal & Deegan 2013; Khan et al. 2013; Muttakin et al. 2015; Nurunnabi et al. 
2011; Ullah et al. 2013).  
In summary, voluntary disclosure of Bangladeshi firms sampled in this 
study is measured using a voluntary disclosure index. The measurement of 
voluntary disclosure is achieved by the following four steps. First, preliminary 
items for the voluntary disclosure index based on the existing literature are selected. 
Second, these initially selected items are reviewed and altered to ensure there is no 
ambiguity. Third, the score for the voluntary disclosure index is calculated. Finally, 
several tests to confirm the reliability and validity of the index are conducted and 
the construction of a voluntary disclosure index is completed. All four steps are 
discussed in the following sections.  
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5.3.2 Select Preliminary Items for Voluntary Disclosure Index  
This study emphasizes important types of voluntary disclosure used in 
business enterprises and researched in the literature. Accordingly, social and 
environmental disclosures are considered important types of voluntary disclosure 
and it is well documented that firms utilize social and environmental disclosures to 
legitimize their operational activities (Meek et al. 1995). Gray et al. (2001, p. 330) 
also notes the significance of corporate social and environmental disclosure by 
stating that, “… a substantial body of literature from a wide spectrum of theoretical 
positions concludes that social and environmental disclosures are an important 
phenomenon employed by corporations for a variety purposes”. Corporate social 
and environmental disclosures also carry extra significance as the local community, 
policymakers and various social and environmental organizations are important 
stakeholders and therefore require or desire this type of disclosure. In addition to 
the social and environmental features of voluntary disclosure, information related 
to the intellectual capital of a firm is also considered as vital. The intellectual capital 
of a firm is located in the firm’s associations, structures and people, and adds value 
to the firm by creating and maintaining creativity, innovation, information 
technology, interpersonal activities and competitive advantage (Appuhami & 
Bhuyan 2015; Guthrie 2001). Intellectual capital also has the potential to enhance 
the efficiency of applied capital and labour (Petty & Guthrie 2000, p. 156). 
Information related to intellectual capital that is voluntarily disclosed is therefore 
considered to be similarly vital for assessing and evaluating the future prospects of 
a firm.  
A firm may provide an extensive array of extra information from different 
aspects – social, environmental and intellectual – and communicate with a diverse 
range of users. The significance of these three types of voluntary disclosure has also 
been observed in prior studies. In particular, several meta-analyses have found that 
social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosures are the most significant 
and widely used voluntary disclosures (Garcia-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2010; 
Samaha et al. 2015). 
Therefore, this study gathers voluntary disclosure items from these three 
important types of voluntary disclosures. Items are collected based on previous 
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studies in the voluntary disclosure literature. Studies from the Bangladeshi context 
have been considered to ensure that disclosure items are relevant and applicable. 
Figure 5-1 presents the relevant studies that are considered for gathering social, 
environmental and intellectual capital disclosure items.  
 
Figure 5-1 References for the Categories of voluntary disclosure 
5.3.2 Review Selected Items for Voluntary Disclosure Index  
 
After gathering various voluntary disclosure items from the selected prior 
studies, a total of 119 disclosure items has been selected. It should also be noted 
that prior studies have considered various sub-categories for social, environmental 
and intellectual capital disclosures. In particular, social, environmental and 
intellectual capital disclosures are sub-categorized into 8, 11 and 3 categories 
respectively. Figure 5-2 presents details of all the sub-categories.   
 
 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Social Disclosure
(Hackston and Milne 1996, 
Haniffa and Cooke 2005, 
Kamal and Deegan 2013, 
Khan et al. 2013)
Environmental Disclosure
(Belal et al. 2010, Clarkson et 
al. 2008, Kamal and Deegan 
2013, Ullah et al. 2013)
Intellectual Capital 
Disclosure
(Abeysekera 2007, 
Muttakin et al. 2015, 
Nurunnabi et al. 2011)
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Figure 5-2 Categories of voluntary disclosure 
 Based on Figure 5-2, social and environmental disclosures are divided into 
a wide range of sub-categories. For instance, social and community, environmental 
audit, environmental initiatives, vision and strategy, and so on. These sub-
categories focus on the nature of the disclosure only. However, social and 
environmental disclosure could be sub-categorized from the context of decision 
making as well. For instance, firm disclosures is an outcome of the strategic 
decision-making process, and such a concept might be applied for categorizing 
social and environmental disclosures. Accordingly, the main focus is placed on both 
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long and short term issues (Banks & Wheelwright 1979). In addition, Carroll (1991, 
p. 44) notes that, when considering social aspects, a firm must manage several 
stakeholders and make decisions in both long and short-term contexts. However, 
there might be some disclosures that may not fall within these two types but cover 
basic information or general comment. By considering the focus of the 
aforementioned decision-making process, a firm’s social and environmental 
disclosures could be sub-categorized into three categories: strategic/long term 
focused disclosure, current/short-term focused disclosure and generic focused 
disclosure. Several insights and details of the sub-categorization are discussed in 
the following: 
 First, some disclosures emphasize the strategic agenda of a firm with a 
long-term focus. Such strategic disclosure may be considered as critical and 
requires in-depth attention from the firm’s strategic decision makers. A large 
number of costs may also be involved. For instance, based on a firm’s governance 
structure, its vision and strategy regarding social issues is considered to be the most 
critical component. Consequently, for a long-term focus, firms may have to redirect 
resources accordingly by deploying relevant staff members or employing experts in 
the field. Consideration of this type of disclosure may add value in the future and 
may not necessarily attract an immediate payoff. As a result, it could be argued that 
a firm considers such disclosures as a strategic response with a long-term focus. 
Social disclosures such as this, though arduous and potentially costly, represent an 
important legitimizing tool of business Summerhays and de Villiers (2012) have 
demonstrated that long-term disclosures, in this case environmental with aspirations 
of gaining social legitimacy, played a vital role for the six largest oil producers in 
the wake of the Gulf of Mexico oil spill of 2010. Their study noted that these 
companies focused on carefully planned, strategic and positive environmental 
responses to draw attention to their business cause while simultaneously avoiding 
litigation. 
 Second, other types of voluntary disclosure simply outlay the current status 
of social/environmental issues in the company or relay information on decisions 
regarding disclosures. Such actions may be considered as short-term strategic 
decision making. An example of this is reporting on the decision to donate in 
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response to a social or environmental event. Such disclosure is considered to be a 
short-term effort to attract customers or deflect criticism. A firm’s involvement in 
society and local communities can be mediated. For example, firms are particularly 
aware of issues related to pollution that can affect their short-term profitability.  
Finally, besides specific strategic/long term and current/short-term 
strategies relating to social and environmental issues, there are other types of 
disclosures that limit social and environmental concerns by expressing a general or 
moral initiative. This type of disclosure practice could be seen as isolated, require 
little or no significant investment or initiative, for example, if a firm makes a moral 
statement or a statement for public awareness. However, it might still convey a 
positive impression of the firm to stakeholders. The concept of general disclosure 
is also argued by De Villiers and Van Staden (2006) for environmental disclosures. 
Therefore, in line with the strategic context of a firm, the final category of social 
and environmental disclosures is termed generic disclosure.  
In light of the above, this thesis has extended sub-categories in relation to 
voluntary disclosure and strategic management: long-term, short-term, and generic 
voluntary disclosure (See Figures 5-3 & 5-4).  
 
Figure 5-3 Categories of social disclosure 
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Figure 5-4 Categories of environmental disclosure 
 
Intellectual capital disclosure is not sub-categorized based on the concept of 
strategic decision making. Intellectual capital of a firm exists within activities such 
as value adding, human structure, relationships in developing and maintaining 
creativity, innovation, information technology, interpersonal activities, and 
competitive advantage (Appuhami & Bhuyan 2015; De Santis & Giuliani 2013). 
As a result, internal, external and human capital might add value to the firm. 
Accordingly, there is scope to consider any capital from a generic perspective. 
Therefore, the sub-categorization of intellectual capital disclosures for this study is 
consistent with prior studies (Abeysekera 2007; Muttakin et al. 2015; Nurunnabi et 
al. 2011). 
Initially, 119 voluntary disclosure items have been identified. A further 
review identifies three important constraints for the voluntary disclosure items. 
First, some of the disclosure items might be considered in the context of mandatory 
disclosure policies. Items that appear in the mandatory requirements are excluded 
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as this study particularly focuses on voluntary disclosure with regards to legitimacy 
(social contract), signalling (decision usefulness) and agent‒principal relationships. 
Second, items in the various sub-categories should not be duplicated. A further 
check is performed to ensure this does not happen. Finally, all items are assessed 
and evaluated within the context of Bangladesh. For instance, the items are based 
on those used within a Western country context and there might be some items that 
are not applicable to Bangladesh. To avoid these pitfalls, all the items have been 
reviewed to confirm that they are applicable to the research context. 
A final list of 80 items is considered including 30 social, 28 environmental 
and 22 intellectual capital disclosure items. Table 5.3 provides a summary of 
voluntary disclosure items; detailed lists of all the voluntary disclosure items are 
shown in Appendix E.    
  
Table 5-3 Summary of voluntary disclosure index category 
                                       
Disclosure Name 
Sub-category 
Number 
of items 
Social Disclosure                   
(Total 30 items) 
Strategic or long-term social disclosure  19 
Current or short –term social disclosure 9 
Generic social disclosure 2 
Environmental Disclosure           
(Total 28 items) 
Strategic or long-term environmental disclosure 13 
Current or short-term environmental disclosure  12 
Generic environmental disclosure 3 
Intellectual Capital Disclosure 
(Total 22 items)  
Internal capital disclosure 5 
External capital disclosure 9 
Human capital disclosure 8 
Voluntary Disclosure 
Social + environmental+ intellectual capital 
disclosure 
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5.3.3 Calculating Scores for the Voluntary Disclosure Index  
 Content analysis is “… a research technique for making replicable and valid 
inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” 
Krippendorff (2004, p. 18). In other words, content analysis is a technique of data 
collection and analysis that codes information into several groups and makes cogent 
and relevant inferences regarding those groups.  
 Within the context of voluntary disclosure, several calculation techniques 
of content analysis have been employed to transform language used in annual 
reports into quantitatively analyzable numbers. Word counting (Deegan & Gordon 
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1996; Haniffa & Cooke 2005; Haniffa & Cooke 2002; Rashid & Lodh 2008), 
counting the number of sentences (Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007; Deegan et al. 2000; 
Hackston & Milne 1996) and calculation of the percentage of pages or number of 
sentences covering relevant information (Adams et al. 1998; Belal 2000; Unerman 
2000) are examples of this technique. Within the various counting approaches, the 
nomination of only one approach to abstract the ‘unit of analysis’ is a difficult 
process (Gray et al. 1995). For example, the main obstacle to using a coding method 
based on the proportion of page, or number of words or sentences is the varying 
formats of annual reports from firm to firm. There are many variations in regards 
to font style, size, expression and syntax. In addition, the page size of the annual 
report varies from firm to firm. It is also important to mention that the coding 
method by proportion of page, or number of words or sentences is not helpful for 
understanding the meaning of the disclosure. Thus, from the unit of analysis aspect, 
proportion of page, or counting words or sentences may not be adequate for 
capturing the appropriate information.  
The focus on a particular word may also be an inadequate abstraction as the 
precise meaning of the disclosure may not be revealed. To resolve this issue, 
Unerman (2000) asserts that, after finding a word, focusing on the whole sentence 
to understand its meaning may be a necessary step to appropriately interpret the 
information and subsequently categorize data correctly. This reduces the chance of 
including data that does not accurately reflect the intended meaning, thereby giving 
us a more robust method of analysis (Hackston & Milne 1996; Milne & Adler 
1999). This study utilizes this approach and explores voluntary disclosure by 
focusing on both the words that are listed in the index and the whole sentence 
surrounding that word to understand the disclosure context. 
After finding the disclosure item, the allocation of a score is required for the 
voluntary disclosure index. There are two techniques for allocating scores: 
weighted and unweighted. The weighted method assigns a score to every disclosure 
item from a range (e.g., 1 to 5) after assessing the significance of the disclosure 
item. In contrast, unweighted disclosure considers every disclosure item to be 
equally significant and allocates the same value. The unweighted approach has been 
widely used in prior studies (Khan et al. 2013; Khan 2010; Muttakin & Khan 2014) 
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and is deemed to be preferable to the weighted index (Lim et al. 2007). In particular, 
there are some distinct features of an unweighted index that make it superior. The 
unweighted approach is appropriate for all user groups (Cooke 1989) as the 
weighted index is generated by various users and may reflect the bias of a specific 
group (Marston & Shrives 1991). A weighted technique is more appropriate if the 
research emphasizes particular users of voluntary disclosures instead of diversified 
users. A potential scoring bias and scaling problems may also results in a 
misleading perception (Chow & Wong-Boren 1987) and firms better at disclosing 
significant items are also better at disclosing less significant items (Meek et al. 
1995). Advocating an unweighted index, Cooke (1989, p. 182) argues; 
[t]he additive model used here is unweighted. The implied assumption is 
that each item of disclosure is equally important. Clearly one class of user 
will attach different weights to an item of disclosure than another class of 
user. However, the focus of this research is not on one particular user group 
but rather all users of corporate annual reports. An approach which tried to 
encapsulate the subjective weights of a multitude of user groups would be 
unwieldy and probably futile. 
Since the research context of this thesis is not limited to a particular group, every 
disclosure item is regarded as equally important; prior studies on voluntary 
disclosure that employ both weighted and unweighted approaches find no notable 
difference between the two approaches (Barako 2004; Chow & Wong-Boren 1987). 
Based on the preceding discussions, the benefits of the unweighted approach were 
greater than the benefits of the weighted approach for the research context of this 
thesis. Therefore, unweighted is more appropriate for this research and has been 
adopted for measuring voluntary disclosure index. For example, ‘1’ is awarded for 
disclosing one item, otherwise ‘0’. Accordingly, a firm is awarded based on total 
number of disclosure while the maximum possible score is 80 as there are 80 
disclosure items.    
Some disclosure items may not be applicable for every sector and this may 
also distort the score for the voluntary disclosure index. This complication is more 
relevant for environmental disclosures. For example, the scope of the 
environmental disclosure may not be same for the service and manufacturing 
industries and in the service and leisure sector no significant environmental impact 
based on their operations occurs, therefore, this sector may come with minimal 
114 
 
disclosures. To resolve this potential problem, this study omits irrelevant items for 
a particular firm (sector) and deems them to be ‘Not Applicable’. The voluntary 
disclosure index (VDI) is calculated by considering the proportion of disclosures 
made by the firm and maximum possible score for that firm. Accordingly, the 
measurement of voluntary disclosure is based on the following formula,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where,  
VDIt = Voluntary Disclosure Index of ith firm categories,.  
SDIit = Sum of the total number of points awarded for social disclosure to the firm i. 
EDIit = Sum of the total number of points awarded for environmental disclosure to the firm i,  
ICDIit =Sum of the total number of points awarded for intellectual capital disclosures to the  
firm i,  
Ni  = the maximum number of items which the firm is expected to disclosure. For instance,  
N <80 
 
5.3.4 Reliability and Validity Test of the Voluntary Disclosure Index  
Personal judgment is required to create a voluntary disclosure index. The 
subjectivity involved in the method is considered a major limitation of content 
analysis (Allegrini & Greco 2013; Healy & Palepu 2001). However, this limitation 
is overcome through rigorous and careful assessment. Several in-depth assessments 
of the disclosure index are found in prior studies (e.g., Botosan 1997; Cheng & 
Courtenay 2006). Assessments of reliability, defined as a reasonable quantitative 
abstraction of reality, and validity of the index are both important (Allegrini & 
Greco 2013; Saunders 2011).  
Reliability of the measurement index implies that results can be reproduced 
in a consistent manner. Marston and Shrives (1991, p. 197) assert that  
[t]he index scores awarded to companies can be considered to be reliable if 
the results can be replicated by another researcher. Since the scores are 
extracted from printed annual reports which remain constant over time there 
is no obstacle to repetition.  
 There are three common ways to achieve this, including inter-coder reliability, 
test‒retest and assessment of internal consistency (Hassan & Marston 2010). These 
common procedures for assessing reliability are discussed below. 
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In cases where there is a single coder, inter-coding reliability is ensured if 
the disclosure items are well explained and the decision of the coder is made after 
a sufficient period of training (Guthrie et al. 2003; Guthrie et al. 2004; Milne & 
Adler 1999). This study uses disclosure items tested in previous studies along with 
precise sub-categories and the coder has undergone continuous training with an 
expert supervisor over an extended period.  
Assessing reliability by applying the test‒retest approach is implemented by 
following several steps. First, the whole annual report was read and understood 
before initiating the coding process. This is a necessary step to ensure that the coder 
has an adequate understanding and knowledge about the disclosure of the annual 
report. This approach further facilitates identification of the applicable and non-
applicable items in the annual reports (Omar & Simon 2011). Second, the coding 
for the entire sample has been completed by spending around six months 
investigating the data. This is a sufficient amount of time to deem the coding 
process reliable, assuming the researcher is well trained. Finally, a random sample 
of several firms has been coded again to compare with the previous score. Since, 
the results from the random check aligned with the initial coding, the test‒retest 
process supports the conclusion that the voluntary disclosure index measurement is 
reliable.  
Assessing reliability by examining internal consistency among the 
disclosure items has been implemented through the statistical approach of 
Cronbach’s alpha. Cronbach's coefficient alpha (Cronbach 1951) has been widely 
used in prior voluntary disclosure studies to assess the reliability of the constructed 
voluntary disclosure index (Allegrini & Greco 2013; Bontis et al. 2007; Botosan 
1997). In particular, Cronbach’s alpha assesses whether various categories of the 
measurement complement each other to ensure the reliability of the measurement 
(Hassan and Marston 2010). Cronbach’s alpha expresses a value between 0 to 1, 
and an alpha value over .80 confirms internal consistency for the measurement 
(Allegrini & Greco 2013; Field 2005). Accordingly, this study considers 
Cronbach’s alpha tests to assess internal consistency as a part of reliability for the 
constructed index. This study explored the Cronbach’s alpha for three broad 
categories of voluntary disclosure, and the result is demonstrated in Table 5.4 
116 
 
 
Table 5-4 Summary of Cronbach’s alpha test for main categories 
Disclosure Name 
Number of 
items 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Cronbach’s alpha 
(if item deleted) 
Social Disclosure  30  
 
 
0.904 
0.810 
Environmental Disclosure   28 0.889 
Intellectual 
Capital Disclosure 
22 0.886 
 From Table 5.4, Cronbach’s alpha value 0.904 demonstrates that the 
reliability of this index is strong (Allegrini & Greco 2013; Botosan 1997; Field 
2005; Gul & Leung 2004; Khan et al. 2013). To ensure further assurance of internal 
consistency, three sub-categories of each of the main categories are also assessed. 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.882, along with a higher value ‘Cronbach's alpha if item 
deleted’, for each sub-category supports the conclusion that every aspect of this 
voluntary disclosure index is reliable (see Table 5.5).  
 
 Table 5-5 Summary of Cronbach’s alpha test for voluntary disclosure categories  
Based on the results, it is concluded that all the necessary requirements for 
a reliable disclosure index have been satisfied. Accordingly, the measurement of a 
voluntary disclosure index in this study is deemed reliable and operable.  
Ensuring the validly of a disclosure index is another important factor. 
Saunders et al. (2007) p. 614) defines validity as: “the extent to which data 
collection methods accurately measure what they were intended to measure”. In 
other words, the validity of an index can be established when the purpose of the 
study is reflected accurately within the index (Marston & Shrives 1991; Omar & 
Simon 2011). Marston and Shrives (1991, p. 198) recommend that an index could 
Disclosure Name 
Disclosure    
sub-category  
Number 
of items 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Cronbach’s alpha 
(if item deleted ) 
Social 
Disclosure 
Strategic or long-term Social 19 
 
 
 
0.882 
0.873 
Current or short-term Social 9 0.857 
Generic Social 2 0.871 
Environmental 
Disclosure   
Strategic or long-term 
Environmental 
13 0.885 
Current or short-term 
Environmental 
12 0.871 
Generic Environmental 3 0.859 
Intellectual 
Capital 
Disclosure 
Internal Capital 5 
 
0.872 
External Capital 9 0.867 
Human Capital 8 0.860 
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be considered valid if the index scores “mean what the researchers intended. That 
is to say, do the index scores have any meaning as a measure of information 
disclosure?” Accordingly, the collection of accurate data that aligns with the 
research objective is considered a major contributor to validity.  
There are significant reasons to ensure that the constructed voluntary 
disclosure index is valid. First, all the disclosure items are based on established 
prior studies with an extensive focus on voluntary disclosure and within a 
Bangladeshi context (Abeysekera 2007; Belal et al. 2010; Clarkson et al. 2008; 
Hackston & Milne 1996; Khan et al. 2013; Muttakin et al. 2015; Saunders 2011). 
Second, the construction of the disclosure index was completed under the 
supervision and guidance of the research supervisors. Finally, validity of the 
voluntary disclosure index is further enhanced by presenting the first draft of the 
index at doctoral conferences.33  
5.4. Corporate Governance Variables 
 To explore the determinants of voluntary disclosure, it is important to 
consider factors that are associated with the decision, capacity and control processes 
of a firm as this type of disclosure is not enforced by law. Within the literature, the 
determinants of voluntary disclosure have been categorized into two branches: 
corporate governance and firm characteristics. 
Corporate governance is extensively emphasized as it plays a significant 
role in the operational, control and decision-making processes of a firm (Dalton et 
al. 1998). Weimer and Pape (1999, p. 152) articulate, the concept of corporate 
governance as a “[…] framework of legal, institutional and cultural factors shaping 
the patterns of influence that stakeholders exert on managerial decision-making”. 
Accordingly, corporate governance may play a significant role in disclosure 
decisions of a firm (Ho & Wong 2001).  
 The significance of corporate governance is also observable in the 
voluntary disclosure literature as a significant number of studies also considered 
                                                          
33 Bhuyan, M 2016, ‘Determinants and Effects of Voluntary Disclosure – Corporate Governance and Firm   
     Performance: Evidence from Bangladesh’, in Faculty of Business, Higher Degree Research Student          
      Conference, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, 15-16 September.  
 From the conference the researcher benefitted from feedback from academics and experienced researchers 
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corporate governance as an important determinant. Emphasis is placed on the 
specific features of corporate governance including board structure, committees and 
ownership structure (Garcia-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2010; Samaha et al. 2015). 
It should also be noted that these three features play a crucial role in a firm’s 
decision making and monitoring. Therefore, this study considers these aspects of 
corporate governance as potential explanatory factors for voluntary disclosure.  
  Board structure of a firm is considered an important factor in corporate 
governance structure as it is the centre of decision-making processes in relation to 
monitoring, controlling and directing a firm to achieve its goals (Dalton et al. 1998; 
Dalton et al. 1999; Garcia-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 2010; Khlif & Souissi 2010; 
Samaha et al. 2015). Board structure is also considered as a core concept of reducing 
agency conflict, information asymmetry and promoting transparency within the 
firm. Within the literature, some features of the board have been widely considered 
as an explanatory factor for voluntary disclosure; in particular, CEO duality 
(Allegrini & Greco 2013; Hidalgo et al. 2011), board size (Abeysekera 2010; 
Akhtaruddin et al. 2009; Hidalgo et al. 2011) and board composition (Cheng & 
Courtenay 2006; Donnelly & Mulcahy 2008; Eng & Mak 2003). 
 The existence of a committee, or the particular features thereof, are 
considered as a significant factor for monitoring, controlling and compilation of 
statutory factors within the firm, as well as ensuring transparency (Allegrini & 
Greco 2013; Haji 2015). Various studies identify that committee features act as an 
explanatory factor for voluntary disclosure, in particular, the existence of a sub-
committee (Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007) and audit committee composition 
(Akhtaruddin & Haron 2010; Li et al. 2012; Othman et al. 2014). 
Besides the above features, the ownership structure of a firm is also 
necessary to formulate and implement the vision and strategy of the business and 
align with the preference of stakeholders. Effective communication of these factors 
contributes to legitimacy and accountability in relation to decision making. 
Ownership structure is also relevant because the interests of investors may vary; 
thus investors’ preferences are not necessarily the same. Within the literature, 
ownership structure has been extensively considered as an explanatory factor for 
voluntary disclosure, in particular, foreign ownership (Haniffa & Cooke 2005; 
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Huafang & Jianguo 2007), director ownership (Ghazali & Weetman 2006; Mohd 
Ghazali 2007) and institutional ownership (Barako et al. 2006a; Ntim et al. 2012).  
In light of the above discussions, and consistent with prior studies, eight 
characteristics of corporate governance are deemed important and likely to have an 
impact on voluntary disclosure. Consequently, CEO Duality, Board Size, Board 
Composition, Sub-committee, Audit Committee Composition, Foreign Ownership, 
Director Ownership and Institutional Ownership are considered. The detailed 
measurement of each corporate characteristic is discussed below.  
5.4.1 CEO Duality 
CEO duality refers to the dual leadership structure of a firm. Especially it 
relates to the arrangement by which the CEO acts both as the CEO of the firm and 
as chairperson of the board of directors (Rechner & Dalton 1991). Various studies 
have considered CEO Duality as a determinant of voluntary disclosure within the 
literature (Barako et al. 2006a; Huafang & Jianguo 2007; Khan et al. 2013). 
Throughout these studies, a consistent measurement process involving a dummy 
variable is used to measure CEO duality, that is 1 is awarded if the CEO is also the 
chairman of the board, otherwise 0. Consistent with prior studies, CEO duality is 
measured by using a dummy variable (Barako et al. 2006a; Huafang & Jianguo 
2007; Khan et al. 2013). 
5.4.2 Board Size  
Board size refers to the number of members on the board of directors of a 
firm. In the literature, board size is considered to be an influential factor for 
voluntary disclosure (Samaha et al. 2015) but the findings are contradictory. Board 
size is mostly measured as a sum of board members (Abeysekera 2010; Barako et 
al. 2006a; Esa & Anum Mohd Ghazali 2012; Hidalgo et al. 2011) but some studies 
consider the logarithm of the total number of board members to derive relevant 
findings (Carter et al. 2003). The second approach is more pragmatic as the number 
of board members varies from company to company and use of a log may reduce 
heteroscedasticity34  (Brooks 2014). It also facilitates the validity of a variable 
                                                          
34 Heteroscedasticity is a statistical issue, the details of which are discussed in 4.8.1.3. 
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measurement. Therefore, consistent with the literature, board size is measured as 
the logarithm of the total number of board members (Carter et al. 2003). 
5.4.3 Board Composition  
Board composition refers to the make-up or characteristics of directors 
regarding responsibilities, independence, race, gender and so on. Among these, the 
presence of independent directors is considered as the most pivotal factor. 
Independent directors have the ability to maintain objectivity because they have less 
incentive to act in their own interests. Because they are divorced from the financial 
performance goals of a firm they are better able to contribute to the monitoring and 
decision-making processes (Cheng & Courtenay 2006; Fama 1980). Accordingly, 
in the literature, board composition is widely measured as the proportion of 
independent directors and considered to be significant for firm monitoring and 
control, and an important factor for voluntary disclosure (Eng & Mak 2003; Ho & 
Wong 2001; Khan et al. 2013). Consistent with the literature, this study measures 
board composition as the proportion of independent directors.  
5.4.4 Sub-committee  
The sub-committee variable encompasses the presence of the various 
committees to review and implement board decisions of a firm in an efficient 
manner. The existence of sub-committees (i.e., Nomination Committee and Audit 
Committee) may facilitate the controlling function by presiding over important 
tasks (Fama & Jensen 1983). Vafeas (1999, p. 220) describes this function by 
focusing on the role of the nomination committee: 
The nominating committee can influence, however, the independence of 
outsider directors since, given the number of outsiders, the committee 
influences the degree of independence among those by selecting fewer 
`grey' directors. This evidence is partly consistent with better boards 
forming nominating committees or, alternatively, with the use of 
nominating committees improving board quality.  
The audit committee is another example of a sub-committee that performs a vital 
corporate governance role. Its monitoring function can prevent serious commercial 
malfeasance by ensuring companies adhere to regulatory requirements and 
corporate imperatives, such as voluntary disclosure (Appuhami & Tashakor 2017; 
Karamanou & Vafeas 2005; Kolk & Pinkse 2010). Consequently, the presence of 
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sub-committees, such as the nomination and audit committee, is a significant 
contributor to sound corporate governance practices and is therefore considered as 
a relevant variable for this study. A range of prior studies confirm that the presence 
of a sub-committee can shape voluntary disclosure (Allegrini & Greco 2013; 
Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007; Karamanou & Vafeas 2005). Consistent with these 
studies, this study measures sub-committees by considering a dummy variable (1 is 
awarded if a firm has both Nomination and Audit Committee, otherwise 0.)  
5.4.5 Audit Committee Composition  
Audit committee composition can be measured by focusing on particular 
features, including race, gender, background, role, independence and so on. Among 
these, the independence of audit committee members is considered to be one of the 
most significant factors as it influences the monitoring function. The independence 
of members is an important factor to ensure active monitoring and it has also been 
noted that it is an explanatory factor for the inclusion of voluntary disclosure (Madi 
et al. 2014; Othman et al. 2014). Consistent with prior studies, this study uses the 
proportion of independent directors within the audit committee as the relevant 
variable (Akhtaruddin & Haron 2010; Li et al. 2012). 
5.4.6 Foreign Ownership  
Foreign ownership refers to the proportion of shares owned by foreigners. 
Foreign ownership may shape the decision to voluntarily disclose as transparency 
and compliance with international standards is expected under such conditions. It 
has been reported that foreign owners might be sufficiently dominant to moderate 
the monitoring, controlling and decision-making process of a firm (Barako et al. 
2006a; Haniffa & Cooke 2002) especially within Bangladesh as foreign owners are 
considered a powerful group (Islam & Deegan 2008). In line with such arguments, 
a large number of prior studies claim that the proportion of foreign ownership may 
moderate the voluntary disclosure practices of a firm (Barako et al. 2006a; Belal & 
Owen 2007; Haniffa & Cooke 2002; Islam & Deegan 2008; Khan et al. 2013). 
Consistent with prior studies, this study also measures foreign ownership as the 
percentage of shares owned by foreigners.   
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5.4.7 Director Ownership  
Director ownership refers to the proportion of shares owned by the firm’s 
directors. Due to director ownership, an agency conflict issue may mean that 
monitoring activity will not be performed appropriately (Jensen & Meckling 1976; 
McConnell & Servaes 1990). Accordingly, directors may negatively influence the 
transparency of a firm’s activities since they gain access to firm information. In line 
with this argument, a large number of prior studies claim that the proportion of 
director ownership may moderate the voluntary disclosure practices of a firm 
(Donnelly & Mulcahy 2008; Eng & Mak 2003; Khan et al. 2013; Mohd Ghazali 
2007). Consistent with prior studies, this study also measures director ownership as 
percentage of shares owned by the directors.  
5.4.8 Institutional Ownership  
Institutional ownership refers to the proportion of shares owned by 
institutional investors. Among the diverse range of owners, this group of investors 
is considered more professional with greater expertise on matters that may influence 
firm disclosure and performance. Their expertise means that these investors are 
privileged regarding corporate governance operations, including monitoring, firm 
management and decision-making processes (Donnelly & Mulcahy 2008; Hope 
2013). In light of these arguments, a large number of prior studies claim that the 
proportion of institutional ownership may moderate the voluntary disclosure 
practices of a firm (Donnelly & Mulcahy 2008; Khlif et al. 2016; Laidroo 2009; 
Rashid & Lodh 2008). Consistent with prior studies, this study also measures 
institutional ownership as a percentage of shares owned by institutions.  
5.4.9 Summary of Corporate Governance Characteristics Measurement 
The above discussion has demonstrated the relevance of certain corporate 
governance variables and the various relationships pertaining to voluntary 
disclosure and firm performance. The list of variables, measurement processes and 
relevant prior research in relation to corporate governance characteristics is 
presented in Table 5.6. 
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Table 5-6 List of corporate governance variables and measurement process 
 
 
5.5 Firm Performance Variables  
The assessment of firm performance is a complex matter as various 
contingent factors are related to the measurement process (Orlitzky et al. 2003; 
Peloza 2009; Richard et al. 2009; Wu 2006). In the literature, a significant number 
of indicators has been considered. This wide range of indicators can be categorized 
into three main groups: accounting-based measurements (e.g., ROA, ROS), market-
based measurements (e.g., MCAP, EPS) and mixed measurements (e.g., Tobin’s 
Q). 
Among the categories, accounting measurement is the most common, valid 
and easily available measure and reflects the internal efficiency of a firm (Cochran 
& Wood 1984; Richard et al. 2009). Orlitzky et al. (2003, p.  408) describe 
accounting-based measure in the following way,  
Accounting returns are subject to managers’ discretionary allocations of 
funds to different projects and policy choices, and thus reflect internal 
decision-making capabilities and managerial performance rather than 
external market responses to organizational (non-market) actions. 
Variable Measurement References 
CEO Duality (CD) 
Dummy variable (value 1 = CEO and 
Chairman, value 0 = otherwise) 
(Barako et al. 2006a; Huafang & Jianguo 
2007; Khan et al. 2013) 
Board Size (BS) 
Logarithm of total number of directors 
on the board 
(Carter et al. 2003) 
Board Composition 
(BC) 
Percentage of independent directors 
within total number of directors on the 
board. 
(Eng & Mak 2003; Ho & Wong 2001; Khan 
et al. 2013) 
 
Sub-committee 
(SCOM) 
Dummy variable by awarding 1 for 
Existence of a Nomination and Audit 
committee, otherwise 0 
(Allegrini & Greco 2013; Cerbioni & 
Parbonetti 2007; Karamanou & Vafeas 
2005) 
Audit Committee 
Composition (ACC) 
Proportion of independent directors on 
the Audit Committee. 
(Akhtaruddin & Haron 2010; Li et al. 2012) 
Foreign ownership 
(FNO) 
Percentage of shares owned by the 
foreign investors 
 
(Barako et al. 2006a; Haniffa & Cooke 
2005; Khan et al. 2013) 
Director Ownership 
(DO) 
Percentage of shares owned by 
directors 
(An et al. 2011; Donnelly & Mulcahy 2008; 
Eng & Mak 2003; Khan et al. 2013; Mohd 
Ghazali 2007) 
Institutional 
Ownership (INO) 
Percentage of shares owned by the 
Institutions 
(Donnelly & Mulcahy 2008; Khlif et al. 
2016; Laidroo 2009) 
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However, accounting measures are also open to criticism. For instance, a firm may 
manipulate accounting numbers or select a particular method of measurement 
(Azim 2012; Richard et al. 2009) that leads to inconsistency in performance 
measurement systems. Wiwattanakantang (2001) also indicates that accounting 
performance measurements may not reveal all relevant agency costs.  
Market-based measures are forward looking and also incorporate the 
intangible assets of a firm (Fisher & McGowan 1983; Lev 2000). However, this 
feature does not mean that market measurement is free from limitations as market-
based measurements are not alienated from efficiency effects (Bacidore et al. 1997; 
Joh 2003).  
Besides accounting and marked-based performance measurements, a mixed 
method is available. Richard et al. (2009, p.  732) consider Tobin’s Q as a popular 
mixed measurement:  
An advantage of mixed accounting/financial market measures is that they 
are better able to balance risk (largely ignored by accounting measures) 
against operational performance issues that are sometimes lost in market 
measures. Examples of mixed measures are given in Table 4. Tobin’s q is 
perhaps the earliest and most popular hybrid measure of firm performance.  
However, Tobin’s Q is also subject to criticism as it considers proxies to measure 
firm performance and these proxies might not be calculated accurately (Varaiya et 
al. 1987). 
In light of the above, selection of a particular method for measuring firm 
performance can be problematic as every category of firm performance 
measurement method has both limitations and some useful features (Deegan & 
Faux 2005; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Richard et al. 2009). Consequently, consideration 
of multiple indicators may resolve this quandary as each indicator can supplement 
and mitigate potential limitations. A review and meta-analysis of a large number of 
prior studies suggests that consideration of a multiple measurement indicator 
approach is justified (Dalton et al. 1998; Dalton et al. 1999; Griffin & Mahon 1997; 
Orlitzky et al. 2003). Therefore, this study measures firm performance based on 
widely used measurements from each category (e.g., accounting, market and mixed 
measurement) (Griffin & Mahon 1997; Lu et al. 2014; Margolis & Walsh 2003; 
Orlitzky et al. 2003; Richard et al. 2009). In particular, Return on Asset and Return 
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on Sales as accounting measures, Market Capitalization and Earnings per Share as 
marketing measures, and Tobin’s Q as mixed measurement are indicator of firm 
performance for this study. The significance of each indicator and measurement 
process are discussed below.   
5.5.1 Return on Asset  
Return on Asset is an accounting measure of firm performance used to 
assess the profitability of a firm’s assets. In the literature, among several accounting 
measurements, ROA is considered as the most common, widely used and 
significant variable (Aerts et al. 2008; Choi et al. 2010; Eng & Mak 2003; Khan et 
al. 2013; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Patelli & Prencipe 2007; Teoh et al. 1998; Yusoff et 
al. 2013). In addition, ROA has been considered as an important factor for voluntary 
disclosure within various research contexts, including developed as well as 
developing countries.  
Some distinct features of ROA make it a pertinent and operational indicator 
of firm performance. First, assets are a fundamental element to cover liability and 
equity. A higher level of ROA means the firm has invested efficiently and has the 
capability of managing firm debt and equity in an efficient manner. As a result, a 
stakeholder may receive a signal that the firm is being managed well. Second, ROA 
is an ultimate profitability measurement used to assess the efficiency of a firm’s 
assets or to calculate a firm’s ability to generate profit.  
ROA is calculated as Net Profit after Tax scaled by book value of the total 
assets of the firm for a particular year. This measurement process is consistent with 
prior studies (Aerts et al. 2008; Eng & Mak 2003; Patelli & Prencipe 2007). 
5.5.2 Return on Sales  
Return on Sales is another accounting measure of firm performance used to 
calculate profitability in relation to a firm’s sales. Prior studies considered ROS as 
a significant indicator of firm performance (Orlitzky et al. 2003; Richard et al. 
2009) and it is widely considered within disclosure-related studies (Aras et al. 2010; 
Chen & Wang 2011).  
Some distinct feature of ROS makes it a widely used indicator of firm 
performance. First, ROS measures performance on the basis of return on sales. 
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Therefore, a better understanding regarding profitability might be achieved by 
considering this indicator. Second, customers’ perception of the price of a firm’s 
product or service influences their decision to pay for that product or service. In 
particular, it should be noted that having a positive impression may provide the 
flexibility of charging a higher price to improve ROS. As a firm performance 
indicator, ROS is particularly relevant for voluntary disclosure as customer 
perception is directly reflected in the measurement of ROS. 
 Therefore, consistent with prior studies, ROS is considered as an indicator 
of firm performance and is calculated as Net Profit after Tax scaled by total sales 
of the firm for a particular year (Aras et al. 2010; Chen & Wang 2011; Chen et al. 
2016).  
5.5.3 Market Capitalization  
Market capitalization is a market-based firm performance metric and 
represents the total value of a firm’s common stock. Although it is not widely used 
as an indicator of firm performance (Mathews 1997; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Richard 
et al. 2009), this indicator has some distinct features. First, market capitalization 
may cover potential pitfalls of accounting-based measurements as this measurement 
integrates intangible assets more effectively (Lev 2000). Forbes (2002) advocates 
market capitalization as a relevant firm performance metric and argues that it may 
capture the long-term effects of a firm’s operational activities. Therefore, market 
capitalization can provide insight into the potential future prospects of the firm. 
Second, market capitalization represents the total value of a firm’s common stock 
and symbolizes the residual worth of the firm’s resources. In other words, it reflects 
the satisfaction of shareholders (e.g., willingness to pay for the share) and 
shareholders’ satisfaction (Cochran & Wood 1984). Therefore, this study is 
consistent with prior studies and calculates market capitalization by multiplying 
total common shares outstanding with the current value of common stock for the 
year ending day of the financial year (Abdolmohammadi 2005; Anam et al. 2011; 
Brammer et al. 2006)  
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5.5.4 Earnings per Share  
Earnings per share is a market-based firm performance indicator and 
represents the firm’s earnings allocated to each outstanding share of common stock. 
In other word, EPS assesses the profitability of the firm (Orlitzky et al. 2003; 
Richard et al. 2009). Accordingly, EPS is widely used in studies related to voluntary 
disclosure and firm performance and is calculated as earnings after tax divided by 
total number of outstanding shares at the end of each financial year (Kwanbo 2011; 
Nor et al. 2016; Oeyono et al. 2011). 
5.5.5 Tobin’s Q  
Tobin’s Q is a mixed measurement proxy of firm performance. Originally, 
Tobin (1969) described the ratio of market value of the firm to the replacement 
value of the firm’s assets. Regarding the assessment of Tobin’s Q, if the value of 
this measurement is within 0 and 1 then the reproduction cost of a firm’s assets is 
higher than the price of equity. If the value is above 1 then the market value of stock 
is more than the replacement cost of the firm’s assets and this represents a better 
position. The use of a mixed measurement allows the researcher to overcome the 
limitations of an assessment process that omits important factors. In prior studies, 
the use of Tobin’s Q is popular and since replacement value is difficult to ascertain 
in the Bangladeshi context, consistent with prior studies and with the Bangladeshi 
context this study measures Tobin’s Q (Agrawal & Knoeber 1996; Rashid et al. 
2010; Rashid 2009).  
Tobin’s Q = (MV Equity+ BV Debt + BV Preferred Stock)/BV Assets   
  
Where,  
MV Equity= Market value of the Equity; 
BV Debt =Book value of debt; 
BV Preferred Stock= Book value of Preferred Stock; 
BV Assets= Book value of Assets; 
 
5.5.6 Summary of Firm Performance Measurement  
Based on the preceding discussion, the variables, measurement processes 
and relevant literature in relation to firm performance indicators are summarized in 
Table 5.7. 
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Table 5-7 List of firm performance variables with measurement process 
Variable Measurement References 
Return on 
Asset 
Net Profit after Tax  
Book value of total asset  
(Aerts et al. 2008; Eng & Mak 
2003; Patelli & Prencipe 2007) 
Return on 
Sales 
Net Profit after Tax  
Total Sales 
(Aras et al. 2010; Chen & Wang 
2011; Chen et al. 2016) 
Market 
Capitalization 
Multiplying total common share 
outstanding with the current value of 
common stock  
(Abdolmohammadi 2005; Anam 
et al. 2011; Brammer et al. 2006) 
Earnings per 
Share  
Earnings after tax f 
Total number of outstanding shares at the 
end of each financial year 
(Kwanbo 2011; Nor et al. 2016; 
Oeyono et al. 2011) 
Tobin’s Q  
(Market Value of the Equity+ Book value 
of the debt + Book value of Preferred 
Stock) / Book value of Assets 
(Agrawal & Knoeber 1996; 
Rashid et al. 2010; Rashid 2009) 
 
5.6 Control Variables 
Other variables that may moderate voluntary disclosure and firm 
performance have been identified in the literature. Thus, this study considers these 
factors as control variables.  
Prior studies have established that firm characteristics play a crucial role in 
determining voluntary disclosures of a firm (Ahmed & Courtis 1999; Alsaeed 2006; 
Orlitzky 2001; Raffournier 1995) A significant number has been reported and 
Alsaeed (2006) suggests that they may be separated into three categories: structure-
related variables (e.g., firm size and leverage), market-related variables (e.g., 
industry type) and performance-related variables (e.g., return on asset, Earnings per 
share, Tobin’s Q). Prior studies also consider firm size, leverage, industry type and 
firm performance as potential significant determinants of voluntary disclosure 
(Ahmed & Courtis 1999; Alsaeed 2006; Cooke 1992; Fifka 2013). Consistent, with 
the literature, this study considers firm size, leverage, industry type and firm 
performance indicators as control variables.  
To examine the effects of voluntary disclosure, prior studies have also 
reported that firm characteristics may moderate firm performance (Orlitzky 2001; 
Ullmann 1985; Waddock & Graves 1997). Within the literature, a large number of 
prior studies has considered firm size, leverage and industry type as potential 
explanatory factors for firm performance (Anam et al. 2011; Choi et al. 2010; 
Mishra & Suar 2010; Qiu et al. 2016). Accordingly, this study considers firm size, 
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leverage and industry type as a control variable for examining the effects of 
voluntary disclosure on firm performance. It should also be noted that a large 
number of prior studies argue that the features of a board (e.g., CEO duality, board 
independence) may moderate firm performance (Dalton et al. 1998). Thus, to 
examine the effects of voluntary disclosure a large number of prior studies has 
considered CEO duality and board independence as an explanatory factor of firm 
performance (Dalton et al. 1998; Farooque et al. 2007; Nahar Abdullah 2004; 
Rashid et al. 2010; Rechner & Dalton 1991). In line with these studies, this study 
considers CEO duality and board independence as a control variable for model 2. 
Therefore, to investigate the determinants and effects of voluntary 
disclosure, this study selects firm size, leverage and industry type as control 
variables. Besides these variables, firm performance is considered as a control 
variable for examining the determinants of voluntary disclosure. Similarly, board 
size and board independence are considered to examine the effects of voluntary 
disclosure. Details of these control variables are presented below. 
5.6.1 Firm Size (SIZE) 
Firm size is one of the widely considered explanatory factors that may 
moderate voluntary disclosure (Ahmed & Courtis 1999) as well as firm 
performance (Capon et al. 1990). 
Regarding firm size as a determinant of voluntary disclosure, Firth (1979) 
and Singhvi and Desai (1971) argue that there are significant reasons to consider 
larger firm size as an explanatory factor. First, larger firms may have the capability 
to afford extra costs to manage voluntary disclosure. Similarly, a larger firm has the 
potential to address issues efficiently through scaled economic activity and this may 
significantly reduce costs. Second, larger firms rely more on the stock market for 
financing. As a result, extra disclosure may reduce the cost of finance. Third, larger 
firms are more sensitive towards political costs. Therefore, to avoid public criticism 
or government involvement, larger firms disclose more. Finally, smaller firms may 
prefer to keep internal information secret as it may be key to providing competitive 
advantage. As a result, they may be reluctant to disclose more. Conversely, it could 
be argued that smaller firms may be more proactive in voluntary disclosure 
compared to larger firms, particularly because smaller firms have limited 
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information to disclose. Hence, smaller firms can easily legitimize their activities 
with less cost by considering voluntary disclosure while larger firms attract higher 
costs to manage large amounts of information. Therefore, firm size may play a 
critical role in decisions to disclose information but the decision to do so voluntarily 
depends, to a certain extent, on the context and circumstances of the firm. The 
significance of firm size is observable in prior studies. A significant number of prior 
studies explore the influence of firm size on voluntary disclosure and the 
contributions and results are varied based on the research context (Adams 2002; 
Eng & Mak 2003; Hackston & Milne 1996; Haji 2013; Haniffa & Cooke 2005; Ho 
& Wong 2001; Li et al. 2008; Patten 2002; Stanwick & Stanwick 1998). 
Besides voluntary disclosure, firm size is also significant for firm 
performance. It could be argued that larger firms may have the ability to access 
finance to enhance performance (Majumdar & Chhibber 1999; Short & Keasey 
1999). However, a larger firm may suffer from lack of coordination (Williamson 
1967) or from higher costs, which can be detrimental to firm performance. 
Accordingly, firm size is considered as a control variable to explore the effects of 
voluntary disclosure on firm performance (Anam et al. 2011; Cheng et al. 2016; 
Choi et al. 2010; Mishra & Suar 2010) 
From the above discussion, firm size is deemed to be a relevant factor for 
examining the determinants and effects of voluntary disclosure and is therefore 
considered as a control variable for this study. Consistent with prior studies, total 
revenue (natural log of revenue) is used as a reasonable proxy for firm size (Haji 
2013; Li et al. 2008; Patten 2002; Stanwick & Stanwick 1998). 
5.6.2 Leverage  
Firm leverage refers to the ratio of debt to equity. Firm leverage reflects the 
capital structure of a firm and may moderate the voluntary disclosure decision 
(Naser 1998; Xiao et al. 2004) as well as firm performance.  
  From a disclosure perspective, higher leverage may increase monitoring 
costs (Jensen & Meckling 1976) and increase information asymmetry as creditors 
may require extra information about firm activities. Conversely, it could also be 
argued that voluntary disclosure may reduce information asymmetry and facilitate 
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several investors or creditors since, in order to access finance, a firm must ensure 
transparency. As a result, leverage may act as an explanatory factor for voluntary 
disclosure. Within the literature, leverage is widely considered as a control variable 
for exploring the determinants of voluntary disclosure (Barako et al. 2006a, 2006b; 
Cheng & Courtenay 2006; Khan et al. 2013; Muttakin & Khan 2014; Muttakin et 
al. 2015).  
However, a more leveraged firm may also have to incur extra costs (interest 
expense) and this may mitigate or overturn potential benefits to firm performance. 
In any case, the agency costs of the firm can be addressed through the threat of 
liquidation (Berger & Di Patti 2006) and the responsibility attached to leveraging 
activities can lead to better performance. Thus, leverage is widely considered as a 
control variable in prior studies to examine the effects of voluntary disclosure on 
firm performance (Anam et al. 2011; Cheng et al. 2016; Lima Crisóstomo et al. 
2011; Qiu et al. 2016). 
   Therefore, firm leverage (debt to equity ratio) is included as a control 
variable for examining the determinants and effects of voluntary disclosure. 
Leverage is measured as the ratio of total debt to total equity and this measurement 
is consistent with prior studies (Anam et al. 2011; Cheng & Courtenay 2006; 
Muttakin et al. 2015; Qiu et al. 2016). 
5.6.3 Industry 
Industry type can be an important factor for exploring the determinants of 
voluntary disclosure as well as for the effects on firm performance as the level of 
information, activities, revenue and expenses are not the same across industries.  
To examine the determinants of voluntary disclosure, it could be argued that 
industries such as cement are heavily regulated in relation to environmental 
disclosure and may have to report voluntarily on this issue to mitigate societal 
concerns; whereas many service industries, such as banks do not warrant such 
attention. Hence, in the context of voluntary disclosure, firm disclosure depends on 
the type of operating activities. Consistent with this argument, a wide range of prior 
studies has considered industry context as an important contributing factor for the 
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determinants and effects of voluntary disclosure (Brammer et al. 2006; Cooke 1992; 
Haniffa & Cooke 2002).  
To examine the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance, due to 
varied capital requirements, revenue and operational cost, firm performance may 
vary from industry to industry as expenses also vary widely from industry to 
industry. As a result, a large number of prior studies has considered industry as a 
control variable to explore the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance 
(Khlif et al. 2015; Qiu et al. 2016).  
Therefore, industry type is considered as a control variable. Consistent with 
the literature, industry type is measured by using a dummy variable (Alsaeed 2006; 
Cooke 1992). In particular, 1 is awarded if a firm belongs to the financial industry, 
otherwise 0.  
5.6.3 Profitability (Firm Performance): Additional Control Variable for 
Research Model 1  
The concept of agency and signalling theory indicates that a firm with better 
firm performance intends to convey a message to stakeholders to distinguish it from 
other firms (Haniffa & Cooke 2002; Owusu-Ansah 1998; Singhvi & Desai 1971; 
Wallace & Naser 1995). A large number of prior studies has reported that there is 
a positive relationship between firm performance and voluntary disclosure (Ghazali 
& Weetman 2006; Mangena & Tauringana 2007). Alternatively, it is also argued 
that firms with better performance may not disclose more as less disclosure may 
avoid legal costs (e.g., tax) and protect competitiveness (Prencipe 2004; Verrecchia 
1983) 
A large number of prior studies considered firm performance as a control 
variable for examining the determinants of voluntary disclosure (Allegrini & Greco 
2013; Bacidore et al. 1997; Barako et al. 2006a, 2006b; Eng & Mak 2003; Ho & 
Wong 2001). Therefore, consistent with the literature, as a firm performance 
indicator Tobin’s Q (mixed method indicator) is considered.   
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5.6.4 Corporate Governance Characteristics: Additional Control Variables for 
Research Model 2  
The concept of agency theory suggests that managing firm performance or 
maximizing a principal’s interests are paramount A large number of prior studies 
has documented board independence and CEO duality as a moderator of firm 
performance (Dalton et al. 1998; Nahar Abdullah 2004; Rechner & Dalton 1991), 
including studies within Bangladesh (Farooque et al. 2007; Rashid et al. 2010). 
Accordingly, board independence and CEO duality are also considered as control 
variables to examine the effects of voluntary disclosure (Li et al. 2017). Therefore, 
in line with the literature, board independence and CEO duality are considered as 
control variables for examining the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm 
performance. 
5.6.4 Summary of Control Variables Measurement  
 To investigate the determinants and effects of voluntary disclosure, 
considered control variables, measurement process and literature references have 
been summarized in Table 5.8.  
Table 5-8 Control variables with measurement process 
Control Variables for Research Models 1 & 2 
Variables Measurement References 
 
Firm Size 
 
Natural logarithm of total Revenue  
(Haji 2013; Li et al. 2008; Patten 2002; 
Stanwick & Stanwick 1998) 
Leverage Total Debt/ Equity (Cheng & Courtenay 2006; Ho & 
Wong 2001) 
Industry Dummy variable (value 1 = firm 
belongs to financial industry, value 0 
= otherwise) 
(Alsaeed 2006; Cooke 1992) 
Additional Control Variables for Research Model 1 
Profitability  
Tobin’s Q 
(Market Value of the Equity + Book 
value of the debt + Book value of 
Preferred Stock) / Book value of 
Assets 
(Agrawal & Knoeber 1996; Rashid et 
al. 2010; Rashid 2009) 
Additional Control Variables for Research Model 2 
Board 
Composition 
(BC) 
Percentage of independent directors 
within total number of directors on 
the board. 
(Eng & Mak 2003; Ho & Wong 2001; 
Khan et al. 2013) 
CEO Duality 
(CD) 
Dummy variable (value 1 = CEO 
and Chairman, value 0 = otherwise) 
(Barako et al. 2006a; Huafang & 
Jianguo 2007; Khan et al. 2013) 
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5.7 Research Models  
To derive sound conclusions based on the research questions, this study 
considers two research models. Model 1 focuses on the determinants of voluntary 
disclosure by considering corporate governance characteristics and firm 
performance as explanatory variables. Model 2 examines the effects of voluntary 
disclosure by considering firm performance as a dependent variable. Details of each 
model are provided below.  
5.7.1 Research Model 1 
 Model 1 examines the relationship between corporate governance 
characteristics and voluntary disclosure. In this model, voluntary disclosure is 
considered as the dependent variable and corporate governance characteristics re 
the independent variables. Details are presented as follows: 
𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽7𝐷𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                          (1) 
 
Where,  
VDIit = Total score on Voluntary disclosure, 
CDit = CEO Duality,  
 BSit = Board Size,  
 BCit = Board Composition,           
SCit = Sub-committee,  
ACCi t =Audit Committee Composition,  
FNOit = Foreign Ownership,  
DOit = Director Ownership, 
INOit = Institutional Ownership, 
Control variables FSit = Firm size, INDUSit = Industry type, LEVit = Leverage and Tobin’s 
Qit = Firm Performance 
𝜀𝑖𝑡  = error term 
 
5.7.2 Research Model 2 
Model 2 investigates the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm 
performance in the following year. In regards to firm performance measurement, 
this study considers five different firm performance indicators. Hence, model 2 
consists of five sub-models.  
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The basic model is presented as s follows:  
𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    + 𝛽5
∗ 𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … .2 
 
Where,  
FPit+1 = Firm performance for the following year, 
VDIit = Total score on voluntary disclosure, 
Control variables: FSit = Firm size, INDUSit = Industry type, LEVit = Leverage, 
    CDit = CEO Duality and BCit = Board Composition 
 𝜀𝑖𝑡=  error term 
As on the considered five firm performance indicators, the five sub-models are as 
follows,  
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    
+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … .2.1 
𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    
+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … .2.2 
𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    
+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … .2.3 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    
+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … .2.4 
𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    
+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … .2.5 
 
 
5.8 Statistical Tests   
Various statistical tests have been applied to investigate the determinants 
and effects of voluntary disclosures and discussed in the following. 
5.8.1 Test of Assumptions of Model  
Before proceeding with any statistical analysis, an investigation of several 
assumptions including normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and 
endogeneity is advisable (Gujarati 2003; Rashid 2015a, 2015b, 2015c) to achieve a 
bias free result. Thus, this thesis considers these tests before proceeding towards 
136 
 
statistical analyses. In the following, details of these tests are discussed 
respectively. 
5.8.1.1 Normality  
This assumption is based on the view that all observations will be distributed 
normally within the population. Whilst this is true Brooks (2008, p. 164) has stated 
that, “for sample sizes that are sufficiently large, violation of the normality 
assumption is virtually inconsequential”. Coakes and Steed (2001) also note that 
violation of normality is not a significant concern if the sample size is large (greater 
than 30). Therefore, having a large sample (402 firm-year observations) provides 
the researcher with confidence that normality should not be a concern for this study. 
However, Residual Test/Histogram–Normality Test of the regression equation is 
considered to confirm normality in this study. 
5.8.1.2 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity refers to the situation of having a high or significant 
correlation among independent variables (Brooks 2008, p. 171) and making it 
difficult to assess the effect of independent variables on dependent variables. 
Therefore, this study considers Pearson correlation coefficients (parametric), 
Spearman correlation coefficients (non-parametric), 35  and Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF)36 tests for multicollinearity. These tests contribute to the validity of 
the method adopted in this study. 
5.8.1.3 Heteroscedasticity  
Heteroscedasticity refers to the presence of an error term in the estimated 
model that is not constant. The existence of heteroscedasticity may lead to a 
distorted result. To investigate the presence of heteroscedasticity, this study plots 
standardized residuals (ZRESID) versus the standardized predicted value 
(ZPRED). In addition, based on the guidance of (Cooke 1998) a further assessment 
using the Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test is conducted.  
                                                          
35 Multicollinearity may be a problem when the correlation exceeds 0.80 (Gujarati, 2003, p. 359).  
36 Multicollinearity may be a problem when VIF is above 10 or tolerance level is close to 0 
(Gujarati, 2003, p. 362). 
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5.8.1.4 Endogeneity 
Endogeneity refers to the presence of high correlation between dependent 
and explanatory variables and the error term (Wooldridge Jeffrey 2002, p. 50). It 
has been noted that, in the context of corporate governance, voluntary disclosure 
and firm performance may be affected by an endogeneity problem (Ammann et al. 
2011).  
Therefore, this study primarily applies an endogeneity test for research 
models 1 and 2 by employing well established techniques, (Elsayed 2011; Rashid 
2015a, 2015b, 2015c). Moreover, to examine research model 2, a lagged structure 
has been applied to investigate the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm 
performance to avoid the concern of endogeneity (Larcker & Rusticus 2010). A 
further endogeneity test has been applied to research models 1 and 2 while 
implementing a robustness test (details are discussed in the robustness test section). 
5.8.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics include the basic features of the collected data for the 
study and provide a simple summary of the data set, at the initial analytical stage. 
In addition, it is important to offer descriptions or inferences about a data set 
(Tabachnick & Fidell 2007). Cooper and Schindler (2008) note that descriptive 
statistics help to explain the centre, spread, and shape of data distributions. 
Therefore, this study adopts descriptive statistics for all the variables (independent, 
dependent and control) to provide an overview and analytical resource for further 
investigation (results are illustrated in Chapters Six and Seven). 
5.8.3 Statistical Methods  
In order to achieve an effective result, this study proceeds with a panel data 
analysis using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. A further analysis is 
also conducted by using a two stage least squares (2SLS) regression. Details of 
these are discussed below.  
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5.8.3.1 Panel Data Analysis  
Collection data from an individual sample over a specified period is referred 
to as ‘panel data’ and this study considers 134 firms for the period 2011 to 2013 
yielding a total firm-year sample of 402. Use of panel data has advantages such as 
the ability to interpret complicated behavioural models compared to others 
(Gujarati 2003; Wooldridge 2015). 
5.8.3.2 Pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
Within statistical analyses, ordinary least squares (OLS) is one of the most 
powerful and popular methods of regression if some assumptions (e.g., 
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity) are satisfied (Gujarati 2003). Rashid (2015b) 
advocates that OLS is a suitable approach if multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity 
and endogeneity issues are addressed properly. 
It should also be noted that OLS has been widely used in corporate 
governance, voluntary disclosure (Eng & Mak 2003; Huafang & Jianguo 2007; 
Wang & Claiborne 2008) and firm performance-related studies (Qiu et al. 2016; 
Scholtens 2008). Accordingly, considering the research context and consistent with 
the literature, this study considers OLS in conjunction with retrieved panel data.  
5.8.3.3 Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) 
Cooke (1998, p. 209) states “… no one procedure is the best but that 
multiple approaches are helpful to ensure the results are robust across methods”. 
Within prior studies, two stage least squares regression has been considered as an 
alternative statistical method for exploring the relationship between corporate 
governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure (Lim et al. 2007; Ntim et al. 
2013), and firm performance and voluntary disclosure (Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004). 
Therefore, to examine the determinant and effects of voluntary disclosure as an 
alternative statistical approach, this study considers 2SLS to confirm the result. 
 
5.8.4 Robustness Test 
 Two robustness tests have been applied for every research model and details 
are discussed below.  
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5.8.4.1 Robustness Test for Research Model 1 
 Endogeneity is a concern for the results related to corporate governance, 
performance and social responsibility-related studies (Jo & Harjoto 2012; Larcker 
et al. 2007; Larcker & Rusticus 2007, 2010; Wintoki et al. 2012). Thus, to ensure a 
strong result, a further endogeneity test has been applied by considering an 
alternative measurement process for a few corporate governance variables. This 
alternative measurement approach is consistent with prior studies (Jiang & Habib 
2009; Vu 2012). Within the literature, ownership variables have been measured by 
considering a dummy variable, for example, for the presence of ownership, 1 is 
awarded, otherwise 0 (Gelb 2000; Ho & Wong 2001; Huafang & Jianguo 2007; Vu 
2012) or ownership is examined in low and high ownership concentration levels 
(above and below 20 per cent level) (La Porta et al. 2000). Accordingly, this study 
measures foreign, director and institutional ownership by considering dummy 
variables for low and high ownership concentration levels (above and below 20 per 
cent level). In addition, consistent with this approach, this study also applies an 
alternative measurement for board composition and audit composition (above and 
below 20 per cent level). Within model 1, alternative measurement for board 
composition and audit composition, and foreign, director and institutional 
ownership have been applied.  
This study considers three different categories of voluntary disclosure 
including social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosures. A large number 
of studies also explored the determinants of voluntary disclosure by considering 
these categories separately. In particular, the effects of social disclosure (Haniffa & 
Cooke 2005; Khan et al. 2013; Khan 2010), environmental disclosure (Halme & 
Huse 1997; Iatridis 2013; Rao et al. 2012) and intellectual capital disclosure 
(Abeysekera 2010; Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007; Li et al. 2008). Therefore, as a 
robustness test, this study investigates the determinants and effects of voluntary 
disclosure by replacing voluntary disclosure variables (VDIit) with social 
disclosures (SDIit), environmental disclosures (EDIit) and intellectual capital 
disclosures (ICDIit) within research model 1. Details of the additional research 
models for robustness test 2 are presented below: 
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𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽7𝐷𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                      𝑀.1.𝑅2.137 
 
𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽7𝐷𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                        𝑀.1.𝑅2.2 
 
𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽7𝐷𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                       𝑀.1.𝑅2.3 
 
5.8.4.2 Robustness Test for Research Model 2 
Consistent with research model one, two robustness tests have been applied 
for research model two and the details are discussed below. 
 To ensure the results are free of endogeneity, a further test has been applied. 
In particular, with regard to the relationship between firm performance and 
voluntary disclosure, an alternative view that firm performance may moderate 
voluntary disclosure exists. Thus, the result for model 2 might be subject to a 
reverse causality problem. In addition to adopting a lag year concept, research 
model two is further sub-categorized (Rashid, 2015a):  
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.138 
𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.2 
𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    + 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.3 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.4 
𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    + 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.5 
                                                          
37 M1 refers to Model One.R.2 refers to Robustness test Two. Therefore, M1.R.2.1 means first sub 
model to examine Second Robustness test of Model One.   
38 Consistent with previous explanation, M2 refers to Model Two.R.1 refers to Robustness test 
One. Thus, M2.R.1.1 means first sub model to examine First Robustness test of Model Two.   
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+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.6 
𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.7 
𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    + 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.8 
𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.9 
𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    + 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.10 
 To extend the understanding of the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm 
performance, a second robustness test has been applied by replacing voluntary 
disclosure with three main categories separately. Accordingly, as a second 
robustness test, this study investigates the effects of voluntary disclosure by 
replacing voluntary disclosure variables (VDIit) with social disclosures (SDIit), 
environmental disclosures (EDIit) and intellectual capital disclosures (ICDIit) within 
research model 2. Details of the additional research models for robustness test 2 are 
as follows: 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.139 
𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.2 
𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.3 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.4 
𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.5 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.6 
                                                          
39 Consistent with the previous explanation, M2 refers to Model Two. R.2 refers to Robustness test 
Two. Thus, M2.R.2.1 means first sub model to examine Second Robustness test of Model Two.   
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5.9 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter presents the research methodology for this study. Section 5.2 
presents justification for the sample design and data selection. Data for the three-
year period from 2011 to 2013 is used, yielding a total firm-year sample of 402. In 
regards to sampling, this study considers the top 200 firms listed on the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange. Annual reports obtained for the period 2011 to 2013 are used as the main 
source of data. In addition, as a source of firm performance data, the Bloomberg 
database is used.  It is expected that the results from these respective periods may 
provide interesting findings as there are very few studies that consider examining 
voluntary disclosure from a Bangladeshi perspective following the severe stock 
market collapse and the reformation of the SEC. Annual reports are considered a 
relevant source of voluntary disclosure as these are regularly published and are 
reliable documents, utilized by most firms to communicate financial and non-
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financial information to those who are deemed to be the most important 
stakeholders.  
Section 5.3 describes the measurement process of voluntary disclosure by 
constructing a disclosure index. The process of constructing a voluntary disclosure 
index is completed in four steps. First, a list of voluntary disclosure items was 
gathered based on prior studies as well as studies within the Bangladeshi context. 
By doing so this study relies on three significant categories of voluntary disclosure 
including social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosures. Second, 
selected items were reviewed and altered within the context of this study. In 
particular, several sub-categories for social and environmental disclosures were 
combined within the frame of the strategic/long-term, current/short-term, and 
generic focus. Furthermore, a total of 80 items was considered for the voluntary 
disclosure index including 28 social, 30 environmental and 22 intellectual capital 
disclosures items. Third, by considering content analysis, selected items were 
measured and the allocated score unweighted. Finally, the reliability and validity 
of this index was confirmed by applying several tests. 
Section 5.4 describes the measurement process of corporate governance 
characteristics variables, including CEO duality, board size, board composition, 
sub-committee, audit committee composition, foreign ownership, director 
ownership and institutional ownership. Section 5.5 presents the measurement 
process of various firm performance indicators. Firm performance indicators were 
within the category of accounting-based measurement (return on asset, return on 
sales), market-based measurement (market capitalization, earnings per share) and 
mixed measurement (Tobin’s Q). In addition, the measurement process of 
considered control variables including firm size, leverage and industry were 
presented in Section 5.6. 
The research models for this study were discussed in Section 5.7. Research 
model 1 considers corporate governance characteristics as a determinant of 
voluntary disclosure. In addition, model 2 emphasizes the effects of voluntary 
disclosure by considering firm performance as an effect variable.  
Finally, various statistical approaches were applied, including descriptive 
statistics, normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and endogeneity tests. In 
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addition, this study considers pooled ordinary least squares and two stage least 
squares regressions to explore the determinants and effects of voluntary disclosure. 
Finally, two robustness tests, including an additional endogeneity test and a test in 
which voluntary disclosures were replaced with social, environmental and 
intellectual capital disclosures, for research models one and two were applied. The 
following Chapters Six and Seven presents the results of the study.  
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Chapter Six: Results – The Relationship between 
Corporate Governance Characteristics and Voluntary 
Disclosure 
 
6.1 Introduction  
Chapters Two to Five outline the literature, develop research questions and 
the theoretical framework, describe the background of research within the context 
of Bangladesh, develop relevant hypotheses and demonstrate the research approach 
utilized in this thesis. This chapter presents the findings related to the first research 
question: To what extent do corporate governance characteristics affect voluntary 
disclosure of social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosures in 
Bangladesh listed firms? It does so in relation to corporate governance 
characteristics as a potential determinant. This chapter presents and analyses the 
results and the remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. 
Section 6.2 provides details of the descriptive statistics of dependent, 
independent and control variables pertaining to research question one. The 
dependent variable is Voluntary Disclosure Index (VDI). The independent variables 
consist of CEO Duality, Board Size, Board Composition, Sub-committee, Audit 
Committee Composition, Foreign Ownership, Director Ownership and Institutional 
Ownership. The control variables consist of firm size, leverage, industry and firm 
performance. Section 6.3 conducts diagnostic analyses including normality, 
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and endogeneity tests relating to the variables 
used in examining the relationship between corporate governance characteristics 
and voluntary disclosure. Section 6.4 presents the results obtained from the 
statistical analyses including OLS and 2SLS to assess the determinants of voluntary 
disclosure to answer research question one. Section 6.5 discusses the robustness of 
the results by conducting further analysis of an additional endogeneity test and 
replacing the current dependent variable VDI with Social Disclosure Index (SDI), 
Environmental Disclosure Index (EDI) and Intellectual Capital Disclosure Index 
(IDI). Finally, Section 6.6 presents a summary and conclusion of this chapter.  
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6.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 Descriptive statistics concerning research question one (research model 1) 
are presented in this section. Descriptive statistics (mean, median and standard 
deviation) for the dependent variable, independent variables and control variable 
are provided in Sub-sections 6.2.1, 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 respectively.  
6.2.1 Descriptive Statistics – Dependent Variable: Voluntary Disclosure Index  
 Table 6.1 reports descriptive statistics for voluntary disclosures, including 
three main categories: social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosures. It 
also presents the sub-categories of disclosures, that is, social (SSD, CSD, GSD), 
environmental (SED, CED, GED) and intellectual capital disclosures (INCD, EC, 
HC).  
Table 6-1 Descriptive statistics for Voluntary Disclosure 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Observations 
Voluntary Disclosure 0.1616 0.1375 0.1293 402 
Social Disclosure 0.1692 0.1333 0.1411 402 
Environmental Disclosure 0.13 0.1071 0.1177 402 
Intellectual Capital Disclosure 0.1914 0.1363 0.1657 402 
Long-term Social Disclosure 0.0864 0.0526 0.1142 402 
Short-term Social Disclosure 0.226 0.1111 0.2235 402 
General Social Disclosure 0.6977 1.0000 0.3852 402 
Long-term Environmental Disclosure 0.0359 0.0000 0.0736 402 
Short-term Environmental Disclosure 0.1323 1.0000 0.17 402 
General Environmental Disclosure  0.5961 0.6666 0.3843 402 
Internal Capital Disclosure 0.1213 0.000 0.1658 402 
External Capital Disclosure 0.1627 0.1111 0.1765 402 
Human Capital Disclosure 0.2674 0.25 0.228 402 
 
As per Table 6.1, the average corporate voluntary disclosure index is 0.16 
and a median of 0.13 reflects that there are very limited voluntary disclosure 
discharges from the firms and most of the firms are limited to discharging a small 
number of voluntary disclosures. In addition, within the main categories, the 
average of social disclosure, environmental disclosure and intellectual capital 
disclosure is 0.16, 0.13 and 0.19 respectively with a median of 0.13, 0.10 and 0.13 
respectively. Thus, compared to social and environmental disclosures, firms are 
more focused on intellectual capital disclosure while environmental disclosure is 
less emphasized. Furthermore, regarding the sub-categories of social disclosure, 
average SSD, CSD and GSD, are 0.08, 0.22 and 0.69 respectively with a median 
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0.05, 0.11 and 1 respectively. Similarly, for sub-categories of environmental 
disclosures, SED, CED and GED average 0.03, 0.13 and 0.59 respectively with a 
median of 0, 1 and 0.66 respectively. Therefore, from a social and environmental 
disclosure perspective, long-term disclosure is mostly ignored and generic 
disclosure emphasized. Thus, it can be claimed that firms do not consider social and 
environmental disclosures as relevant to the strategic agenda of the firm but are 
keen to seek legitimacy by disclosing information that is general in nature. Finally, 
for the sub-categories of intellectual capital disclosure, INCD, ECD and HCD 
average is 0.12, 0.16 and 0.26 respectively with a median of 0, 0.11, 0.25 
respectively, reflecting that human capital is more focused while internal capital is 
mostly ignored.  
Therefore, based on the above, it is concluded that within Bangladeshi firms 
voluntary disclosure is not widely practised. Firms do not adopt voluntary 
disclosure as a long-term strategy but as a short-term means to deal with an 
immediate issue.   
6.2.2 Descriptive Statistics – Independent Variables: Corporate Governance 
Characteristics  
For research model 1, as a potential determinant of voluntary disclosure, 
eight corporate governance characteristics: CEO Duality, Board Size, Board 
Composition, Sub-committee, Audit Committee Composition, Foreign Ownership, 
Director Ownership and Institutional Ownership are considered as independent 
variables. Table 6.2 presents the mean, median and standard deviation of 
independent variables.  
Table 6-2 Descriptive statistics for corporate governance characteristics 
  Mean Median Std. DEV. Observations 
CEO Duality Dummy Variable 
Board Size 2.1888 2.1972 0.3782 402 
Board Composition 0.1684 0.1538 0.113 402 
Sub-committee Dummy Variable 
Audit Committee 
Composition 
0.2938 0.3333 0.1591 402 
Foreign Ownership 0.0899 0 0.2161 402 
Director Ownership 0.1802 0.15 0.1778 402 
Institutional Ownership 0.0683 0.01 0.1112 402 
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As per Table 6.2, descriptive statistics for CEO duality are not considered 
as a dummy variable is used for measuring this variable. Average Board Size is 
2.18 with a median of 2.19. This means board number of directors is 9 as board size 
is measured as a logarithm. Therefore, most of the firms align with the corporate 
governance guideline.40 Average board composition is 0.15 with a median of 0.15. 
This suggests that the guideline’s minimum requirement of independent directors 
on a board has not yet been adopted by firms. Similarly, the guideline’s requirement 
in relation to sub-committee has not been adopted. Average audit committee 
composition is 0.29 with a median of 0.33, reflecting that firms are mostly aligned 
with the guideline. An average .08 foreign investors with a median of 0 suggests 
that within listed firms foreign investors are not common. In contrast, average 
director ownership is 0.18 with a median of 0.15. Thus, director ownership is 
common among the listed firms in Bangladesh. Finally, average institutional 
ownership is 0.06 with a median of 0.01. Thus, institutional investors are very 
limited among the Bangladeshi listed firms.   
6.2.3 Descriptive Statistics – Control Variables  
For exploring the relationship between corporate governance characteristics 
and voluntary disclosure firm size, leverage, industry and firm profitability are 
considered as control variables and Table 6.3 presents the mean, median and 
standard deviation of these variables. 
 Table 6-3 Descriptive statistics for control variables 
 
 
 
As per Table 6.3, average firm size is 21.89 with median 21.84. This 2.18 
or 2.19 reflects that average and median firm size is 306 million as this variable is 
measured as a logarithm. The average for leverage is 1.24 with a median of 0.46, 
which means a significant number of firms have debt. Descriptive statistics for 
industry is not considered as a dummy variable is used for measuring this variable. 
Finally, average firm profitability is 1.34 with median of 1.05. It should be noted 
                                                          
40 Corporate Governance Guideline for Bangladeshi firms is discussed in Chapter Five. 
 Firm Size Leverage Industry Firm Profitability 
Mean  21.8904  1.2420 
Dummy 
Variable 
 1.3432 
Median  21.8430  0.4674  1.0576 
Std. Dev.  1.5290  4.3119  1.3005 
Observations 402 402 402 
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that profitability is measured by Tobin’s Q; any value equal to or less than 1 reflects 
that the cost of a firm is higher than the price of equity. Similarly, it is considered 
that the firm is earning more than the cost or managing profit if the value of Tobin’s 
Q is more than 1. Therefore, from an average value of 1.34 or a median of 1.05 for 
Tobin’s Q, it can be concluded that within the Bangladeshi contexts most of the 
firms are closer to cover the firm cost marginally or managing profit at a minimum 
level as the average and median value of Tobin’s Q is close to 1. 
6.3 Diagnostic Analyses Relating to the Assumptions of Models and Validity 
of Variables  
Prior to proceeding with any statistical analysis, some diagnostic tests are 
advisable to meet the assumptions of statistical analyses including: normality, 
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and endogeneity (Rashid 2015a; Gujarati 
2003). 
6.3.1 Testing for Normality  
This study examines the normality of data by using probability‒probability 
(P‒P) plots of the dependent variable (voluntary disclosure index). The result 
ensures that the normality assumption is not violated (see Appendix F (a) for result). 
The normality assumption is further checked by considering a Residual 
Test/Histogram–Normality Test of the regression equation (in Appendix F (a)). 
Both results recommend that the assumption of normality is violated for model 1.  
However, Coakes and Steed (2001) suggest that violation of normality is 
not a significant concern if the sample size is large (greater than 30). Brooks (2008, 
p. 164) further advocates as follows: 
For sample sizes that are sufficiently large, violation of the normality 
assumption is virtually inconsequential. Appealing to a central limit 
theorem, the test statistics will asymptotically follow the appropriate 
distributions even in the absence of error normality.  
Therefore, the results from relevant normality tests and the existence of a large 
sample (402 firm-year observations) provide confidence that the assumption of 
normality is not a concern for this study. 
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6.3.2 Testing for Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity refers to the situation in which two or more of the 
explanatory variables used in the regression model are highly correlated. Regarding 
multicollinearity, Brooks (2008, p. 171) states   
In any practical context, the correlation between explanatory variables will 
be non-zero, although this will generally be relatively benign in the sense 
that a small degree of association between explanatory variables will almost 
always occur but will not cause too much loss of precision. However, a 
problem occurs when the explanatory variables are very highly correlated 
with each other, and this problem is known as multicollinearity.  
Therefore, it is essential to assess multicollinearity. Consistent with the literature, 
this study considers correlation coefficients and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
tests for multicollinearity (Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007; Eng & Mak 2003; Haniffa 
& Cooke 2005; Haniffa & Cooke 2002; Ho & Wong 2001). Detailed results are 
presented in Table 6.4. 
As per Table 6.4. the correlation matrix of the explanatory variables are not 
strongly correlated (correlation coefficients less than 0.62); correlation exceeding 
0.80 might be considered as a problem (Gujarati 2003).p 359. Therefore, this test 
suggests that multicollinearity is not a concern for this study. 
In addition, the variance inflation factors (VIFs) of all the variables are less 
than 2.11. It is argued that the concern of multicollinearity arises if the value of VIF 
is greater than 10 (Dielman 2001; Gujarati 2003). Thus, there is no potential 
problem for this study from the VIF perspective. Therefore, based on the results of 
the diagnostic tests, it is concluded that there is no multicollinearity problem for 
model 1. 
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Table 6-4 Correlation coefficient matrix and Variance Inflation factor (VIF) of the explanatory variables 
 
CEO 
Duality 
Board 
Size 
Board 
Composition 
Sub-
committee 
Audit 
Committee 
Composition 
Foreign 
Ownership 
Director 
Ownership 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Firm 
Size 
Leverage Industry 
Firm 
Performance 
VIF 
CEO Duality  1.0000             1.0459 
Board Size  -0.0725  1.0000            2.1153 
Board 
Composition 
-0.0270 -0.3712  1.0000           1.9347 
Sub-committee -0.0397  0.0281  0.0851  1.0000          1.0966 
Audit committee 
Composition 
-0.0065 -0.1361  0.6170  0.0016  1.0000         1.7136 
Foreign 
Ownership 
-0.0435 -0.0688  0.0672  0.1991  0.0676  1.0000        1.2907 
Director 
Ownership 
 0.0461  0.0081 -0.0244 -0.1922  0.0008 -0.3061  1.0000       1.1839 
Institutional 
Ownership 
-0.0869  0.0358 -0.0922 -0.0178 -0.1083 -0.0926 -0.0157  1.0000      1.0395 
Firm Size -0.0484  0.4204 -0.1117  0.1358  0.0496  0.1497 -0.2342  0.0364  1.0000     1.4851 
Leverage -0.0341 -0.0520  0.0520 -0.0497  0.0575 -0.0546  0.0723 -0.0616 -0.0634  1.0000    1.0289 
Industry -0.1148  0.6281 -0.2310  0.0313 -0.1546 -0.1027  0.0044  0.0347  0.2632  0.0399  1.0000   2.0594 
Firm 
Performance 
 
-0.0428 -0.3743  0.0620  0.0665  0.0079  0.2827 -0.0597  0.0050 -0.3240 -0.0311 -0.5179  1.0000  1.6752 
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6.3.3 Testing for Heteroscedasticity  
Heteroscedasticity refers to the variance of the errors that do not have a 
constant variance (Brooks 2008), In other words, the assumptions of 
heteroscedasticity occur when the variance of the error terms differ across 
observations. It is essential to test this assumption as Gujarati (2003) warns that the 
presence of heteroscedasticity can lead to incorrect standard errors; thus, any 
interpretations made could be misleading. To investigate the presence of 
heteroscedasticity, this study plots standardized residuals (ZRESID) versus the 
standardized predicted value (ZPRED). Based on the result, the model does not 
completely dismiss the possibility of heteroscedasticity (see Appendix F (b)) for 
result). Cooke (1998) advises that the Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test can also be 
applied for assessing the presence of heteroscedasticity. Accordingly, this study 
applies the Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test, the results of which are presented in Table 
6.5. 
Table 6-5 Heteroscedasticity test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
F-statistic 6.714790  Prob. F(12,389) 0.0000 
Obs*R-squared 68.98147  Prob. Chi-Square(12) 0.0000 
Scaled explained SS 66.98439  Prob. Chi-Square(12) 0.0000 
     
     
 
Table 6.5 shows a significant (0.000) chi-square for observed R Square. 
Accordingly, the chi-square statistics and corresponding p-value of the Breusch–
Pagan–Godfrey test suggest that heteroscedasticity is present in the model.  
Therefore, based on both tests, there is a concern in relation to 
heteroscedasticity. Accordingly, the presence of heteroscedasticity is corrected by 
using White’s (1980) correction technique for unknown heteroscedasticity; this 
approach is consistent with prior studies (Rashid 2015a, 2015b, 2015c).  
6.3.4 Testing for Endogeneity 
An endogeneity problem is considered a significant pitfall for corporate 
governance-related studies as its presence may lead to distorted results (Larcker et 
al. 2007; Larcker & Rusticus 2007, 2010; Rashid 2015b). However, while some 
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earlier studies did not place much emphasis on this issue, this study tests whether 
endogeneity exists. In so doing, the following established techniques by Gujarati 
(2003) have been applied.  
The predicted values for the independent variables were checked against the 
dependent variable (see Appendix F (c) for result). In particular, the F test for the 
predicted value of CEO duality (F= 0.01 and relevant p = 0.9218), board 
composition (F = 0.24 and relevant p = 0.6210), board size (F = 0.04 and relevant 
p = 0.8351), sub-committee (F = 1.01 and relevant p = 0.3166), audit committee 
composition (F = 1.69 and relevant p = 0.1945), foreign ownership (F= 1.15 and 
relevant p = 0.2844), director ownership (F = 2.33 and relevant p = 0.1281) and 
institutional ownership (F = 1.27 and relevant p = 0.2601). The F test for the 
predicted value of every individual variable is insignificant.  
Therefore, findings from these tests indicate that there are no signs of 
potential endogeneity between corporate governance characteristics and voluntary 
disclosure, suggesting that both the OLS and independent variables are consistent. 
Detailed results of the endogeneity test are in Appendix F.  
6.4 Results: The Relationship Between Corporate Governance 
Characteristics and Voluntary Disclosure  
After addressing the basic assumptions, this study proceeds to investigate 
the determinants of voluntary disclosure or research model one. It should be noted 
that besides corporate governance characteristics, this model also considers four 
control variables, including firm size, leverage, industry and firm profitability. 
Accordingly, the research model is as follows:  
𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 CD𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 BS𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 BC𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 SC𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 ACC𝑖𝑡 +  
          𝛽6 FO𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7 𝐷𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 INO𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 FSit  + 𝛽10 IND𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11 LEV𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12 TOBINQ𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡             ( 1) 
 
 
For investigating this model OLS and 2SLS have been applied. The adjusted R2 
for OLS is 56.40% and 2SLS is 56.0%. This indicates that the independent and 
control variables explain 56.0% of the variation in the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. It should be noted that explanatory power is higher than the prior 
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studies within the Bangladeshi context (Khan et al. 2013; Khan 2010; Muttakin et 
al. 2016) as well as other developing countries (Gul & Leung 2004; Haji 2015; 
Haniffa & Cooke 2002; Ho & Wong 2001; Mohd Ghazali 2007). Detailed results 
of the statistical analyses are presented in Table 6.6. 
 
Table 6-6 Results: Relationship between corporate governance characteristics & voluntary disclosure 
 ** Indicates statistically significant at the 5% level 
*** Indicates statistically significant at the 1% level 
 
Based on Table 6.6, the results show a significant negative relationship 
(OLS: coeff = -0.073, p<0.02 and 2SLS: coeff = -0.072, p<0.03) and supports 
hypothesis 1(a). 
Regarding the relationship between board size and voluntary disclosure, the 
results show an insignificant association (OLS: coeff = -0.000, p<0.86 and 2SLS: 
coeff = -5.569, p<0.97); thus, hypothesis1(b) is rejected. 
Regarding the relationship between board composition and voluntary 
disclosure, the results show an insignificant association (OLS: coeff = -0.072, 
p<0.12 and 2SLS: coeff = -0.074, p<0.11); thus, hypothesis 1(c) is not supported. 
Regarding the relationship between sub-committee and voluntary 
disclosure, the results show a significant positive association (OLS: coeff = 0.057, 
p<0.00 and 2SLS: coeff = 0.053, p<0.00), thus a the arguments of hypothesis1 (d). 
Independent Variables 
Voluntary Disclosure Index 
Pooled OLS 
 
2SLS 
  Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
CEO Duality -0.073 -2.182 0.029*** -0.072 -2.140 0.033*** 
Board Size -0.000 -0.017 0.861 -5.5690 -0.036 0.971 
Board Composition -0.072 -1.536 0.125 -0.074 -1.577 0.115 
Sub-committee 0.057 2.882 0.004*** 0.053 2.723 0.006*** 
Audit Committee 
Composition 
0.070 2.188 0.029*** 0.072 2.262 0.024*** 
Foreign Ownership 0.133 4.230 0.000*** 0.124 3.848 0.000*** 
Director Ownership -0.102 -4.397 0.000*** -0.146 -4.085 0.000*** 
Institutional Ownership -0.036 -1.256 0.209 -0.038 -1.330 0.184 
Firm Size 0.042 13.416 0.000*** 0.041 12.402 0.000*** 
Leverage 0.000 0.487 0.625 0.000 0.643 0.520 
Industry 0.049 3.727 0.000*** 0.048 3.628 0.000*** 
Firm Performance  -0.002 -0.751 0.453 -0.002 -0.800 0.424 
  
R-   0.564  R2  0.560 
Adjusted R2 0.550  Adjusted R2  0.546 
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Regarding the relationship between audit committee composition and 
voluntary disclosure, the results show a significant positive association (OLS: coeff 
= 0.070, p<0.02 and 2SLS: coeff = 0.072, p<0.02); thus supporting hypothesis1(e). 
Regarding the relationship between foreign ownership and voluntary 
disclosure, the results show a significant positive association (OLS: coeff = 0.133, 
p<0.00 and 2SLS: coeff = 0.124, p<0.00), supporting hypothesis1(f). 
Regarding the relationship between director ownership and voluntary 
disclosure, the results show a significant negative association (OLS: coeff = -0.102, 
p<0.00 and 2SLS: coeff = -0.146, p<0.00); thus supporting hypothesis1(g). 
Regarding the relationship between institutional ownership and voluntary 
disclosure, the results show an insignificant association (OLS: coeff = -0.036, 
p<0.20 and 2SLS: coeff = -0.038, p<0.18); thus rejecting hypothesis1(h). 
Besides the corporate governance characteristics, regarding the relationship 
between firm size and voluntary disclosure, the results show a significant positive 
association (OLS: coeff = 0.042, p<0.00 and 2SLS: coeff = 0.041, p<0.00). 
Regarding the relationship between firm leverage and voluntary disclosure, 
an insignificant association (OLS: coeff = 0.000, p<0.62 and 2SLS: coeff = 0.000, 
p<0.52) is observed. 
Regarding the relationship between industry and voluntary disclosure, the 
results show a significant positive association (OLS: coeff = 0.042, p<0.00 and 
2SLS: coeff = 0.041, p<0.00).  
Regarding the relationship between firm performance and voluntary 
disclosure, an insignificant association (OLS: coeff = -0.002, p<0.45 and 2SLS: 
coeff = -0.002, p<0.42) is observed. 
Therefore, based on the above discussions, some characteristics of corporate 
governance and control variables act as a significant explanatory factor for 
voluntary disclosures. Accordingly, a summary of the eight hypotheses and results 
are presented in Table 6.7. 
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Table 6-7 Summary – Results of the hypotheses regarding the relationship between corporate 
governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure  
 
6.5 Robustness Check  
To understand the relationship between corporate governance 
characteristics and voluntary disclosure more rigorously and to contribute a robust 
result, the main result findings are tested further. In so doing two different 
robustness tests have been applied for model 1. Initially, to ensure the results are 
free from endogeneity, a further test considering an alternative measurement with 
some corporate governance characteristics is applied. Finally, the relationship of 
corporate governance characteristics with voluntary disclosure has been assessed 
by replacing voluntary disclosure with three main categories (social, environmental 
and intellectual capital).  
6.5.1 Robustness Test 1: Additional Endogeneity Test 
Alternative measurements of variables representing several corporate 
governance characteristics, including board composition, audit committee 
composition, foreign ownership, director ownership and institutional ownership, 
Hypotheses 
Expected 
Result 
Results Hypothesis   
Rejected 
/ Not 
Rejected  
Based on 
OLS 
Based on 
2SLS 
Hypothesis 1: 
CEO duality is negatively associated 
with voluntary disclosure. 
Significant 
Relationship 
Negative 
Relationship 
Negative 
Relationship 
 
Supported  
Hypothesis 2: 
There is an association between Board 
size and voluntary disclosure. 
Significant 
Relationship 
No 
Significant 
Relationship  
No 
Significant 
Relationship 
Not  
Supported 
Hypothesis 3: 
Board composition is positively 
associated with voluntary disclosure. 
Significant 
Relationship 
No 
Significant 
Relationship 
No 
Significant 
Relationship 
Not  
Supported 
Hypothesis 4: 
There is an association between sub-
committee and voluntary disclosure. 
Significant 
Relationship 
Positive 
Relationship 
Positive 
Relationship 
 
   
Supported 
Hypothesis 5: 
Audit Committee Composition is 
positively associated with voluntary 
disclosure. 
Significant 
Relationship 
Positive 
Relationship 
Positive 
Relationship 
Supported  
Hypothesis 6: 
Foreign Ownership is positively 
associated with voluntary disclosure. 
Significant 
Relationship 
Positive 
Relationship 
Positive 
Relationship 
Supported  
Hypothesis 7: 
Director ownership is negatively 
associated with voluntary disclosure. 
Significant 
Relationship 
Negative 
Relationship 
Negative 
Relationship 
Supported  
Hypothesis 8: 
There is an association between 
Institutional ownership and voluntary 
disclosure. 
Significant 
Relationship 
No 
Significant 
Relationship 
No 
Significant 
Relationship 
Not  
Supported 
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have been applied. Results from this alternative measurement for the relationship 
between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure are presented in Table 6.8.  
 
Table 6-8 Results: Relationship between corporate governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure 
from alternative measurement  
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
     
C -0.860 0.070 -12.222 0.000 
CEO Duality -0.075 0.034 -2.163 0.031*** 
Board Size -0.002 0.015 -0.154 0.877 
Board Composition -0.010 0.011 -0.974 0.330 
Sub-committee 0.065 0.018 3.510 0.000*** 
Audit Committee Composition 0.022 0.011 1.912 0.056** 
Foreign Ownership 0.084 0.018 4.477 0.000*** 
Director Ownership -0.029 0.008 -3.340 0.000*** 
Institutional Ownership -0.015 0.013 -1.152 0.249 
Firm Size 0.045 0.003 14.696 0.000*** 
Leverage 0.000 0.000 0.357 0.720 
Industry 0.046 0.013 3.436 0.000*** 
Firm Performance  0.000 0.003 0.104 0.916 
     
R-squared 0.562523  
Adjusted R-squared 0.549028  
     
     
As for Table 6.8, CEO duality (regression coefficient is -0.075 and the p 
value is 0.031) and director ownership (regression coefficient is -0.029 and the p 
value is 0.000) have a significant negative relationship with voluntary disclosure. 
In contrast, sub-committee (regression coefficient is 0.065 and the p value is 0.000), 
audit committee composition (regression coefficient is 0.022 and the p value is 
0.056) and foreign ownership (regression coefficient is 0.084 and the p value is 
0.000) have a significant positive relationship. No significant relationship has been 
reported for board size (regression coefficient is -0.002 and the p value is 0.877), 
board composition (regression coefficient is -0.010 and the p value is 0.330) and 
institutional ownership (regression coefficient is -0.015 and the p value is 0.249). 
In addition, from control variables, firm size (regression coefficient is 0.045 and the 
p value is 0.000) and industry (regression coefficient is 0.046 and the p value is 
0.000) have a significant positive relationship and no significant relationship has 
been reported for leverage (regression coefficient is 0.000 and the p value is 0.720) 
and firm performance (regression coefficient is 0.065 and the p value is 0.916). For 
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alternative measurement of the variables, 2SLS is also considered (see Appendix H 
for result) and a consistent result has been reported. Therefore, the results from the 
robustness test one are consistent with the main findings and further dismiss the 
potential endogeneity problem.  
6.5.2 Robustness Test 2: Relationship between Corporate Governance 
Characteristics and Three Main Categories of Voluntary Disclosure  
Within the literature, a significant number of prior studies examines the 
relationship of corporate governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure by 
considering individual categories including social (Haniffa & Cooke 2005; Khan et 
al. 2013; Mohd Ghazali 2007; Saleh et al. 2010), environmental (Brammer & 
Pavelin 2008; Halme & Huse 1997; Rao et al. 2012) and intellectual capital 
(Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007; Li et al. 2012; Li et al. 2008). In studies from other 
countries, as well as Bangladesh, a varied result has been observed. Thus, further 
investigation will provide a strong understanding of the relationship between 
corporate governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure.  
Hence, as a test of robustness, this study replaces voluntary disclosure 
(dependent variable) with social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosure 
individually. Research model 1 is altered into the following three models.  
 
𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽7𝐷𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                      𝑀.1.𝑅2.1 
 
𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽7𝐷𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                        𝑀.1.𝑅2.2 
 
𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽7𝐷𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                       𝑀.1.𝑅2.3 
As on the above models, the relationship of corporate governance characteristics 
with social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosures are examined within 
pooled OLS and 2SLS. Detailed results are presented in Table 6.9.
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Table 6-9 Results: Relationship of the corporate governance characteristics of with social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosure individually 
 
  
Voluntary Disclosure  
 
Social Disclosure 
 
Environmental Disclosure  
 
Intellectual Capital Disclosure  
 
OLS 
 
2SLS 
 
OLS 
 
2SLS 
 
OLS 
 
2SLS 
Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
CEO Duality -0.083 -2.325 0.020*** -0.081 -2.263 0.024*** -0.075 -2.304 0.021*** -0.074 -2.267 0.023*** -0.058 -1.683 0.093* -0.058 -1.661 0.097* 
Board Size -0.001 -0.091 0.927 -0.000 -0.035 0.971 0.017 1.071 0.284 0.017 1.092 0.275 -0.028 -1.339 0.181 -0.028 -1.306 0.192 
Board 
Composition -0.079 -1.426 0.154 -0.084 -1.493 0.136 -0.072 -1.531 0.126 -0.075 -1.575 0.116 -0.064 -0.922 0.357 -0.066 -0.950 0.342 
Sub-
committee 0.077 3.549 0.000*** 0.072 3.366 0.000** 0.049 2.298 0.022*** 0.046 2.145 0.032*** 0.038 1.365 0.172 0.036 1.286 0.199 
Audit 
Committee 
Composition 0.057 1.532 0.126 0.061 1.645 0.100* 0.075 2.120 0.034*** 0.077 2.183 0.029*** 0.079 1.769 0.077* 0.081 1.797 0.073* 
Foreign 
Ownership 0.106 2.891 0.004*** 0.094 2.513 0.012*** 0.085 2.675 0.007*** 0.077 2.379 0.017*** 0.230 5.720 0.000*** 0.224 5.425 0.000*** 
Director 
Ownership -0.111 -4.207 0.000*** -0.173 -4.440 0.000*** -0.069 -2.790 0.005*** -0.109 -2.806 0.005*** -0.132 -4.232 0.000*** -0.160 -3.432 0.000*** 
Institutional 
Ownership -0.081 -2.312 0.021*** -0.084 -2.411 0.016*** -0.058 -2.019 0.044*** -0.059 -2.098 0.036*** 0.051 1.294 0.196 0.050 1.261 0.208 
 
 R2  0.519  R2  0.514  R2  0.476  R2  0.473  R2  0.481  R2  0.480 
Adjusted R2  0.504 Adjusted R2  0.499 Adjusted R2  0.460 Adjusted R2  0.457 Adjusted R2  0.465 Adjusted R2  0.464 
** Indicates statistically significant at the 5% level 
*** Indicates statistically significant at the 1% level 
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Based on the results in Table 6.9, the relationship between corporate 
governance characteristics and the categories of voluntary disclosure (social, 
environmental, intellectual capital) are similar, with some exceptions as discussed 
below.  
CEO duality is significantly negatively associated with social (OLS: 
coefficient = -0.083 and p value = 0.020; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.081 and p value = 
0.024), environmental (OLS: coefficient = -0.075 and p value = 0.021; 2SLS: 
coefficient = -0.074 and p value = 0.023) and intellectual capital (OLS: coefficient 
= -0.058 and p value = 0.093; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.058 and p value = 0.097) 
disclosures. This finding is also consistent with the main result and provides a 
strong argument that CEO duality reduces the monitoring power of a firm and may 
reduce the transparency of a firm.   
Board size is insignificantly associated with social (OLS: coefficient =   
-0.001 and p value = 0.927; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.971 and p value = 0.000), 
environmental (OLS: coefficient = 0.017 and p value = 0.284; 2SLS: coefficient = 
0.017 and p value = 0.275) and intellectual capital (OLS: coefficient = -0.028 and 
p value = 0.181; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.028 and p value = 0.198) disclosures. This 
is also consistent with the main result, indicating that having more directors causes 
a coordination problem, or scope to emphasize or make a decision regarding 
voluntary disclosure. 
Board composition has an insignificant relationship with social (OLS: 
coefficient = -0.079 and p value = 0.154; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.084 and p value = 
0.136), environmental (OLS: coefficient = -0.072 and p value = 0.126; 2SLS: 
coefficient = -0.075 and p value = 0.116) and intellectual capital (OLS: coefficient 
= -0.064 and p value = 0.357; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.066 and p value = 0.342) 
disclosures. These findings are consistent with the main result and further suggest 
that independent directors might be focused on operational efficiency and not 
interested in voluntary disclosure. In addition, within Bangladesh, the mandatory 
provision to maintain a minimum number of independent directors influenced this 
insignificant result. In particular, in order to comply with the minimum independent 
director requirements of the guidelines, independent directors have less flexibility 
to implement their own preferences.  
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The presence of a sub-committee has a positive significant relationship with 
social (OLS: coefficient = 0.077 and p value = 0.000; 2SLS: coefficient = 0.072 and 
p value = 0.000; ), environmental (OLS: coefficient = 0.049 and p value = 0.022; 
2SLS: coefficient = 0.046 and p value = 0.032), and insignificant significant 
relationship with intellectual capital (OLS: coefficient = 0.038 and p value = 0.172; 
2SLS: coefficient = 0.036 and p value = 0.199) disclosures. Although this finding 
is consistent with social and environmental disclosure, it is different for intellectual 
disclosure. This finding indicates that Bangladeshi firms might focus on social and 
environmental issues as a monitoring and controlling mechanism. In contrast, due 
to poor social and economic conditions, stakeholders may not be familiar with 
intellectual capital disclosure.  
Audit committee composition has an insignificant relationship with social 
(OLS: coefficient = 0.057 and p value = 0.126; 2SLS: coefficient = 0.061 and p 
value = 0.100) but a significant positive relationship with environmental (OLS: 
coefficient = 0.075 and p value = 0.034; 2SLS: coefficient = 0.077 and p value = 
0.029) and intellectual capital (OLS: coefficient = 0.079 and p value = 0.077; 2SLS: 
coefficient = 0.081 and p value = 0.073) disclosures. This finding for environmental 
and intellectual capital disclosures is consistent with the main result and provides 
strong support for the argument that independent directors on an audit committee 
stimulate monitoring and controlling of a firm and increase transparency. It should 
also be noted that due to environmental issues stakeholders might be affected by 
legal problems caused by pollution. In addition, for intellectual capital disclosure, 
investors are keen to know about the potential for value creation and reducing 
information asymmetry. Accordingly, audit committee composition is more 
concerned with environmental and intellectual capital disclosure. In contrast, an 
insignificant result with social disclosure supports the argument that independent 
directors are more concerned with legal issues and firm performance. 
Foreign ownership has a significant positive relationship with social (OLS: 
coefficient = 0.106 and p value = 0.004; 2SLS: coefficient = 0.094 and p value = 
0.012), environmental (OLS: coefficient = 0.085 and p value = 0.007; 2SLS: 
coefficient = 0.077 and p value = 0.017) and intellectual capital (OLS: coefficient 
= 0.230 and p value = 0.000; 2SLS: coefficient = 0.224 and p value = 0.000) 
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disclosures. This finding is also consistent with the main result and provides a 
strong argument that foreign investors are powerful enough to stimulate 
transparency as well as compliance with Western values. In addition, having foreign 
investors reflects the interest in operational activities and transparency of a firm.  
Director ownership has significant negative relationship with social (OLS: 
coefficient = -0.111 and p value = 0.000; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.173 and p value = 
0.000), environmental (OLS: coefficient = -0.069 and p value = 0.005; 2SLS: 
coefficient = -0.109 and p value = 0.005) and intellectual capital (OLS: coefficient 
= -0.132 and p value = 0.000; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.160 and p value = 0.000) 
disclosures. This finding is also consistent with the main result and provides a 
strong argument that director ownership may stimulate an agency problem and 
increase information asymmetry by ignoring voluntary disclosure. Directors are 
privileged to have additional access to the internal information of a firm. Thus, 
director ownership may facilitate the opportunistic behaviour of limiting additional 
information within directors only; therefore, firms disclose minimum additional 
information.  
Institutional ownership has a significant negative relationship with social 
(OLS: coefficient = -0.081 and p value = 0.021; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.084 and p 
value = 0.016) and environmental (OLS: coefficient = -0.058 and p value = 0.044; 
2SLS: coefficient = -0.059 and p value = 0.036) but an insignificant relationship 
with intellectual capital (OLS: coefficient = 0.051 and p value = 0.196; 2SLS: 
coefficient = 0.050 and p value = 0.208) disclosures. A significant negative 
relationship with social and environmental disclosure provides a strong argument 
that institutional owners are focused on firm performance and avoid additional costs 
or agendas like social and environmental disclosures. On the other hand, an 
insignificant positive relationship with intellectual capital disclosure is consistent 
with the main findings. Institutional owners are more interested in potential value 
creation activities than social and environmental issues.  
 Based on the above discussion, most of the corporate governance 
characteristics are consistently associated with voluntary disclosure as well as 
social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosure. However, a varied result 
from sub-committee, audit committee composition and institutional ownership 
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suggests that the emphasis on corporate governance characteristics is not unique in 
relation to all the categories of voluntary disclosure. Therefore, corporate 
governance characteristics of a firm play a significant role for voluntary disclosure 
while managing monitoring and controlling a firm. A summary of the findings from 
robustness tests one and two is presented in Table 6.10.  
Table 6-10 Summary of the robustness test 
 Robustness Test_1 Robustness Test_2 
Corporate Governance 
Characteristics 
Voluntary Disclosure Social Disclosure 
Environmental 
Disclosure 
Intellectual Capital 
Disclosure 
CEO Duality  NEG &CRD  NEG &CRD NEG &CRD NEG &CRD 
Board Size (BS) NSR & CRD NSR & CRD NSR & CRD NSR & CRD 
Board Composition  NSR & CRD NSR & CRD NSR & CRD NSR & CRD 
Sub-committee  POS & CRD POS & CRD POS & CRD NSR & NCRD 
Audit Committee 
Composition  
POS & CRD NSR & NCRD. POS & CRD POS & CRD 
Foreign ownership  POS & CRD POS & CRD POS & CRD POS & CRD 
Director Ownership  NEG &CRD NEG &CRD NEG &CRD NEG &CRD 
Institutional Ownership  NSR & CRD NEG & NCRD NEG & NCRD NSR & NCRD 
POS= Positive relationship 
NEG= Negative relationship  
NSR= No significant relationship 
CRD= Consistent with main result  
NCRD= Not Consistent with Main Result 
 
 
 
6.6 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter reported the empirical results of whether characteristics of 
corporate governance act as a determinant of voluntary disclosure. Specifically, it 
sought to achieve three main objectives.  
First, this chapter conducted some diagnostic tests including: normality, 
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and endogeneity. As a test for normality 
assumptions, probability‒probability (P‒P) plots of the dependent variable 
(voluntary disclosure index) and a Residual Test/Histogram–Normality test were 
applied and both tests suggest that the assumption of normality is not violated. 
Multicollinearity was checked by considering the matrix of the explanatory 
variables and VIF, finding no major violation of multicollinearity assumptions. By 
plotting standardized residuals (ZRESID) versus the standardized predicted value 
(ZPRED) and applying the Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test, assumptions of 
heteroscedasticity were assessed, finding a concern in relation to heteroscedasticity. 
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By applying White’s (1980) correction technique for unknown heteroscedasticity, 
this issue was resolved. Finally, no endogeneity issue was observed.  
Second, this chapter presents the empirical results for the eight hypotheses. 
Accordingly, OLS and 2SLS have been applied and a consistent result reported for 
both analyses. In particular, the findings suggest that CEO duality and director 
ownership are significantly negatively associated with voluntary disclosure. In 
contrast, the presence of sub-committee, audit committee composition and foreign 
ownership are significantly positively associated with voluntary disclosure. 
However, no significant relationship was found for board size and board 
composition. In addition, the characteristics of corporate governance, firm size and 
financial industry were found to be significantly positively associated with 
voluntary disclosure, while an insignificant relationship was observed for leverage 
and profitability.  
Finally, this chapter discussed the tests used to check robustness. Two tests 
were employed to check whether the results are robust: (1) further endogeneity test; 
(2) voluntary disclosure was replaced with social, environmental and intellectual 
capital disclosures. The first robustness test, a further endogeneity test using a 
different measurement (dummy variable) for ownership variables, including board 
composition, audit composition, foreign, director and institutional ownership, was 
applied. Results from these tests were consistent with the main findings. The second 
robustness test replaced the dependent variable voluntary disclosure with three 
categories including social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosure. A 
majority of the results was consistent with the main result.  
The next chapter discusses the results of the second research question: To 
what extent does voluntary disclosure affect firm performance in Bangladeshi listed 
firms? Consistent with Chapter Six, the assumptions of normality, multicollinearity, 
heteroscedasticity and endogeneity are applied initially, then OLS and 2SLS 
regression analysis is used to investigate the question. Finally, the findings from 
two robustness tests are presented.  
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Chapter Seven: Results – The Effects of Voluntary 
Disclosure on Firm Performance 
7.1 Introduction  
Chapter Six provides the findings related to the first research question: To 
what extent do corporate governance characteristics affect voluntary disclosure of 
social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosures in Bangladesh listed 
firms? This chapter focuses on the result of other research question: To what extent 
does voluntary disclosure affect firm performance in Bangladeshi listed firms? 
Section 7.2 of this chapter provides details of the descriptive statistics for 
dependent, independent and control variables. The dependent variables include firm 
performance (Return on Asset, Return on Sales, Market Capitalization, Earning Per 
Share and Tobin’s Q). The independent variable, the voluntary disclosure index 
(VDI) and the control variables are firm size, leverage, industry, CEO Duality and 
Board Composition. Consistent with Chapter Six, Section 7.3 conducts diagnostic 
tests, including normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and endogeneity 
assumptions.  
 Section 7.4 presents the results obtained from the statistical analyses, 
including OLS and 2SLS to assess the effects of voluntary disclosure to answer 
research question two. As an indicator of firm performance, five indicators, 
including ROA, ROS, MCAP, EPS and Tobin’s Q, have been considered in order 
to assess this relationship. Then Section 7.5 discusses the robustness of the results 
by conducting further analysis of an additional endogeneity test and replacing the 
current independent variable VDI with three categories, including SDI, EDI and 
IDI. Finally, Section 6.6 presents a summary and conclusion of this chapter.  
7.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics concerning research question two (research model 2) 
are presented in this section. Descriptive statistics report the mean, median, 
maximum, minimum and standard deviation for the dependent variable, 
independent variables and control variable and are provided in Table 7.1.  
 
166 
 
Table 7-1 Descriptive statistics for the variables of Research Model 2 
Variable 
Category 
Variables Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
Observations 
Dependent 
Variables 
Return on Asset (ROA) 0.0473 0.0258 0.0571 402 
Return on Sales (ROS) 0.1377 0.0942 0.2566 402 
Market Capitalization 
(MCAP) 
22.5835 22.5436 1.19687 402 
Earnings Per share (EPS) 6.0310 2.2929 1.4273 402 
Tobin’s Q 1.2982 0.9831 1.2982 402 
Independent 
Variable 
VDI 0.1616 0.1375 0.1293 402 
Control 
Variables 
Firm Size 21.8904 21.8430 1.5290 402 
Leverage 1.2420 0.4674 4.3119 402 
Industry Dummy Variable 
CEO Duality Dummy Variable 
Board Composition 0.1684 0.1538 0.1130 402 
 
As per Table 7.1, regarding the dependent variables, including ROA, ROS, 
MCAP, EPS and Tobin’s Q, the average is 0.047, 0.1377, 22.583, 6.031 and 1.298 
respectively with a median 0.025, 0.094, 22.543, 2.292 and 0.983 respectively. 
These results of average and median reflect that most of the firms are performing 
below the average. An independent variable voluntary disclosure is considered and, 
as per Table 7.1, the average voluntary disclosure index is 0.16 and a median of 
0.13. Thus, there are very limited voluntary disclosures from the firms and most of 
these are small. In addition, five control variables have been considered as a control 
variable, including firm size, leverage industry, board composition and CEO 
duality, as an explanatory factor for firm performance. As per Table 7.1, average 
firm size is 21.89 with median 21.84. This 2.18 or 2.19 reflects that average and 
median firm size is 306 million as this variable is measured as a logarithm. The 
average for leverage is 1.24 with a median of 0.46, suggesting that a significant 
number of firms has debt. Descriptive statistics for industry are not considered as a 
dummy variable is used for measuring this variable. Average board composition is 
0.15 with a median of 0.15. This suggests that the minimum requirement of 
independent directors on board is not yet followed. Descriptive statistics for CEO 
duality are not considered as a dummy variable is used for measuring this variable 
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7.3 Diagnostic Analyses Relating to the Assumptions of Models and 
Validity of Variables 
Consistent with the arguments for model 1 (from Chapter Six), this chapter 
also applies four diagnostic tests: normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity 
and endogeneity. Results from these assumptions are discussed below. 
7.3.1 Testing for Normality  
Consistent with Chapter Six, the assumptions of normality of data have been tested 
using probability‒probability probability (P‒P) plots of each dependent variable 
(Return on Asset, Return on Equity, Market Capitalization, Earning Per Share and 
Tobin’s Q). The results are available in Appendix G (a). The normality assumption 
is further checked by considering a Residual Test/Histogram–Normality Test of the 
regression equation (in Appendix G (a)). Although, the result did satisfy the 
normality assumption completely, having a larger sample (more than 30 
observations) provides the confidence that the assumption of normality should not 
be a concern for this study (Brooks 2008; Coakes & Steed 2001).  
7.3.2 Testing for Multicollinearity 
Consistent with Chapter Six, multicollinearity assumptions for model 2 
have been assessed by two diagnostic tests, including implementing correlation 
coefficients and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) tests. Detailed results from tests 
are presented in Table 7.2. As per Table 7.2, the explanatory variables are not 
strongly correlated (correlation coefficients less than 0.65); if correlation exceeds 
0.80 this might be considered a problem (Gujarati 2003). In addition, the variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) of all the variables are less than 1.81, thus, there is no 
potential problem for this study from the VIF perspective (Dielman 2001; Gujarati 
2003).  
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Table 7-2 Correlation coefficient matrix and Variance Inflation factor (VIF) of the explanatory variables 
 Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Firm Size Leverage Industry CEO 
Duality  
Board 
Composition 
VIF 
Voluntary 
Disclosure  1.000      
1.817 
Firm Size 
 0.6513  1.000000     
1.740 
Leverage 
-0.034271 -0.063422  1.000000    
1.008 
Industry 
 0.314455  0.263263  0.039962  1.000000   
1.185 
CEO Duality 
-0.145399 -0.048451 -0.034146 
-
0.114898  1.000000  
1.034 
Board Composition  
-0.074367 -0.111795  0.052050 
-
0.231062 -0.027074  1.000000 
1.073 
 
7.3.3 Testing for Heteroscedasticity  
Consistent with Chapter Six, the assumption of heteroscedasticity is 
assessed by considering two tests. The first test is conducted by plotting 
standardized residuals (ZRESID) versus the standardized predicted value 
(ZPRED). Based on the results of each dependent variable (see Appendix G (b) for 
result), the heteroscedasticity problem cannot be dismissed. Second, a further 
assessment for heteroscedasticity is conducted by using the Breusch–Pagan–
Godfrey test. Accordingly, for every dependent variable for model 2, the results of 
the Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test are discussed in Tables 7.3 to 7.7.  
As per Table 7.3, ROA is the dependent variable for model 2 and chi-square 
for observed R square is significant (.00031). Accordingly, the chi-square statistics 
and corresponding p-value of the Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test suggest that 
heteroscedasticity is present in the model. 
 
Table 7-3 Heteroscedasticity test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey (ROA) 
     
     F-statistic 3.393089  Prob. F(6,395) 0.0028 
Obs*R-squared 19.70378  Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.0031 
Scaled explained SS 107.6352  Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.0000 
     
     
As per Table 7.4, ROS is the dependent variable for model 2 and chi-square 
for observed R square is insignificant (.2789). Accordingly, the chi-square statistics 
and corresponding p-value of the Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test rejects that 
heteroscedasticity is present in the model. 
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Table 7-4 Heteroscedasticity test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey (ROS) 
     
     F-statistic 1.247837  Prob. F(6,395) 0.2809 
Obs*R-squared 7.477961  Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.2789 
Scaled explained SS 208.7273  Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.0000 
     
     
 
As per Table 7.5, MCAP is the dependent variable for model 2 and chi-
square for observed R square is significant (.0000). Accordingly, the chi-square 
statistics and corresponding p-value of the Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test suggest 
that heteroscedasticity is present in the model. 
 
Table 7-5 Heteroscedasticity test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey (MCAP) 
     
     F-statistic 5.746716  Prob. F(6,395) 0.0000 
Obs*R-squared 32.27407  Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.0000 
Scaled explained SS 43.36571  Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.0000 
     
     
 
As per Table 7.6, EPS is the dependent variable for model 2 and chi-square 
for observed R square is significant (.0000). Accordingly, the chi-square statistics 
and corresponding p-value of the Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test suggest that 
heteroscedasticity is present in the model. 
 
Table 7-6 Heteroscedasticity test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey (EPS) 
     
     F-statistic 8.056552  Prob. F(6,395) 0.0000 
Obs*R-squared 43.83190  Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.0000 
Scaled explained SS 401.8503  Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.0000 
     
     
 
As per Table 7.7, Tobin’s Q is the dependent variable for model 2 and chi-
square for observed R square is significant (.00113). Accordingly, the chi-square 
statistics and corresponding p-value of the Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test suggest 
that heteroscedasticity is present in the model. 
 
Table 7-7 Heteroscedasticity test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey (Tobin’s Q) 
     
     F-statistic 2.816214  Prob. F(6,395) 0.0107 
Obs*R-squared 16.49127  Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.0113 
Scaled explained SS 130.2424  Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.0000 
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Therefore, as per the results from Tables 7.3 to 7.7, there is a concern in 
relation to heteroscedasticity for all the models except for ROS as a dependent 
variable. In addition, concern was also observed from initial graphs.  
Consistent with Chapter Six, the presence of heteroscedasticity is corrected 
by using White’s (1980) correction technique for unknown heteroscedasticity and 
this approach is consistent with prior studies (Rashid 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). 
7.3.4 Testing for Endogeneity 
An endogeneity test for the predicted value for the independent variable 
(voluntary disclosure) was checked against each dependent variable (firm 
performance indicator) (see Appendix G (c) for result). 
The F test for the predicted value of voluntary disclosure is insignificant for 
each indicator: ROA (F = 0.58 and relevant p value = 0.4482), ROS (F = 7.60 and 
relevant p value = 0.006, Market Capitalization (F = 1.52 and relevant p value = 
0.2188), EPS (F = 0.31 and relevant p value = 0.5770) and Tobin’s Q (F = 1.24 and 
relevant p value = 0.265). Therefore, an insignificant P value dismisses the potential 
endogeneity problem for all the firm performance indicators except for ROS. 
Detailed results of the endogeneity test are in Appendix G. 
 
7.4 Results: The Effects of Voluntary Disclosure on Firm 
performance  
After addressing the basic assumptions, this study proceeds to investigate 
the effects of voluntary disclosures on firm performance indicators including ROA, 
ROS, MCAP, EPS and Tobin’s Q along with five control variables: firm size, 
leverage, industry, CEO duality and board composition. Accordingly, five sub-
research models have been considered for research model two and the results of 
each sub-model are discussed in Sub-sections 7.4.1 to 7.4.5, while Sub-section 7.4.6 
presents the results for the control variables regarding all the sub-models for the 
second research model.  
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7.4.1 Results: The effects of Voluntary Disclosure on Return on Assets  
As a firm performance indicator, ROA is considered to examine the effects 
of voluntary disclosure on firm performance and the research model is as follows, 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                    (2.1) 
Based on research model 2.1, the detailed results from OLS and 2SLS are presented 
in Table 7.8.  
Table 7-8 Results: The effects of voluntary disclosure on Return on Asset 
 ** Indicates statistically significant at the 5% level 
*** Indicates statistically significant at the 1% level 
 
Regarding the effects of voluntary disclosure on ROA, OLS reports that the 
regression coefficient is 0.092 and the p value is 0.000. In addition, as on 2SLS the 
regression coefficient is 0.093 and the p value is 0.000. Therefore, voluntary 
disclosures have a significant positive effect on ROA. Accordingly, hypothesis 2(a) 
is supported and hypothesis 2(a) is not rejected. In addition, the adjusted R2 for OLS 
is 28.16% and 2SLS is 28.33%. This indicates that the independent and control 
variables explain 28% of the variation in the effects of voluntary disclosure. It 
should also be noted that the explanatory power is higher than the prior studies 
(Garay et al. 2013; Mishra & Suar 2010). 
 
 
 
Independent Variables 
Return on Asset 
 OLS 2SLS 
  Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
Voluntary Disclosure 0.092 3.777 0.000*** 0.093 3.842 0.000*** 
Firm Size 0.001 0.803 0.421 0.001 0.768 0.442 
Leverage -0.000 -1.749 0.081 -0.000 -1.772 0.077 
Industry -0.066 -12.780 0.000*** -0.067 -11.949 0.000*** 
CEO Duality -0.039 -5.591 0.000*** -0.039 -5.575 0.000*** 
Board Composition -0.016 -0.814 0.415 -0.037 -0.823 0.411 
  
R2-    0.292  R2     0.294 
Adjusted R2  0.281 Adjusted R2      0.283 
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7.4.2 Results: The Effects of Voluntary Disclosure on Return on Sales  
As a firm performance indicator, ROS is considered to examine the effects 
of voluntary disclosure on firm performance and the research model is as follows, 
𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                    (2.2) 
 
 
Based on research model 2.2, the detailed results from OLS and 2SLS are presented 
in Table 7.9.  
 
Table 7-9 Results: The effects of voluntary disclosure on Return on Sales 
** Indicates statistically significant at the 5% level 
*** Indicates statistically significant at the 1% level 
 
 
Regarding the effects of voluntary disclosure on ROS, OLS reports that the 
regression coefficient is 0.146 and the p value is 0.214. In addition, as on 2SLS the 
regression coefficient is 0.156 and the p value is 0.188. Therefore, voluntary 
disclosures have an insignificant positive effect on ROS. Accordingly, hypothesis 
2(b) is not supported and hypothesis 2(b) is rejected. In addition, the adjusted R2 for 
OLS is 1.78% and 2SLS is 1.15%. This indicates that the independent and control 
variables explain 1% (approximately) only of the variation in the effects of 
voluntary disclosure. Therefore, a low R2 and the concern of endogeneity reflects 
that there might be some other significant contingent factors that may act as an 
explanatory variable for ROS. 
7.4.3 Results: The Effects of Voluntary Disclosure on Market Capitalization  
As a firm performance indicator, MCAP is considered to examine the 
effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance and the research model is as 
follows, 
Independent 
Variables 
Return on Sales 
Pooled OLS 
 
2SLS 
  Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
Voluntary Disclosure 0.146 1.242 0.214 0.156 1.318 0.188 
Firm Size -0.035 -2.918 0.003*** -0.035 -2.992 0.002*** 
Leverage -0.001 -0.945 0.345 -0.001 -0.706 0.480 
Industry -0.015 -0.616 0.538 -0.014 -0.514 0.607 
CEO Duality -0.054 -2.036 0.042*** -0.051 -1.980 0.048*** 
Board Composition -0.094 -1.304 0.192 -0.155 -0.610 0.541 
  
R2-    0.032  R2  0.029 
Adjusted R2  0.017 Adjusted R2  0.015 
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𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                    (2.3) 
Based on research model 2.3, the detailed result from OLS and 2SLS are presented 
in Table 7.10.   
Table 7-10 Results: The effects of voluntary disclosure on Market Capitalization 
** Indicates statistically significant at the 5% level 
 *** Indicates statistically significant at the 1% level 
 
Regarding the effects of voluntary disclosure on MCAP, OLS reports that 
the regression coefficient is 2.308 and the p value is 0.000. In addition, as on 2SLS 
the regression coefficient is 2.364 and the p value is 0.000. Therefore, voluntary 
disclosures have a significant positive effect on MCAP. Accordingly, hypothesis 
2(c) is supported and hypothesis 2(c) is not rejected. In addition, the adjusted R2 for 
OLS is 63.31% and 2SLS is 64.24%. This indicates that the independent and control 
variables explain 63% of the variation in the effects of voluntary disclosure. It 
should also be noted that the explanatory power is higher than prior studies 
(Abdolmohammadi 2005; Anam et al. 2011; Uyar & Kılıç 2012) and a higher R2 
reflects that voluntary disclosure plays a crucial role for MCAP within the 
Bangladeshi context.  
 
 7.4.4 Results: The Effects of Voluntary Disclosure on Earnings per Share  
 As a firm performance indicator, EPS is considered to examine the effects 
of voluntary disclosure on firm performance and the research model is as follows, 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                     (2.4) 
Independent Variables 
Market Capitalization 
Pooled OLS 
 
2SLS 
  Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
Voluntary Disclosure 2.308 5.559 0.000*** 2.364 5.710 0.000*** 
Firm Size 0.482 15.64 0.000*** 0.481 15.507 0.000*** 
Leverage -0.019 -5.433 0.000*** -0.017 -5.628 0.000*** 
Industry -0.185 -2.384 0.017*** -0.199 -2.289 0.022*** 
CEO Duality -0.285 -1.072 0.284 -0.281 -1.038 0.299 
Board Composition -0.532 -1.796 0.073 -1.043 -1.444 0.149 
  
R2- 0.638  R2  0.647 
Adjusted R2  0.633 Adjusted R2  0.642 
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Based on research model 2.4, the detailed result from OLS and 2SLS have been 
presented in Table 7.11.  
 Table 7-11 Results: The effects of voluntary disclosure on Earning Per Share 
 ** Indicates statistically significant at the 5% level 
*** Indicates statistically significant at the 1% level 
 
Regarding the effects of voluntary disclosure on EPS, OLS reports that the 
regression coefficient is 26.671 and the p value is 0.002. In addition, as on 2SLS 
the regression coefficient is 26.591 and the p value is 0.001. Therefore, voluntary 
disclosures have a significant positive effect on EPS. Accordingly, hypothesis 2(d) 
is supported and hypothesis 2(d) is not rejected. In addition, the adjusted R2 for OLS 
is 19.09% and 2SLS is 19.07%. This indicates that the independent and control 
variables explain 19% of the variation in the effects of voluntary disclosure.  
 
 
7.4.5 Results: The Effects of Voluntary Disclosure on Tobin’s Q 
As a firm performance indicator, Tobin’s Q is considered to examine the 
effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance and the research model is as 
follows, 
𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                    (2.5) 
Based on research model 2.4, the detailed results from OLS and 2SLS are presented 
in Table 7.12. 
 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Earnings per Share  
Pooled OLS 
 
2SLS 
  Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
Voluntary Disclosure 26.671 3.112 0.002*** 26.591 3.131 0.001*** 
Firm Size 1.008 2.746 0.006*** 1.005 2.772 0.005*** 
Leverage -0.059 -0.720 0.471 -0.060 -0.711 0.477 
Industry -9.249 -6.717 0.000*** -9.268 -6.691 0.000*** 
CEO Duality -3.656 -2.516 0.012*** -3.694 -2.447 0.014*** 
Board Composition 1.770 0.472 0.637 1.785 0.183 0.854 
  
R2-    0.203 R2 0.2029 
Adjusted R2  0.1909 Adjusted R2 0.1907 
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Table 7-12 Results: The effects of voluntary disclosure on Tobin’s Q 
 ** Indicates statistically significant at the 5% level 
 *** Indicates statistically significant at the 1% level 
Regarding the effects of voluntary disclosure on Tobin’s Q, OLS reports 
that the regression coefficient is 2.099 and the p value is 0.000. In addition, as on 
2SLS the regression coefficient is 02.045 and the p value is 0.000. Therefore, 
voluntary disclosures have a significant positive effect on Tobin’s Q. Accordingly, 
hypothesis 2(e) is supported and hypothesis 2(e) is not rejected In addition, the 
adjusted R2 for OLS is 26.19% and 2SLS is 23.01%. This indicates that the 
independent and control variables explain 23% (approximate) of the variation in the 
effects of voluntary disclosure. It should also be noted that explanatory power is 
higher than in prior studies (Garay et al. 2013; Lima Crisóstomo et al. 2011). 
7.4.6 Results: The Effects of Control Variables on Firm Performance Indicators  
Firm Size has a mixed effect on the five firm performance indicators. There 
is a positive effect on the market-based firm performance indicators including 
market capitalization (OLS: coefficient = 0.482 and p value = 0.000; 2SLS: 
coefficient = 0.481 and p value = 0.000) and Earnings per Share (OLS: coefficient 
= 1.008 and p value = 0.006; 2SLS: coefficient = 1.005 and p value = 0.005). 
Investors might favour larger firms. Thus, larger firms receive a better response 
from the market. In contrast, larger-sized firms also require a higher amount of 
return to cover their larger costs. Thus, there might be a negative or insignificant 
effect from firm size to accounting or mixed indicators. Consistent with this 
argument, firm size might have a negative effect on ROS (OLS: coefficient = -0.035 
and p value = 0.003; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.035 and p value = 0.002), Tobin’s Q 
(OLS: coefficient = -0.197 and p value = 0.000; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.181 and p 
value = 0.003) where no significant effect has been revealed for ROA (OLS: 
Independent 
Variables 
Tobin’s Q 
Pooled OLS 
 
2SLS 
  Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
Voluntary Disclosure 2.099 3.624 0.000*** 2.045 3.502 0.000*** 
Firm Size -0.197 -3.361 0.000*** -0.181 -2.973 0.003*** 
Leverage -0.007 -1.664 0.096* -0.009 -1.668 0.095* 
Industry -1.466 -12.923 0.000*** -1.315 -12.152 0.000*** 
CEO Duality -0.989 -5.964 0.000*** -0.868 -5.468 0.000*** 
Board Composition -0.014 -0.029 0.976 2.353 1.976 0.048*** 
  
R2-    0.272 R2  0.241 
Adjusted R2  0.261 Adjusted R2 0.230 
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coefficient = 0.001 and p value = 0.421; 2SLS: coefficient =0.001 and p value = 
0.442).  
Leverage reveals the debt structure of a firm. Accordingly, higher leverage 
may incur an increased cost of capital for the firm and may have a negative effect 
on firm performance. In addition, having more debt might be a concern for 
investors. Consist with this perception, a negative relationship has been 
demonstrated for ROA (OLS: coefficient = -0.000 and p value = 0.081; 2SLS: 
coefficient = -0.000 and p value = 0.077), MCAP (OLS: coefficient = -0.019 and p 
value = 0.000; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.017 and p value = 0.000) and Tobin’s Q (OLS: 
coefficient = -0.007 and p value = 0.096; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.009 and p value = 
0.095). In contrast, no effect has been revealed for ROS (OLS: coefficient = -0.001 
and p value = 0.345; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.001 and p value = 0.480) and EPS 
(OLS: coefficient = -0.059 and p value = 0.471; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.060 and p 
value = 0.477). This mixed finding may be explained by the fact that the calculation 
process of every firm performance indicator is not unique. Thus, cost of leverage 
may not have a consistent effect on every indicator.  
 Financial industry has a negative relationship with firm performance 
indicators including ROA (OLS: coefficient = -0.066 and p value = 0.000; 2SLS: 
coefficient = -0.067 and p value = 0.000), MCAP (OLS: coefficient = -0.185 and p 
value = 0.017; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.199 and p value = 0.022), EPS (OLS: 
coefficient = -9.249 and p value = 0.000; 2SLS: coefficient = -9.268 and p value = 
0.000) and Tobin’s Q (OLS: coefficient = -1.466 and p value = 0.000; 2SLS: 
coefficient = -1.315 and p value = 0.000), but not ROS (OLS: coefficient = -0.015 
and p value = 0.5381; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.014 and p value = 0.607). This 
negative effect for the financial industry can be explained by this industry being 
subject to extra monitoring as a requirement for additional capital. Due to extra 
monitoring, additional cost might be incurred for this industry and that may lead to 
an adverse effect on firm performance. Therefore, firms in financial services may 
struggle to develop firm performance compared to other industries. In addition, an 
insignificant relationship with ROS might occur because the financial industry is 
services oriented and it may be difficult to relate sales to cost of sales.  
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CEO duality primarily has a negative relationship with firm performance 
indicators including ROA (OLS: coefficient = -0.039 and p value = 0.000; 2SLS: 
coefficient = -0.039 and p value = 0.000), ROS (OLS: coefficient = -0.054 and p 
value = 0.042; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.051 and p value = 0.048), EPS (OLS: 
coefficient = -3.656 and p value = 0.012; 2SLS: coefficient = -3.694 and p value = 
0.014) and TOBIN’S Q (OLS: coefficient = -0.989 and p value = 0.000; 2SLS: 
coefficient = -0.868 and p value = 0.000), but not MCAP (OLS: coefficient = -0.285 
and p value = 0.284; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.281 and p value = 0.299). This negative 
effect may mean that having this leadership structure is not recognised by 
stakeholders due to a lack of transparency. In addition, according to the 
recommendations of the BSEC, firms should avoid this leadership style. However, 
an insignificant effect on MCAP may occur due to poor socio-economic conditions 
and a lack of concern regarding this leadership structure. Therefore, CEO duality 
has a minimal effect on MCAP. 
Board composition mostly does not have a significant relationship with the 
firm performance indicators, including ROA (OLS: coefficient = -0.016 and p value 
= 0.415; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.037 and p value = 0.411), ROS (OLS: coefficient = 
-0.094 and p value = 0.192; 2SLS: coefficient = -0.155 and p value = 0.541) and 
EPS (OLS: coefficient = 1.770 and p value = 0.637; 2SLS: coefficient = 1.785 and 
p value = 0.854). This insignificant result may be a result of the new corporate 
governance guidelines to maintain one third independent directors. Thus, board 
composition from an independent director perspective is less a matter of choice but 
rather compliance with the regulatory guideline. However, a contradictory result 
has been observed for MCAP (OLS: coefficient = -0.532 and p value = 0.0733; 
2SLS: coefficient = -1.043 and p value = 0.149) and Tobin’s Q (OLS: coefficient = 
-0.014 and p value = 0.976; 2SLS: coefficient = -2.359 and p value = 0.048) as the 
results of OLS and 2SLS are not consistent. Although for both indicators only one 
statistical result is significant, it can be concluded that mostly, there is no significant 
relationship between firm performance and board composition within the 
Bangladeshi context.  Therefore, consistent with the argument of compliance, it can 
also be explained that firm performance might not be directly moderated by board 
composition and there might be some other contingent factor that acts as an 
explanatory variable for such a relationship.   
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7.4.7 Overall Findings: The Effects of Voluntary Disclosure on Firm 
Performance  
The results of the effects from voluntary disclosures on firm performance 
are provided above in Sub-sections 7.4.1 to 7.4.5. A summary of all the sub-
hypotheses regarding hypothesis two and their status is presented in Table 7.13.  
 
Table 7-13 Summary of all the sub-hypotheses for Hypothesis Two 
 
7.5 Robustness Check  
Based on the findings from model 2, the voluntary disclosure of a firm has 
significant positive effects on the following year firm performance. Consistent with 
Chapter Six, two robustness tests have been applied. Initially, a further endogeneity 
test was applied as robustness test one. Then as a second robustness test, from the 
second research model (sub-models), the independent variable voluntary disclosure 
is replaced with each category: social, environmental and intellectual capital. 
Detailed results of each test are discussed below.  
7.5.1 Robustness Test 1: Additional Endogeneity Test 
Regarding the relationship between firm performance and corporate 
voluntary disclosure, reverse causality is a concern. It is also documented that firm 
Hypotheses 
Expected 
Result 
Results Hypothesis  
Rejected/ 
Not  
Rejected   
Based on 
OLS 
Based on 
2SLS 
Hypothesis 
2 Hypothesis 
2(a): 
Corporate Voluntary 
Disclosure is positively 
associated with Return on 
Asset 
Positive 
Relationship 
Positive 
Relationship 
Positive 
Relationship 
Not 
Rejected 
Hypothesis 
2(b): 
Corporate Voluntary 
Disclosure is positively 
associated with Return on 
Sales 
Positive 
Relationship 
No 
Significant 
Relationship  
No 
Significant 
Relationship 
Rejected 
Hypothesis 
2(c): 
Corporate Voluntary 
Disclosure is positively 
associated with Market 
Capitalization 
Positive 
Relationship 
Positive 
Relationship 
Positive 
Relationship 
Not 
Rejected 
Hypothesis 
2(d): 
Corporate Voluntary 
Disclosure is positively 
associated with Earning per 
Share. 
Positive 
Relationship 
Positive 
Relationship 
Positive 
Relationship 
Not 
Rejected 
Hypothesis 
2(e): 
Corporate Voluntary 
Disclosure is positively 
associated with Tobin’s Q 
Positive 
Relationship 
Positive 
Relationship 
Positive 
Relationship 
Not 
Rejected 
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performance can influence corporate voluntary disclosure (Haniffa & Cooke 2005; 
Khan et al. 2013). This study used a lagged approach to voluntary disclosure to 
avoid a causality problem. In addition, a further endogeneity (reverse causality) 
check was implemented with a simple crossed-lagged regression model consistent 
with Davidson et al. (1997) and Rashid (2015a). In so doing, the following ten 
models have been considered: 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.1 
𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.2 
𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    + 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.3 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.4 
𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    + 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.5 
𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.6 
𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.7 
𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    + 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.8 
𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.9 
𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    + 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.10 
Within the first five equations (M2.R1.1 to M2.R1.5), the following year 
firm performance is considered as a dependent variable over current year voluntary 
disclosure, firm performance and other control variables. In the following five 
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equations, following year voluntary disclosure is considered as dependent by 
considering current year firm performance and social disclosure as independent 
variables.  
For the first five equations (see Appendix I for detailed results), current year 
firm performance (ROA = regression coefficient is 0.757 and the p value is 0.000, 
ROS = regression coefficient is 0.777 and the p value is 0.000, MCAP = regression 
coefficient is 0.937 and the p value is 0.000, EPS = regression coefficient is 1.102 
and the p value is 0.000, and Tobin’s Q = regression coefficient is 0.753 and the p 
value is 0.000) is significantly associated with future firm performance. Detailed 
results are in Appendix I. These findings are consistent with prior studies (Khlif et 
al. 2015; Veronica  & Bachtiar 2010) and support the concept that having better 
performance may continue to impact the following year.  
However, based on the results of the last five equations (see Appendix I for 
detailed results), current year firm performance is not found to affect the following 
year corporate voluntary disclosure (ROA = regression coefficient is .005 and the 
p value is 0.775; MCAP = regression coefficient is .001 and the p value is 0.517; 
EPS = regression coefficient is 9.430 and the p value is 0.606; Tobin’s Q = 
regression coefficient is 0.000 and the p value is 0.813; except for ROS = regression 
coefficient is 0.005 and the p value is 0.081); detailed results are in Appendix I. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that for most of the firm performance indicators there 
is no reverse casualty problem. Regarding ROS, a reverse casualty problem and 
endogeneity issue has already been expressed for this indicator in the earlier 
analysis. In addition, an insignificant result is consistent with the argument that 
within a developing country like Bangladesh sales return might be not affected by 
additional disclosure.  
7.5.2 Robustness Test 2: The Effects of Three Main Categories of Voluntary 
Disclosure on Firm Performance  
A significant number of prior studies examine the effects of specific 
categories of voluntary disclosure, including social (Haniffa & Cooke 2005; Khan 
et al. 2013; Mohd Ghazali 2007; Saleh et al. 2010), environmental (Brammer & 
Pavelin 2008; Halme & Huse 1997; Rao et al. 2012) and intellectual capital 
(Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007; Li et al. 2012; Li et al. 2008) both in Bangladesh and 
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other country contexts. Thus, for the purposes of robustness, this study replaces 
voluntary disclosure (dependent variable) with social, environmental and 
intellectual capital disclosure. Fifteen different models have been developed for 
every category of disclosure and the results for the models are presented in Table 
7.14.  
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Table 7-14 Results: The individual effects of social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosure on 
firm performance 
 
Return on Asset 
(ROA) 
Return on Sales 
(ROS) 
Market Capitalization 
(MCAP) 
Earnings per Share 
(EPS) 
Tobin’s Q 
 Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  
Social Disclosure  0.058 0.019*** 0.045 0.640 1.560 0.000*** 20.262 0.003*** 1.385 0.025*** 
Environmental 
Disclosure  
0.041 0.189 0.176 0.225 2.490 0.000*** 15.609 0.1441 0.933 0.256 
Intellectual Capital 
Disclosure  
0.093 0.000*** 0.125 0.078* 1.434 0.000*** 22.218 0.000*** 2.099 0.000*** 
 
Based on the results of Table 7.14 (see Appendix J for detailed results), 
social disclosure has a positive effect on all the firm performance indicators (ROA 
= regression coefficient is .058 and the p value is 0.019; MCAP = regression 
coefficient is 1.560 and the p value is 0.000; EPS = regression coefficient is 20.262 
and the p value is 0.003; Tobin’s Q = regression coefficient is 1.385 and the p value 
is 0.025, with the exception of ROS = regression coefficient is 0.045 and the p value 
is 0.640). This finding is also consistent with the main findings of this study. In 
addition, a positive effect from social disclosure to firm performance is also 
consistent with a large number of prior studies (Ahamed et al. 2014; Chen & Wang 
2011; Choi et al. 2010; Mishra & Suar 2010; Prado-Lorenzo et al. 2008; Veronica  
& Bachtiar 2010). Within the Bangladeshi context, a positive effect from social 
disclosure to firm performance may mean that stakeholders are concerned with 
social issues, which leads to improved firm performance. Accordingly, in recent 
times an improved emphasis on social issues in Bangladesh (Sobhani et al. 2009) 
also justifies this positive effect.  
Based on the results in Table 7.14, an insignificant effect on firm 
performance from environmental disclosure is identified (ROA = regression 
coefficient is .041 and the p value is 0.189; ROS = regression coefficient is 0.176 
and the p value is 0.225; EPS = regression coefficient is 15.609 and the p value is 
0.144; Tobin’s Q = regression coefficient is .933 and the p value is 0.256, with the 
exception of MCAP = regression coefficient is 2.490 and the p value is 0.000). This 
result might be explained by a lack of environmental awareness among stakeholders 
within Bangladesh (Hoque & Clarke 2013; Hossain et al. 2012; Islam 2008). As a 
result, due to poor socio-economic conditions and overpopulation, firms may not 
access a better return compared to the cost of environmental issues. Similarly, local 
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stakeholders are not sufficiently influential to demand that firms address 
environmental issues. Consistent with this argument, less emphasis on 
environmental information has been observed in Bangladesh (Belal et al. 2010) due 
to lack of enforcement from regulatory authorities (Hossain et al. 2012). In addition, 
in Chapter Six it was reported that institutional ownership is negatively associated 
with environmental disclosure because this form of ownership is primarily 
interested in firm performance. Therefore, an insignificant effect on almost every 
firm performance indicator return supports that these forms of investors ignore 
environmental information as there is no compensation from a firm performance 
perspective. However, a positive effect on market capitalization suggests that 
society in general values environmental disclosure. Thus, a lack of monitoring of 
environmental issues might be the reason for this result.  
Based on the results in Table 7.14, intellectual capital disclosure has a 
positive effect on firm performance (ROA = regression coefficient is .093 and the 
p value is 0.000; ROS = regression coefficient is 0.125 and the p value is 0.078; 
MCAP = regression coefficient is 1.434 and the p value is 0.000; EPS = regression 
coefficient is 22.218 and the p value is 0.000; Tobin’s Q = regression coefficient is 
2.099 and the p value is 0.000). This finding is also consistent with the main 
findings of this study. In addition, a positive effect from intellectual capital 
disclosure to firm performance is also consistent with prior studies 
(Abdolmohammadi 2005; Anam et al. 2011; Ribeiro Soriano et al. 2012). This 
result might be explained by the potential for intellectual capital disclosure to reveal 
potential value creation and the intangible assets of a firm. Thus, stakeholders might 
consider additional disclosure as a positive signal. Accordingly, disclosure related 
to intellectual capital has a positive effect on firm performance in a positive manner.  
7.6 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter reported the empirical results of whether there is an effect from 
voluntary disclosure to firm performance by considering five indicators: ROA, 
ROS, MCAP, EPS and Tobin’s Q. Specifically, it achieved three main objectives.  
First, consistent with Chapter Six, this chapter also conducted some 
diagnostic tests including normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and 
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endogeneity. To test for normality assumptions, probability‒probability (P‒P) plots 
of the dependent variable (voluntary disclosure index) and a Residual 
Test/Histogram–Normality test were applied and both tests suggest that the 
assumption of normality is not violated. Multicollinearity was checked by 
considering the matrix of the explanatory variables and VIF. Results ensured that 
there were no major violations of multicollinearity assumptions. By plotting 
standardized residuals (ZRESID) versus the standardized predicted value (ZPRED) 
and applying the Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test, assumptions of heteroscedasticity 
were assessed and a concern in relation to heteroscedasticity was revealed. By 
applying White’s (1980) correction technique for unknown heteroscedasticity, this 
issue was resolved. Finally, no endogeneity issue was observed for all the firm 
performance indicators: ROA, MCAP, EPS and Tobin’s Q, except for ROS.  
Second, similar to Chapter Six, this chapter applied OLS and 2SLS for 
examining the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance by investigating 
five sub-hypotheses developed for research model two. A significant positive effect 
for ROA, MCAP, EPS and Tobin’s Q were found except for ROS. For insignificant 
indicator ROS, the previous section already outlined the concern for endogeneity 
test that also discounts ROS. Accordingly, a consistent result from the perspective 
of most of the firm performance indicators leads to the conclusion that, in 
Bangladesh, voluntary disclosure has a significant positive effect on firm 
performance.  
Finally, this chapter discussed the tests used to check robustness. Two tests 
were employed to check whether the results are robust: (1) a further endogeneity 
test regarding reverse causality; (2) the independent variable voluntary disclosure 
was replaced with social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosures 
individually. First, a robustness test reported that there is no concern for reverse 
causality, thus further ensuring that there is no concern for endogeneity. For the 
second robustness test aimed at understanding the effects of voluntary disclosure 
on firm performance and social and intellectual capital disclosure, a significant 
positive effect on firm performance was observed. In contrast, no significant effect 
was revealed for environmental disclosure and firm performance, except for 
MCAP. A likely explanation is that stakeholders may be aware of social and 
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intellectual capital disclosures but have limited or no awareness of environmental 
disclosure.  
Based on the result of various statistical analyses, the result of the effects of 
voluntary disclosure on firm performance can be considered strong and rigorous. 
This study addresses basic statistics assumptions, including normality, 
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and endogeneity, to ensure a bias free result.  
In the next chapter, the results of Chapters Six and Seven are summarized 
and discussed, along with providing a conclusion for this thesis. More specifically, 
the chapter summarizes and discusses the results regarding the determinants of 
voluntary disclosure and the effects of voluntary disclosures on firm performance. 
Then, it presents a summary for the policy implications from the findings and 
highlights the contributions from the study. Finally, it addresses the limitations of 
this study and suggests some avenues for future study. 
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Chapter Eight: Discussion and Conclusions 
8.1 Introduction  
This study investigates the determinants and effects of corporate voluntary 
disclosures of social, environmental and intellectual capital (voluntary disclosure) 
with an emphasis on corporate governance characteristics and firm performance 
within a Bangladeshi context. More precisely, this study combines three significant 
forms of voluntary disclosure ‒ social, environmental and intellectual capital ‒ to 
gain a more complete understanding. To explore the determinants of voluntary 
disclosures the study examines the relationship between corporate governance 
characteristics and voluntary disclosure. In addition, the effects of voluntary 
disclosures on firm performance have also been examined. To achieve these 
objectives, the thesis used quantitative methods along with a comprehensive 
theoretical framework for a developing country context.  The findings of this study 
contribute to an in-depth understanding for policymakers and regulatory bodies 
from Bangladesh as well as other developing countries, for example, the BSEC, the 
Stock Exchanges, The Institute of Cost and Management Accountants of 
Bangladesh, Bangladesh Enterprise Institute and Bangladesh Bank with regard to 
enhancing transparency by considering voluntary disclosures 
This chapter has two primary objectives. First, it reiterates key results along 
with a detailed discussion and elaborates the contributions and limitations of this 
thesis. Second, it offers suggestions for future research. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.2 provides an overview of 
the thesis. Section 8.3 presents a detailed discussion of the results of the relationship 
between corporate governance characteristics and voluntary disclosures. 
Discussion of the results of the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm performance 
are presented in Section 8.4. Section 8.5 addresses the contributions of the study. 
Section 8.6 discusses the implications of this study for policymakers and 
practitioners. Section 8.7 explicitly discusses the limitations of the study with some 
suggestions for future research. 
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8.2 Overview of the Thesis  
This thesis is organized into eight chapters. Chapter One introduced the 
background of this study and highlighted five factors that motivated the research. It 
established the study’s two research questions and discussed the expected 
contributions. 
Chapter Two produced a critique of the literature regarding voluntary 
disclosure, corporate governance characteristics and firm performance, focusing on 
prior meta-analyses, as well as developed and developing country and Bangladeshi 
contexts. From this review, a need for further insights from a Bangladeshi context 
emerged and an opportunity for contributions to the literature were identified.  
 Chapter Three explained the theoretical underpinnings of the study. 
Following a rigorous analysis of the existing individual and combined theoretical 
frameworks, the framework of An et al. (2011) was considered as more appropriate 
for this study, with some modifications. These changes included considering the 
research context and applying social and environmental, along with intellectual 
capital, disclosures in an empirical study. This study adopted agency, legitimacy 
and signalling theory to articulate the determinants and effects of voluntary 
disclosure suitable in a Bangladeshi context.    
Chapter Four provided a review of the Bangladeshi context and developed 
hypotheses for this study. The overall context, including historical, economic, legal 
and regulatory aspects, relevant authorities for corporate governance, voluntary 
disclosure and status of the market, were discussed. Eight hypotheses were 
developed to explore the determinants of voluntary disclosure in relation to 
corporate governance characteristics, including CEO duality, board size, board 
composition, sub-committee, audit committee compositor, foreign ownership, 
director ownership and institutional ownership. In addition, a further hypothesis 
was also developed to explore the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm 
performance. Five sub-hypotheses were constructed by considering five indicators 
of firm performance including ROA, ROS, MCAP, EPS and Tobin’s Q.  
In Chapter Five the data and empirical models employed in this study were 
described. The study considered the top 200 listed firms on the Dhaka Stock Exchange 
for the years 2011 to 2013 with firm performance based on the years 2012 to 2014. 
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Since the focus of the thesis is voluntary corporate disclosure, data was collected from 
listed firm's annual reports. To ensure rigorous data collection, a disclosure index for 
social, environmental and intellectual capital was developed from prior studies using 
content analysis. Secondary data of firm performance was collected from the 
Bloomberg database. The two models focused on the relationship between corporate 
governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure and the effects of voluntary 
disclosure on financial performance. In addition, consistent with the literature, Firm 
Size, Leverage, Industry and Current Year Firm Performance were considered as 
control variables. Furthermore, to analyse the research models panel data, OLS and 
2SLS were applied along with two robustness tests for each model.  
Chapter Six presented the results, revealing that corporate governance 
characteristics act as a significant explanatory factor for corporate voluntary 
disclosures of social, environmental and intellectual capital. It should also be noted 
that several robustness tests and statistical analyses were performed.   
Chapter Seven presented the results revealing that voluntary disclosures of 
social, environmental and intellectual capital moderate firm performance. 
Consistent with the previous chapter several robustness tests and statistical 
assumptions were performed.  
Chapter Eight concludes the thesis with a discussion of the results obtained 
in Chapters Six and Seven, implications for policy and practice, acknowledgement 
of the contributions of this thesis and the limitations as well as avenues for future 
research. 
8.3 Discussion of the Findings. 
This thesis investigated two research questions.  
1) To what extent do corporate governance characteristics affect 
voluntary disclosure of social, environmental and intellectual capital 
disclosures in Bangladesh listed firms?     
2) To what extent does voluntary disclosure affect firm performance in 
Bangladeshi listed firms? 
These findings are discussed in the following section.  
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8.3.1 Discussion on the Findings of the Relationship Between Corporate 
Governance Characteristics and Voluntary Disclosures   
This section provides a summary of the findings relating to research 
question one. In particular, to what extent do corporate governance characteristics 
affect voluntary disclosure of social, environmental and intellectual capital 
disclosures in Bangladeshi listed firms. Previous empirical studies suggest that the 
characteristics of corporate governance act as an explanatory factor (Ali et al. 2017; 
Allegrini & Greco 2013; Barako et al. 2006a, 2006b; Garcia-Meca & Sánchez-
Ballesta 2010; Khlif et al. 2016; Samaha et al. 2015) and the findings of the limited 
studies of the Bangladeshi context also report it as a significant explanatory factor 
(Khan et al. 2013; Muttakin et al. 2015; Rashid & Lodh 2008).  
The hypotheses were formulated in light of prior relevant studies. Suitable 
statistical tests were used to answer whether eight significant characteristics of 
corporate governance: CEO duality, board size, board composition, sub-committee, 
audit committee composition, foreign ownership, director ownership and 
institutional ownership act as an explanatory factor. The results were also reported 
in robustness tests one and two and in some cases not all three aspects of voluntary 
disclosures were found. The findings are summarized in Figure 8-1. 
 
 
Figure 8-1 Summary of the main findings of the relationship between corporate governance 
characteristics and voluntary disclosures 
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A significant negative relationship was reported between CEO duality and 
voluntary disclosure. This finding is consistent with a large number of prior studies 
from developed and other developing countries (Allegrini & Greco 2013; Cerbioni 
& Parbonetti 2007; Giannarakis 2014b; Huafang & Jianguo 2007). Within the 
Bangladeshi context, the result is consistent with Muttakin et al. (2016) while Rouf 
(2011) reported a positive and no significant relationship. However, a negative 
relationship between CEO duality and voluntary disclosure is also consistent with 
corporate governance guidelines in Bangladesh as firms are advised to avoid this 
form of leadership to ensure transparency.  Thus, it can be concluded that CEO 
duality reduces transparency within the Bangladeshi context. In addition, finding a 
negative relationship further supports the argument that a CEO can exercise his/her 
power over others to focus on mandatory issues or operational success while 
ignoring any additional initiative that might incur an extra cost.  
An insignificant relationship was reported between board size and voluntary 
disclosure. This finding is consistent with a large number of prior studies from 
developed and other developing countries (Alves et al. 2012; Cerbioni & Parbonetti 
2007; Donnelly & Mulcahy 2008; Giannarakis 2014a, 2014b; Haji 2015; Samaha 
et al. 2012; Uyar et al. 2013). Within the Bangladeshi context, limited studies have 
explored this relationship. Those that do report a significant relationship between 
board size and voluntary disclosure (Muttakin et al. 2016; Rouf 2011). Thus, an 
insignificant relationship provides a new dimension to the Bangladeshi context as 
it provides a strong basis for the argument that having more directors is a constraint 
for coordination (Lipton & Lorsh 1992) and difficult to control by the chairperson 
(Hermalin & Weisbach 2003; Kaymak & Bektas 2008). Therefore, a larger board 
is as a pitfall for voluntary disclosure due to a decrease in the effectiveness and 
monitoring aspect of a board. In addition, a large number of directors makes 
decision making time-consuming because of the likely wide range of opinions, 
since values vary from person to person. Ensuring attendance may also be tricky 
within a developing country context as a smaller board is more beneficial within 
developing countries (Mak & Kusnadi 2005). Furthermore, it should also be noted 
that, according to the BSEC guideline, board size should be between five to 20 
directors within Bangladesh. Due to such a large range in the number of directors, 
the monitoring mechanism might be affected or the benefit overestimated. 
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Therefore, large board size might not play a significant role for adopting voluntary 
disclosure.     
An insignificant relationship was reported between board composition and 
voluntary disclosure. This finding is consistent with other prior studies from 
developed and other developing countries (Al-Shammari & Al-Sultan 2010; 
Allegrini & Greco 2013; Ghazali & Weetman 2006; Hidalgo et al. 2011; Ho &  
Wong 2001; Xiao et al. 2004). In contrast, limited studies from Bangladesh 
consistently report a positive relationship between board composition and voluntary 
disclosure (Khan et al. 2013; Khan 2010; Muttakin et al. 2015; Muttakin et al. 2016; 
Rashid & Lodh 2008) and an insignificant relationship contributes a new dimension 
to the literature of Bangladesh. Accordingly, an insignificant result for board 
composition and voluntary disclosure might be an outcome of the recent corporate 
governance guideline provided by the BSEC (one-third of board members should 
be an independent director).41 Due to the amended mandatory provision to maintain 
independent directors, firms may comply with the law. However, the independent 
directors may not emphasize optional issues such as voluntary disclosure. In 
addition, it could also be argued that, after facing a market collapse in 2010, 
independent directors might be driven toward firm performance and ignore any 
issues that might incur extra costs or are not required by law.  
A significant positive relationship was reported between the presence of a 
sub-committee and voluntary disclosure. This result is consistent with a large 
number of prior studies from developed and other developing countries (Al-
Shammari & Al-Sultan 2010; Arcay & Vazquez 2005; Barako et al. 2006b; 
Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007; Ho & Wong 2001; O’Sullivan et al. 2008). Within 
Bangladesh, Rouf (2011) and Khan et al. (2013) report a significant positive 
relationship by considering only the audit committee as a sub-committee. However, 
other sub-committees, like a nomination committee, have been ignored in prior 
studies. This study includes the presence of a nomination committee along with an 
audit committee to facilitate board monitoring (Allegrini & Greco 2013; Cerbioni 
& Parbonetti 2007). Accordingly, this study added the presence of a nomination 
                                                          
41 Corporate Governance guideline 2012 http://www.secbd.org/Notification%20on%20CG-
07.8.12-Amended.pdf 
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committee, as well as an audit committee, by arguing that these committees ensure 
monitoring, controlling and transparency within firms in a Bangladeshi context. 
Therefore, finding a positive relationship with the addition of another sub-
committee extends our understanding and provides further support for the argument 
that the existence of a sub-committee facilitates monitoring and controlling. It 
should also be noted that having a sub-committee (nomination committee) is not 
mandatory in Bangladesh. Thus, firms maintaining the sub-committee reduce 
information asymmetry and increase transparency by disclosing additional 
information.   
A significant positive relationship was reported between audit committee 
composition and voluntary disclosure. This result is consistent with prior studies 
from other countries (Akhtaruddin & Haron 2010; Haji 2015; Madi et al. 2014). In 
the robustness test, this relationship was only shown to exist between environmental 
and intellectual capital disclosure. No significant relationship has been reported 
with social disclosure and it is concluded that the audit committee ensures 
monitoring and transparency within firms in a Bangladeshi context. Finding a 
positive relationship between audit committee composition and voluntary 
disclosure supports the argument that independent directors within the audit 
committee strengthen the monitoring function and establish controlling power. 
Accordingly, this plays a significant role in reducing information asymmetry and 
increasing transparency.     
A significant positive relationship was reported between foreign ownership 
and voluntary disclosure. This result is consistent with a large number of prior 
studies from other country contexts (Barako et al. 2006a; Haniffa & Cooke 2005; 
Haniffa & Cooke 2002; Huafang & Jianguo 2007). This result is also consistent 
with prior studies from Bangladesh (Khan et al. 2013; Muttakin et al. 2015). 
Therefore, it is concluded that foreign ownership reinforces compliance with 
international rules and standards. Hence, this form of ownership facilitates 
transparency within the firms in the Bangladeshi context. Similarly, finding a 
positive relationship between foreign ownership and voluntary disclosure further 
supports the argument that having foreign ownership provides an opportunity to 
comply with other, often developed country, norms and values. At the same time, 
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firms with foreign ownership might also be interested in promoting their firm within 
international markets and attracting various investment opportunities while 
simultaneously considering a broader range of stakeholders.  
A significant negative relationship was reported between director ownership 
and voluntary disclosure and supports hypothesis1 (g). This result is consistent with 
a large number of prior studies from other country contexts (Eng & Mak 2003; 
Ghazali & Weetman 2006; Haji 2013; Mohd Ghazali 2007). This is also consistent 
with the prior studies from a Bangladesh perspective (Khan et al. 2013; Rashid & 
Lodh 2008; Rouf & Al Harun 2011).  Thus, it can be concluded that director 
ownership reduces transparency within the Bangladeshi context. Accordingly, this 
result further supports the argument that director ownership may discourage 
disclosure of additional information while limiting the focus on firm performance 
metrics. It should also be noted that director ownership might encourage an agency 
conflict. As a result, within a developing country like Bangladesh, directors have 
the privilege of accessing additional information and might not be interested in 
sharing this information with others through voluntary disclosure.  
 An insignificant relationship was reported between institutional ownership 
and voluntary disclosure. Hypothesis1 (h) is, therefore, rejected. This result is 
consistent with prior studies from developed and developing countries (Donnelly 
& Mulcahy 2008; Haniffa & Cooke 2002). This result is also consistent with the 
findings of Rashid and Lodh (2008). However, robustness tests demonstrate an 
insignificant relationship with intellectual capital and a significant negative 
relationship with social and environmental disclosures. As a result, it is concluded 
that institutional ownership does not moderate the level of voluntary disclosure. It 
should also be noted that an insignificant relationship between institutional 
ownership and voluntary disclosure further supports the argument that this form of 
owner ‒ the expert investor ‒ is more concerned with maximizing short-term 
financial returns instead of considering long-term effects or a voluntary disclosure 
agenda. 
Besides corporate governance characteristics, this study also considers four 
control variables including firm size, leverage, industry and firm profitability to 
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examine the determinants of voluntary disclosure. In the following, a result for each 
control variable is discussed.  
A significant positive relationship was reported between firm size and 
voluntary disclosure. This result is consistent with prior studies from other countries 
(Barako et al. 2006b; Donnelly & Mulcahy 2008; Samaha et al. 2012) as well as 
Bangladesh (Khan et al. 2013; Khan 2010; Muttakin & Khan 2014; Muttakin et al. 
2015; Muttakin et al. 2016; Nurunnabi et al. 2011). A positive relationship between 
firm size and voluntary disclosure further supports the argument that larger firms 
are subject to additional pressure from several stakeholders. Since larger firms have 
more stakeholders and greater resources, larger firms can focus on an additional 
agenda like voluntary disclosure (Firth 1979; Singhvi & Desai 1971; Watts & 
Zimmerman 1986; Cowenet al. 1987). Thus, firms with a larger size consider 
voluntary disclosure to communicate to several stakeholders while additional 
capability also allows for considering optional issues like voluntary disclosure.  
An insignificant relationship was reported between leverage and voluntary 
disclosure. This result is consistent with prior studies from other less developed 
countries (Akhtaruddin et al. 2009; Ghazali & Weetman 2006; Ho & Tower 2011; 
Ho & Wong 2001; Samaha et al. 2012) but inconsistent with prior studies from 
Bangladesh (Khan et al. 2013; Muttakin et al. 2015; Muttakin et al. 2016). An 
insignificant relationship might occur because, after the share market collapse, 
firms from Bangladesh were focused on regular economic goals, such as improving 
performance. Accordingly, due to debt there is an additional expense, thus firms are 
less interested in emphasizing optional issues such as voluntary disclosure that may 
cause additional cost.  
A significant positive relationship was reported between industry and 
voluntary disclosure This result is consistent with prior studies from other countries 
(Chan et al. 2014; Jizi et al. 2014; Samaha et al. 2012) as well as  Bangladesh  
(Muttakin & Khan 2014; Muttakin et al. 2016; Nurunnabi et al. 2011). It should be 
noted that the Bangladesh Bank, the regulator of the banking industry in 
Bangladesh, called for more voluntary information (Khan 2010). In addition, firms 
within the financial industry are primarily more concerned with firm transparency 
due to external pressure from various parties (Bhambri & Sonnenfeld 1988). They 
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are also a source of loans for various parties. Accordingly, it can be expected that 
firms within the financial industry might promote increased transparency to impress 
interested parties. In regards to the relationship between financial industry and 
social disclosure Giannarakis (2014, p.  409) states 
The financial industry plays a catalytic role in supporting others industries 
by financing them. In addition, the financial companies provide more 
information on their CSR initiatives to convince that the maximization of 
the profit is not the unique purpose of the companies. 
Consistent with the above discussion, and combined with a significant positive 
result, this suggests that firms within the financial industry in Bangladesh are more 
proactive in their efforts to disclose voluntarily.  
An insignificant relationship was reported between profitability and 
voluntary disclosure. This result is consistent with prior studies from other countries 
(Eng & Mak 2003; Ho & Wong 2001; Samaha et al. 2012; Zeng et al. 2012) but 
inconsistent with prior studies from Bangladesh (Khan et al. 2013; Khan 2010; 
Muttakin et al. 2016). Regarding the inconsistent result from Bangladeshi studies, 
it should be noted that to measure profitability accounting measurements had been 
primarily considered in prior studies (Khan et al. 2013; Khan 2010; Muttakin et al. 
2016) while this thesis considers a mixed method. Thus,  measurement of 
profitablity may also be a probable reason for the insignificant result. Furthermore, 
due to the poor social and economic conditions and lack of a strong local 
stakeholder, firms may consider voluntary disclosure as less important as it may not 
be significant for future profitability. Therefore, based on the results of the control 
variable it can be concluded that larger firms, and those within the financial 
industry, focus on voluntary disclosure. Such findings might be explained by the 
capability to focus on additional agenda, such as voluntary disclosure, while smaller 
firms are limited to regular operations. Similarly, the banking sector is subject to 
more regulation compared to other industries. Thus, the financial industry or banks 
are keen to promote transparency by discharging additional information.  
 
8.3.2 Discussion on the Findings of the Effects of Voluntary Disclosures on 
Firm Performance  
This section provides a summary of the findings obtained from research 
question two. In particular, to what extent does voluntary corporate disclosure of 
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social, environmental and intellectual capital affect firm performance in 
Bangladeshi listed firms. Previous empirical studies suggest that voluntary 
disclosure has a significant positive effect on firm performance (Abdolmohammadi 
2005; Griffin & Mahon 1997; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Qiu et al. 2016) and the findings 
of the limited studies of the Bangladeshi context have similar results (Hossain et al. 
2015). 
The hypotheses were formulated in light of prior relevant studies. Suitable 
statistical tests and five indicators of firm performance including ROA, ROS, 
MCAP, EPS and Tobin’s Q were used to answer whether voluntary disclosure 
affects firm performance. The main findings are summarized in Figure 8-2. 
 
 
 
 Figure 8-2 Summary of the main findings of the effects of voluntary disclosures on firm performance 
 
A significant positive effect from voluntary disclosure on ROA was 
reported. This finding is consistent with a large number of prior studies from 
developed and other developing countries (Ahamed et al. 2014; Basah & Khairi 
2015; Chen & Wang 2011; Chen et al. 2016; Choi et al. 2010; Garay et al. 2013; 
Kim et al. 2013; Mishra & Suar 2010; Platonova et al. 2016; Wibowo 2012). Within 
the Bangladeshi context, the result is consistent with Hossain et al. (2015). ROA is 
an accounting based firm performance measurement, and the findings can be 
explained as follows. First, consistent with agency and signalling theory, disclosing 
extra information reduces information asymmetry and the cost of finance and 
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promotes foreign investment. By doing so, firms may also achieve operational 
efficiencies, which may lead to higher returns. It should also be noted that 
Bangladesh is more dependent on Western investment (Islam 1992) and increased 
disclosure facilitates donations and reductions in operational costs (cost of finance) 
(Sengupta 1998). Second, firms may adopt disclosure of additional information to 
address social concerns, which may make a positive contribution to operational 
efficiency (Brine et al. 2007). For instance, by creating customer loyalty (Mishra & 
Suar 2010), better quality of labour, minimizing costs through fewer lawsuits from 
employees and environmentalists (Ullmann 1985; Waddock & Graves 1997), 
customer advocacy and positive word-of-mouth (Hoeffler & Keller 2002; Sen et al. 
2006). Finally, interested parties might assess the potential of a firm from value 
related disclosures (intellectual capital). Thus, increased disclosure reflects the 
chances of value creation by a firm, which in turn affects returns positively. In 
addition, as a robustness test, it is also documented that social and intellectual 
capital disclosure has a significant positive effect on ROA. However, an 
insignificant effect from environmental disclosure might indicate less awareness of 
environmental issues with a focus on economic development (Belal et al. 2015).   
An insignificant positive effect from voluntary disclosure on ROS was 
reported. It should also be noted that in the earlier analysis an endogeneity problem 
was observed. An endogeneity problem suggests that there might be a contingent 
factor associated with ROS. In addition, ROS might be related to poor socio-
economic conditions where customers are not keen to pay a premium for voluntary 
disclosure. Although the actual reason is difficult to determine, an insignificant 
result is consistent with other studies (Aras et al. 2010; Brine et al. 2007). Aras et 
al. (2010) concluded that the reason for the insignificant result is uncertain but is 
concerned with variable selection. Brine et al. (2007) also emphasized variable 
measurement and a need for lag-year for future studies. In addition, as a robustness 
test, it is also documented that social and environmental disclosure has an 
insignificant effect on ROS. In contrast, intellectual capital disclosure has a 
significant positive effect, and suggests that the interested parties regard highly its 
potential value creation opportunities.  
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A significant positive effect from voluntary disclosure on MCAP was 
reported. This finding is consistent with prior studies (Abdolmohammadi 2005; 
Anam et al. 2011; De Klerk et al. 2015; Elzahar et al. 2015; Uyar & Kılıç 2012) 
and the perspective of legitimacy and signalling theories. This result contributes for 
the first time to the Bangladeshi context. Market capitalization is a market based 
firm performance measurement indicator, and the positive result could be a result 
of the following. First, as agency and signalling theory implies, voluntary 
disclosure facilitates a reduction in information asymmetry as interested parties 
might consider it as a positive signal. Thus, by considering additional information 
firms may justify the potential of value creation through intangible assets. Second, 
as with legitimacy theory, firms discharge their social contract responsibilities by 
considering social and environmental information. Hence, interested parties might 
have a positive perception of the firm that has increased voluntary disclosure. 
Finally, the Bangladeshi share market experienced a severe collapse in 2010, and 
lack of transparency was argued to be a significant contributing factor (Hossain 
2014). As a result, it can be speculated that investors are more concerned with 
transparency to assess the potential of a firm. Therefore, a positive response from 
interested parties in turn stimulates share price. In addition, as a robustness test, it 
is also documented that social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosure 
also has a significant positive effect on MCAP.  
A significant positive effect from voluntary disclosure on EPS was reported. 
This finding is consistent with Oeyono et al. (2011) and Verbeeten et al. (2016) as 
well as legitimacy and signalling theory. It could be speculated that interested 
parties within Bangladesh perceive voluntary disclosure as a positive signal and 
value firms with more voluntary disclosure, which leads to increased earnings per 
share. It should also be noted that EPS is a marketing based firm performance 
indicator. Thus, a positive effect is also advocated by agency theory that additional 
information (voluntary disclosure) reduces information asymmetry and improved 
EPS. In addition, as a robustness test, it is also documented that social and 
intellectual capital disclosure has a significant positive effect on EPS. However, 
consistent with other indicators (i.e., ROA, ROS) an insignificant effect from 
environmental disclosure was reported, further supporting that there is less 
awareness about environmental issues within the Bangladeshi context. 
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A significant positive effect from voluntary disclosure on Tobin’s Q was 
reported. This finding is consistent with prior studies (Chi 2009; Choi et al. 2010; 
Garay et al. 2013; Khlif et al. 2015) and advocates the concept of signalling and 
legitimacy theory where the interested parties perceive voluntary disclosure in a 
positive manner, resulting in a positive impression.  In addition, Tobin’s Q as a 
mixed measurement of firm performance with a positive effect is consistent with 
the result from the accounting indicator (ROA) as well as the market indicator 
(MCAP and EPS). In addition, as a robustness test, it is also documented that social 
and intellectual capital disclosure also has a significant positive effect on ROA. 
Consistent with other indicators (i.e. ROA, ROS, EPS) an insignificant effect from 
environmental disclosure has been reported and further supports the argument that 
there is less awareness about environmental issues within the Bangladeshi context. 
This study also considers firm size, leverage, industry, CEO duality and 
board composition as a control variable while investigating the effects of voluntary 
disclosure on firm performance. In the following, a result of each control variable 
is discussed. 
A mixed result was found regarding the relationship between firm size and 
firm performance. A positive relationship between firm size and firm performance 
was documented by considering MCAP and EPS as indicators of firm performance. 
A positive relationship is consistent with the literature (Anam et al. 2011; Uyar & 
Kilic 2012). A possible explanation may be that investors might appreciate larger 
firms. On the other hand, a significant negative relationship was observed by 
considering ROS and Tobin’s Q as indicators. This negative finding is also 
consistent with prior studies (Lo and Sheu 2007; Weir et al. 2002). It may be that 
larger-sized firms also require a higher amount of return to cover larger costs and 
negatively affect firm performance. In contrast, no significant effect was revealed 
for firm performance by considering ROA. An insignificant relationship between 
firm performance and size is also consistent with prior studies (Mishra & Suar 
2010). Therefore, due to various calculation methods and the involvement of 
various stakeholders in firm performance, firm size may act as an explanatory factor 
in a mixed way and Bangladesh is not an exception.  
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Leverage reveals the debt structure of a firm and a negative relationship with 
firm performance has been observed. In particular, a negative relationship has been 
demonstrated by considering ROA, MCAP and Tobin’s Q as indicators. A negative 
relationship is also consistent with prior studies (Alsaeed 2006; Anam et al. 2011; 
Garay et al. 2013; Lima et al. 2011). Accordingly, it can be claimed that higher 
leverage incurs more agency costs between creditors and shareholders and that can 
lead to a negative effect on firm performance (Fama & French 1998; Khlif et al. 
2015). Therefore, a negative relationship is also consistent with the arguments of 
agency theory. In addition, having more debt might be a concern for investors and 
this perception may have an adverse relationship with firm performance (Myers 
1977). In contrast, no relationship was reported by considering ROS and EPS as an 
indicator. An insignificant relationship between leverage and performance is also 
consistent with prior studies (Qiu et al. 2016). This mixed finding may occur as the 
calculation of firm performance indicators is not unique.  Thus, the cost of leverage 
may not be considered as a contingent factor during the calculation process for 
every indicator.  
Regarding the relationship between industry and firm performance, a 
negative relationship was found. In particular, a negative relationship has been 
demonstrated by considering ROA, MCAP, EPS and Tobin’s Q as firm 
performance indicators. Prior studies also documented that industry acts as an 
explanatory factor for firm performance (Haniffa & Hudaib 2006; Khlif et al. 2015; 
Schmalensee 1985; ). It should be noted that the financial industry is subject to 
intense monitoring from regulators42 and Bangladesh is not an exception. To some 
extent, other industries in Bangladesh are more relaxed compared to the financial 
industry in terms of monitoring and supervision (Bhuiyan & Biswas 2007). As a 
result, varied responses across industries may act as an explanatory factor for firm 
performance (Elsayed & Paton 2005). Therefore, it can be explained that firms in 
financial services may struggle to develop firm performance compared to other 
industries. In contrast, an insignificant relationship with ROS was found. This is 
not surprising as sales are not a direct concern in the financial industry because it is 
service-oriented.  
                                                          
42 https://www2.deloitte.com/au/en/pages/risk/articles/monitoring-conduct-financial-markets.html Visited 
3/03/2018 6.11PM 
201 
 
Primarily a negative result was found regarding the relationship between 
CEO duality and firm performance by considering ROA, ROS, EPS and Tobin’s Q 
as indicators. This negative relationship is also consistent with prior studies 
(Jackling & Johl 2009; Rahman & Haniffa 2005; Ujunwa 2012). This negative 
effect may indicate that having this leadership structure is not appreciated by 
interested parties due to a lack of transparency and individuals’ centralized power. 
In addition, according to the recommendations of the Bangladesh BSEC, firms 
should avoid this leadership style. Accordingly, a firm may have a negative effect 
from a cost of debt/equity perspective. Therefore, a firm with CEO duality struggles 
to maintain better performance. However, an insignificant relationship with firm 
performance was reported by considering MCAP as an indicator. This may be due 
to poor socioeconomic conditions, in which a lack of concern regarding this 
leadership structure exists. In addition, CEO duality may not directly moderate 
MCAP as this indicator is not based on a firm’s operational issues directly. Other 
issues act as a contingent factor for this indicator, therefore, CEO duality has a 
minimal effect on MCAP. 
Board composition does not have a significant relationship with firm 
performance indicators including ROA, ROS, MCAP, EPS and Tobin’s Q. An 
insignificant relationship between board independence (composition) is also 
consistent with prior studies in Bangladesh (Rashid et al. 2010; Rashid 2018d). This 
insignificant relationship can be explained by firms in Bangladesh being mainly 
family ownership dominated (Farooque et al. 2007) where independent directors 
are proposed by internal directors (Rashid 2018d). As a result, independent 
directors may not have enough power to dominate firm performance. It should also 
be noted that the BSEC’s new corporate governance guidelines  maintain one-third 
independent directors. Thus, board composition from an independent director 
perspective is less a matter of choice but of compliance with regulatory guidelines. 
Therefore, independent directors may not be a strong mechanism to moderate firm 
performance. 
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8.4 Implications of the Findings  
This section relates to the implications of the findings of this thesis. In 
particular, the contributions arising from the relationship between corporate 
governance characteristics and voluntary disclosures and the effects of the 
voluntary disclosures on firm performance are presented.  
8.4.1 Implications for the Findings of the Relationship between Corporate 
Governance Characteristics and Voluntary Disclosures  
As discussed in the findings, certain characteristics of corporate governance 
act as an explanatory factor for voluntary disclosure for the 134 listed firms in 
Bangladesh. Therefore, the following implications arise from this finding. 
First, in 2012, the BSEC in Bangladesh promulgated a new guideline for 
corporate governance in response to a severe share market collapse and to foster 
corporate transparency for investors. Since this study investigated disclosures from 
a corporate governance perspective, the thesis has made a significant contribution 
in relation to the assessment of corporate governance practices. For example, 
consistent with the BSEC guideline, this study of Bangladeshi listed firms reported 
that CEO duality adversely contributes to the transparency of a firm. Besides this 
characteristic, audit committee composition and the presence of sub-committees 
(audit and nomination) contributes to the voluntary disclosure of social, 
environmental and intellectual capital information. This result has the potential to 
guide future issuance of corporate governance guidelines to ensure firm 
transparency and boost investor confidence. For example, the BSEC may encourage 
listed firms to establish a nomination committee for monitoring and controlling a 
firm and stimulating transparency.  
Second, regarding ownership, the relationship between foreign, director and 
institutional ownership was equivocal. Therefore, the findings of this thesis suggest 
that in terms of ownership structure foreign investors are more concerned with 
voluntary disclosure. This is consistent with agency and legitimacy theory as this 
form of investor requires more information for investment decisions as well as to 
comply with the values of a wide range of investors.   The BSEC may provide more 
compensation or incentives for firms with foreign investors to voluntarily disclose 
or encourage voluntary disclosure. In addition, director ownership provides the 
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opportunity to limit information as these director owners have direct access. Thus, 
from an agency theory perspective, the BSEC may introduce incentives for 
directors to consider voluntary disclosure as transparency might be a concern. In 
relation to institutional ownership, this group of investors are more concerned with 
firm performance. Thus, once again from an agency perspective the BSEC may 
need incentives for voluntary disclosure.  
Third, board size and composition were observed to have an insignificant 
impact on voluntary disclosure. The current BSEC guidelines suggest that board 
size should be between five to 20 directors, however, it was documented that the 
benefit of a larger board size reduced after a certain level of members (Abeysekera 
2010; Hidalgo et al. 2011). Accordingly, the BSEC may consider the effectiveness 
of a large board when setting the maximum number of board members. In addition, 
the BSEC suggests a board should consist of at least one-third independent 
directors. However, this study found that this finding did not contribute to voluntary 
disclosures, which suggest that (i) the power to appoint directors rests with large 
shareholders and (ii) independent directors in Bangladesh may concentrate on the 
firm or operational performance and ignore voluntary disclosure due to the 
influence of other stakeholders. These features adversely influence firm 
transparency. Therefore, it is essential that the BSEC provide further guidelines to 
ensure increased voluntary disclosure and therefore firm transparency.  
Fourth, leverage did not contribute to voluntary disclosure. This result 
reflects that debt providers may not indicate social and environmental concerns or 
intellectual capital aspects. Accordingly, the BSEC may initiate incentives for firms 
or debt providers. For example, for lending guidelines, firms with more voluntary 
disclosure may get priority.   
Finally, firm size and industry type (banking industry) contributes to the 
level of voluntary disclosure since large firms are able to afford the additional cost 
of managing voluntary disclosures (Ammann et al. 2011; Firth 1979; Singhvi & 
Desai 1971). Similarly, larger firms are subject to additional agency costs, which 
are reduced by additional disclosures (Hossain et al. 1995). Therefore, the BSEC 
could provide incentives to smaller firms to provide more voluntary disclosures. 
Similarly, firms from the financial (banking) industry have an increased level of 
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voluntary disclosure. However, the banking industry receives inducements from the 
Central Bank of Bangladesh to provide additional information (Khan 2010) in the 
form of voluntary disclosure. In addition, increased transparency is expected from 
banks as investor confidence is critical for banking and finance in Bangladesh. 
Therefore, from a legitimacy theory perspective, to comply with the social contract 
and reduce information asymmetry from the agency and signalling theory 
perspectives, voluntary disclosures are important. 
8.4.2 Implications for the Findings of the Results of the Effects of Voluntary 
Disclosure on Firm Performance  
Voluntary disclosures contribute to firm performance for the 134 listed 
firms with the following implications.  
First, within the Bangladeshi context, the BSEC is keen to ensure 
transparency;43 accordingly more voluntary disclosures are expected from firms as 
a mechanism to reduce information asymmetry. Therefore, this effect on firm 
performance provides evidence for regulatory authorities such as the BSEC to 
promote transparency through voluntary disclosures as an incentive.  
Second, since there are insufficient levels of voluntary disclosures within 
Bangladeshi firms (Omran & El-Galfy 2014; Azim et al. 2009; Belal 2000, 2008; 
Belal & Momin 2009; Khan et al. 2009) due to the socio-economic environment, 
firms may assume voluntary disclosures are merely an additional cost with little 
return. Therefore, the findings of this study provide an incentive for firms to 
consider voluntary disclosures from an economic perspective. Accordingly, firms 
may disclose social, environmental and intellectual capital information more 
effectively to align with the strategic goals of shareholder value. For example, firms 
may consider recruiting directors with social, environmental and intellectual capital 
knowledge.   
Finally, for the local investor, the findings shed light on the potential of their 
investment. Investors from Bangladesh may not be aware of the significance of a 
socially or environmentally responsible attitude in terms of firm performance, 
                                                          
43  http://www.secbd.org/Revised%20of%20CG%20Guidlines%20BD.pdf Visited 2/06/2015 6.36PM 
http://www.secbd.org/Order%20relating%20to%20Corporate%20Governance%20Guidelines-9%20Jan06.pdf  
Visited 2/06/2015 6.20PM 
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seeing it only as an additional cost or sacrifice to profit. Therefore, the findings of 
this study provide investors with a lead indicator of overall performance.  
 
8.5 Contributions of the Study  
The current study extends the understanding of the determinants and effects 
of voluntary disclosure by combining the concepts of corporate governance, 
voluntary disclosure and firm performance. It also contributes methodologically to 
the accounting literature in several ways. 
First, most of the prior studies limit the focus of their studies on 
determinants (Khan et al. 2013; Khan 2010; Muttakin & Khan 2014; Muttakin et 
al. 2015; Muttakin et al. 2016; Rashid & Lodh 2008) or effects (Hossain et al. 2015) 
of voluntary disclosure. This study combines both the determinants and effects 
within Bangladeshi listed firms by integrating three perspectives: (1) corporate 
governance; (2) voluntary disclosure; and (3) financial performance.  Therefore, it 
provides a more complete picture of voluntary disclosures as it is presumed that, 
when making decisions about the level of voluntary disclosures, a firm also assesses 
the potential effect on performance. This study also extends the literature by 
considering environmental and intellectual capital disclosure in addition to social 
disclosures in the Bangladeshi context. It also considers the period following a 
severe share market crash in Bangladesh. Thus, the findings contribute to the use 
of an integrated approach by establishing evidence of voluntary disclosure from 
corporate governance and firm performance aspects in Bangladesh. 
Second, the study contributes to the literature by adopting a combined 
theoretical framework to interpret the empirical findings and to understand the 
underpinnings of corporate governance, voluntary disclosure and firm performance 
from a developing country context.  In so doing, this study reviews the existing 
theoretical framework and finds combining several theories guides voluntary 
disclosure studies more appropriately since most studies combine several concepts 
instead of considering the interactions developed by An et al. (2011).  An et al. 
(2011) is considered as a pioneering framework with some limitations. This study 
considered these limitations to develop a combined framework for a Bangladeshi 
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country context. For example, when considering voluntary disclosure, a firm has to 
consider:  reducing information asymmetry; maximizing shareholder interest; 
transparency; monitoring; controlling; agent‒principal conflict; compliance with 
the social contract; and the consequences of ignorance. All these concepts are 
articulated by integrating agency, legitimacy and signalling theory. By considering 
or ignoring voluntary disclosures a firm demonstrates whether it has complied with 
the social contract. Similarly, by considering voluntary disclosure as a signal, 
interested parties may have a certain perception of the firm. These concepts align 
with the concept of legitimacy and signalling theory as articulated in Figure 8-3. 
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 Research Question: Determinants of Voluntary Disclosure (Decision-making Process of Voluntary Disclosure) 
 
                                                                                              Research Question: Effects of Voluntary Disclosure (How Interested Parties Perceive Voluntary Disclosure)  
 
Figure 8-3 Summary of the theoretical contribution 
Voluntary 
Dislcosure
Agency
CEO duality: Due to extra power increase  agent 
principal conflict & information asymetry
Sub-Committee: Increase monitoring / maximize 
shareholders' interest 
Audit Committee Composiiton: Increase 
monitoring / maximize shareholders' interest 
Director Ownership: Increase  agent principal 
conflict & information asymetry
Foreign Ownership: Reduce   information 
asymetry  by satisfying interested parties with 
other region
Legitimacy
CEO duality: Due to extra power ignore social contract .
Sub-Committee: Increase monitoring  also ensure to 
comply with social contract
Audit Committee Composiiton: Increase monitoring  
also ensure to comply with social contract
Director Ownership: Due to personal interest ignore 
social contract
Foreign Ownership: Social values and norms from 
foreign investors need to emphasize and  provides priroty 
to social contract 
Signalling
CEO duality: Due to extra power ignore reduction of information 
asymetry
Sub-Committee: Would like to send a positive signal  regarding 
the monitoring by increasing transperency (dislcosure) 
Audit Committee Composiiton: Would like to send positive 
signal  regarding the monitoring by increasing transperency 
(dislcosure) 
Director Ownership: Due to personal interest just ignore the  
signalling by avoiding  additional information.
Foreign Ownership: Would like to send a positive signal  for 
promoting more investors from abroad, thus by  giving 
addiitonal information they reduce information asymetry
Firm Performance
Compliance with social contract or a positive signal improves the financial performance of a firm. In other words, by considering  voluntary disclosure firm may improve firm performance. 
Signalling
- By considering voluntary disclosure, interested parties  
react  towards the firm. Thus, a posiitve signal may facilitate 
positive reaction and negative signal inversely.
- The reaction from the interested parties moderates the 
share price, cost of debt, goodwill and cost of equity for a 
firm either positively or negatively.  
Legitimacy
- From voluntary disclosure, interested parties assess 
whether that firm complies with the social contract
-Based on the social compliance interested parties 
moderates the share price, cost of debt, good will and 
cost of equity for a firm. In addition, ignoring social 
contract also increase operational cost like lawsuit, 
enviornmental penalty etc. 
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Third, this study extends the voluntary disclosure literature by categorizing 
social and environmental disclosures according to the long-term, short-term and 
general disclosure perspectives. Prior studies mainly assess disclosure by only 
considering the operational context (Belal et al. 2010; Hackston & Milne 1996; 
Kamal & Deegan 2013; Khan et al. 2013). Voluntary disclosure is also considered 
a strategic tool of a firm as it has the potential to develop competitive advantage 
(Mishra & Suar 2010). Accordingly, both long and short-term perspectives (Banks 
& Wheelwright 1979) are included in the categorization of social and 
environmental disclosures (Carroll 1991). Therefore, this study extends the 
literature by aligning strategic management objectives.  
Fourth, this study investigates the relationship between corporate 
governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure from Bangladesh as a 
developing country context. Accordingly, by combining social, environmental and 
intellectual capital disclosures, this study extends the extant literature by providing 
evidence on novel aspects of corporate governance.44 In addition, for corporate 
governance related studies, endogeneity is considered as a significant pitfall 
(Larcker et al. 2007; Larcker & Rusticus 2007). In this study robustness tests, such 
as the additional endogeneity test and the individual effects of social, environmental 
and intellectual capital disclosures guarantee a rigorous result. Furthermore, the 
period of this study covers the post-share market crash, therefore, providing more 
relevant information for decision making.  
Finally, this study draws on three categories of firm performance indicators 
accounting, market-based and mixed, which are absent in prior studies (Brine et al. 
2007; Hossain et al. 2015; Lima Crisóstomo et al. 2011). Therefore, the results from 
this study are considered more rigorous and contribute to a robust understanding of 
voluntary disclosure in a developing country context. 
                                                          
44 This study considers an extra sub-committee in addition to audit committee. In addition, consideration of 
the audit committee composition from independent directors is also novel. Furthermore, consideration of 
institutional ownership is also limited within Bangladesh.  
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8.6 Limitations of this Study  
Although the contributions and implications of the study are addressed in 
the preceding sections, similar to any other empirical study, this study is also subject 
to limitations, as discussed below.  
First, the findings of this study are based on listed firms in Bangladesh. 
Although listed firms are important, there are other firms that significantly 
contribute to the Bangladesh economy, such as small or family firms. Extending 
the data set to include other firms would generate further insight.  
Second, this study’s investigation was based on a three-year period between 
2011 to 2013 for corporate governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure and 
2012 to 2014 for firm performance. Voluntary disclosure data was extracted 
manually from the firms’ annual reports and collection of data in further years was 
beyond the timeline for the thesis. There are 134 firms in the yearly samples  (402 
observations), which is larger than prior studies and the study also considered data 
after the share market collapse in Bangladesh (Hossain et al. 2015; Khan et al. 2013; 
Khan 2010; Muttakin & Khan 2014; Muttakin et al. 2015; Rashid & Lodh 2008). 
Extending the study from 2014 would provide further support for the findings and 
also the theoretical framework. 
Third, the study relies on the annual reports of the firms as the main source 
of voluntary disclosures and ignores other publicly available information. Although 
the annual report is considered the most suitable document as it is published on a 
regular basis (Abeysekera & Guthrie 2005; Khan et al. 2009; Rashid 2015a; 
Unerman 2000) in recent years firms are increasingly using alternative sources such 
as sustainability or CSR reports.  
Fourth, while this study developed a complex disclosure index for content 
analysis, there is always a risk of subjectivity. Future studies using the index in 
other contexts or different time periods may test the accuracy of the categorization. 
Fifth, this study examines the effects of voluntary disclosure on firm 
performance from the Bangladesh share market, which market is not considered as 
an efficient market (Nguyen & Ali 2011). In particular, if all the information is 
reflected in determining share price, then it is considered an efficient measure 
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(Malkiel 1989). A comparatively lower explanatory power (adjusted R2) for EPS 
might be affected by this pitfall.  Accordingly, there might be another contingent 
factor for deciding market related performance.   
Finally, although the study used five financial performance indicators: 
ROA, ROS, MCAP, EPS and Tobin’s Q, a large number of indicators are available 
(Margolis & Walsh 2003; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Richard et al. 2009). To overcome 
these limitations, performance indicators from accounting, market-based and mixed 
were used for the first time in studies within Bangladesh. Further studies could 
expand the number, type or mix of performance indicators and control variables. 
To summarize, future studies could address the following issues for a further 
contribution. 
1) Consider non-listed firms from Bangladesh. 
2) Consider extending data years and a larger sample. 
3) Include other publicly available information sources, to assess the 
disclosure levels. 
4) Adopt a mixed-method approach to provide an in-depth explanation and 
understanding of the governance phenomenon (Johl et al. 2012). Molina-
Azorin (2012, p.  33) states that: 
mixed-methods research is becoming an increasingly popular 
approach in several areas, and it has long been called for as an 
approach for providing a better understanding of research problems.  
 
5) Integrate the findings from quantitative and qualitative data.  
6) Conduct a comparison study of Bangladesh to test the adoption of An et 
al.’s (2011) framework and extend understanding for a multi theoretical 
perspective.  
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Appendix A: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries – Relationship between corporate governance 
characteristics (determinant) and voluntary disclosure  
 
Year Authors 
Sample Descriptions  
Statistical 
Method 
Test Variables 
Significant Results 
Firm Year 
Dependent: 
Disclosure  
Independent:  
Corporate Governance Variables  
2001 Ho & Wong 
98 Hong Kong 
firms 
1997 
 
Multiple 
regression 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Board Composition  
CEO Duality 
Presence of Audit Committee  
Percentage of Family Board member 
Presence of Audit Committee (+)  
Percentage of Family Board 
member (-) 
 
2002 
Haniffa & 
Cooke 
167 Malaysian 
firms 
1995 
Multiple 
regression 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Non-executive Director 
Family Member on Board 
CEO Duality 
Non-executive Chairperson 
Board Directors with Multi 
Directorship 
Chairperson with Multi Directorship 
Top Ten Shareholders 
Malay Managing Director 
Malay Financial Director 
 Malay Chairperson  
Malay Director 
Malay Shareholding  
Accounting Expertise Director 
Accounting Expertise Finance 
Director  
Diffusion of Ownership 
Foreign Ownership 
Institutional Ownership  
Large Audit Firm 
Family Member on Board (-) 
Non-Executive Chairperson (-) 
Top Ten Shareholders (+) 
Foreign Ownership(+) 
 
2002 Naser et al. 84 Jordan firms 1998-99 
 
Multiple 
linear 
regression 
 
Number of Shareholders 
Government Ownership 
Individual Ownership 
Foreign Ownership 
Arab Ownership 
Audit Firm Status 
Audit firm status (+) 
2003 Eng & Mak 
158 Singapore 
listed firms 
1995 
 
OLS  
Voluntary 
Disclosure  
Managerial Ownership 
Block holder Ownership 
Government Ownership 
Board Composition  
Managerial Ownership (-) 
Government Ownership (+) 
Board Composition (-) 
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Appendix A: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries – Relationship between corporate governance characteristics (determinant) and 
voluntary disclosure (continued). 
 
Year Authors 
Sample Descriptions  
Statistical 
Method 
Test Variables 
Significant Results 
Firm Year 
Dependent: 
Disclosure  
Independent:  
Corporate Governance Variables  
2004 Gul & Leung 
385 listed firms in 
Hong Kong  
1996  
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Independent & Experienced Directors  
CEO Duality 
Independent Directors 
Director Ownership 
Audit Firm 
Independent Directors (-) 
CEO Duality (-) 
 
2004 Xiao et al. 
300 largest 
Chinese listed 
firm 
2001 
OLS  
Logit 
Voluntary 
Internet-based 
Disclosures 
Government Ownership 
State Ownership 
Legal Person Ownership 
Foreign Listing/ Share Ownership  
Independent Director 
Audit Firm 
Government Ownership (-) 
Legal Person Ownership (+) 
 
2005 
Haniffa & 
Cooke 
139 Malaysian 
firms 
1996 & 2002 
Multiple 
regression 
Social Disclosure 
Malay Director 
Malay Financial Director 
Malay Shareholder 
Non-executive Director 
Multiple Directorship 
Foreign Ownership  
Malay Director (+) 
Non-executive Director (-) 
Multiple Directorship (+) 
Foreign Ownership (+) 
2005 
Arcay & 
Vazquez 
91 firms listed in 
Madrid stock 
exchange 
1999 
Structural 
Equation 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Proportion of Independent Directors 
on Board  
Existence of Audit Committee 
CEO Duality  
Board Participation (Director 
Ownership) 
Stock Options in Directors 
Remuneration  
Board Size 
Ownership Concentration 
Foreign Stock Listing 
Proportion of Independent 
Directors on Board (+) 
Existence of Audit Committee (+) 
Board Participation (Director 
Ownership) (+) 
Stock Options in Directors 
Remuneration (+) 
Ownership Concentration (+) 
Foreign Stock Listing (+) 
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Appendix A: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries – Relationship between corporate governance characteristics (determinant) and 
voluntary disclosure (continued). 
 
 
 
 
Year Authors 
Sample Descriptions  
Statistical 
Method 
Test Variables 
Significant Results 
Firm Year 
Dependent: 
Disclosure  
Independent:  
Corporate Governance Variables  
2006 Barako et al. 43 Kenyan firms 1992-2001 
 
Pooled OLS 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Board Composition 
CEO Duality 
Presence of Audit Committee 
Shareholder Concentration 
Foreign Ownership 
Institutional Ownership 
Board Composition (+) 
Presence of Audit Committee (+) 
Shareholder Concentration(-) 
Foreign Ownership (+) 
Institutional Ownership (+) 
 
2006 
 
Barako et al. 43 Kenyan firms 1992 to 2001 
 
 
Pooled OLS 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Board Composition,  
CEO Duality, 
Presence of Audit Committee 
Shareholder Concentration,  
Foreign Ownership,  
Institutional Ownership,  
Type of Auditor 
Board Composition (-),  
 
Presence of Audit Committee (+) 
 
2006 
Cheng & 
Courtenay 
104 firms listed 
on the Singapore 
Stock Exchange  
 
1998 and 
2000 
OLS 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Board Composition 
Board Composition (+) 
2006 
Ghazali & 
Weetman 
Top 87 firms    
(after excluding 
financial firms) 
listed Malaysian 
firms 
2001 
Stepwise 
regression 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Ownership Concentration 
Number of Shareholder 
Director Ownership 
Government Ownership 
Family Members on Board 
Independent Non-executive Director 
Director Ownership (-) 
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Appendix A: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries – Relationship between corporate governance characteristics (determinant) and 
voluntary disclosure(continued). 
 
 
 
 
Year Authors 
Sample Descriptions  
Statistical 
Method 
Test Variables 
Significant Results 
Firm Year 
Dependent: 
Disclosure  
Independent:  
Corporate Governance Variables  
2007 
Cerbioni & 
Parbonetti 
 54 European 
firms 
2002-04  
 Eight categories 
of Intellectual 
Capital Disclosure  
Board Size 
Board Composition 
CEO Duality 
Board Committee (Audit, 
Nomination, Remuneration ) 
Ownership Structure 
 
 
Board Size (-) 
Board Composition (+) 
CEO Duality (-) 
Board Committee (Audit, 
Nomination, Remuneration ) 
Ownership Structure (-) 
 
2007 
Huafang & 
Jianguo 
559 listed firms in 
Shanghi Stock 
Exchange  
2002 
 
OLS 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Block Ownership , 
Managerial Ownership, 
State Ownership, 
Legal person Ownership, 
Foreign Ownership, 
Board Composition , 
CEO Duality , 
Block Ownership (+), 
Foreign Ownership (+), 
Board Composition (+),  
CEO Duality (-), 
 
2007 Lim et al. 
181 Australian 
firms 
2001 2SLS 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Board Composition  
Board Size 
Type of Auditor 
Top Shareholders  
Management Compensation  
 
Board Composition (+) 
Top Shareholders (-) 
 
2007 Mohd Ghazali 
87 listed firm in 
Malaysia 
2001 
Multiple 
regression 
Social 
Responsibility 
Disclosure 
Ownership Concentration 
Director Ownership 
Government Ownership 
Director Ownership(-) 
Government Ownership (+) 
 
2007 
Patelli & 
Prencipe 
171 listed non-
financial Italian 
firms  
2002 
 
Multivariate 
least squares 
regression 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Independent Directors on Board  
Ownership Diffusion 
Independent Directors on Board 
(+) 
Ownership Diffusion (+) 
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Appendix A: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries – Relationship between corporate governance characteristics (determinant) and 
voluntary disclosure (continued). 
 
  
Year Authors 
Sample Descriptions  
Statistical 
Method 
Test Variables 
Significant Results 
Firm Year 
Dependent: 
Disclosure  
Independent:  
Corporate Governance Variables  
2008 
Donnelly & 
Mulcahy 
51 listed firms in 
Irish market  
2002 
Poisson 
regression 
Technique 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Non-Executive Director on Board 
Non-Executive Director as Chairman 
Institutional Ownership 
Managerial Ownership 
Index of Managerial Ownership 
Board Size 
Non-Executive Director on Board 
(+) 
2008 Li & Qi 100 Chinese firms 2003-05  
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
CEO Duality 
Managerial Ownership 
Managerial Ownership(+) 
2008 Li et al. 100 UK firms 2004 and 05 
Multiple 
regression 
Intellectual 
Capital Disclosure 
Board Composition 
CEO Duality 
Share Concentration 
Audit Committee Size 
Audit Committee Meetings 
Board Composition (+) 
Share Concentration (-) 
Audit Committee Size (+) 
Audit Committee Meetings (+) 
 
2008 
O’Sullivan et 
al. 
200 & 183 listed 
firms in Australia 
2000 and 02 
Logistic 
regression 
Voluntarily 
Disclose Forward- 
looking 
Information 
Board Autonomy 
Presence and Value of Board 
Committee 
Independent Ownership 
Audit Quality 
Strength of Corporate Governance 
Presence and Value of Board 
Committee(+) 
Audit Quality (+) 
 
2009 
Akhtaruddin et 
al. 
105 listed 
Malaysian firms 
2002 OLS 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Board Size,  
Board Composition, 
Outside Owner, 
Family Control, 
Proportion of Audit Committee 
Members on Board 
Nature of the Audit Firm  
 
Board Size (+)  
Board Composition(+) 
Outside Owner(+) 
Family Control (-) 
 
241 
 
Appendix A: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries – Relationship between corporate governance characteristics (determinant) and 
voluntary disclosure (continued). 
 
 
Authors  
Sample Descriptions   
Statistical 
Method 
Test Variables 
Significant  Results 
Firm Year 
Dependent: 
Disclosure  
Independent :  
Corporate Governance Variables  
2009 Jiang & Habib 
116 New Zealand 
firms 
2001=005 2SLS 
Voluntary  
Disclosure 
Institutional Ownership at  High Level 
Concentration 
Institutional Ownership at Low Level  
Concentration 
Government  Ownership at  High Level 
Concentration 
Government  Ownership at Low Level  
Concentration 
Managerial Ownership at  High Level 
Concentration 
Managerial Ownership at Low Level  
Concentration 
Institutional Ownership at  High 
Level Concentration (-) 
Government  Ownership at  High 
Level Concentration (+) 
Managerial Ownership at  High 
Level Concentration (+) 
 
2009 Laidroo 
52 European firms 
( 3 emerging 
Capital Market)  
2001-05  
Public 
Announcements
’ Disclosures 
Ownership concentration   
Managerial  Ownership  
Government  Ownership  
Institutional;  Ownership  
Foreign  Ownership   
Ownership concentration  (-) 
Institutional  Ownership (+) 
Foreign  Ownership  (-) 
2010 Abeysekera 
Top 26 Kenyan 
firms 
2002-03 
Logistic 
regression 
Intellectual 
capital 
disclosure 
Board size 
Independent directors on board 
Independent directors on audit committee 
Independent directors on other committee 
Board size (+) 
Independent directors on other 
committee (+) 
2010 
Al-Shammari & 
Al-Sultan 
170 listed Kuwait 
firms 
2007 
 
Multiple 
regression 
Voluntary  
Disclosure 
Non-executive director on board 
Family members on board 
Role Duality  
Audit committee existence 
Audit committee existence (+) 
2010 
Akhtaruddin & 
Haron 
124 Malaysian 
Firms 
2003 
 Hierarchical 
regression 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Board ownership  
Proportion of independent directors on 
audit committee  
Proportion of expert  directors on audit 
committee 
Board ownership (-) 
Proportion of independent 
directors on audit committee (+) 
Proportion of expert  directors on 
audit committee (+) 
 
2010 
Veronica  & 
Bachtiar 
87 Listed firms  in 
the Indonesian 
Stock Exchange 
2003 
Multiple 
regression 
Corporate 
social reporting 
Board Size 
Foreign Investees  
Board Size (+ & -) 
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Appendix A: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries -Relationship between Corporate Governance Characteristics (determinant) and 
Voluntary Disclosure (continued). 
Year Authors  
Sample Descriptions   
Statistical 
Method 
Test Variables 
Significant  Results 
Firm Year 
Dependent: 
Disclosure  
Independent :  
Corporate Governance Variables  
2011 Hidalgo et al. 
100 Mexican 
Firms 
2005-07 
Multiple 
regression 
Intellectual Capital 
Disclosure 
Board Size 
Board Independence 
Audit Committee Independence 
Chairman/ CEO Duality  
Insider Ownership 
Family Ownership 
Ownership Concentration 
Institutional Ownership 
Board Size (+) 
Institutional Ownership (-) 
 
2012  Alves et al. 
140 Iberian 
peninsula     (38 
Portugal & 102 
Spain) 
2007 
 
Multiple 
regression 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Managerial Ownership, 
Government Ownership, 
Presence of large shareholder, 
Proportion of non-executive and 
independent directors, 
Board Size, 
Monitoring and control structure, 
Management incentive, 
Management Expertise, 
Management Incentive ( +) 
Presence of a large shareholder (-) 
 
2012 
Esa & Anum 
Mohd Ghazali 
27 Malaysian 
firms 
2005 and 07 
 
Multiple 
regression 
Social 
Board size,  
Board composition, 
Board size (+),  
Board composition (-), 
 
 
2012 Rao et al. 
100 Australian 
Firms 
2008 
 
OLS Environmental 
Disclosure 
Independent Non-Executive  
Institutional Ownership  
Board Size 
Female Directors  
Independent Non-Executive (+) 
Institutional Ownership (+) 
Board Size (+) 
Female Directors (+) 
2012 Li et al. 100 UK Firms 2005 
 
Multiple 
Regression 
Intellectual Capital 
Disclosure 
Audit Committee Size 
Audit Committee Meetings 
Audit Committee Independence 
Audit Committee directors 
shareholding 
Audit Committee financial expertise 
Board Independence 
Share Ownership Concentration 
Audit Committee Size (+) 
Audit Committee Meetings (+) 
Audit Committee directors 
shareholding (-) 
Board Independence (+) 
Share Ownership Concentration (-) 
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Appendix A: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries -Relationship between Corporate Governance Characteristics (determinant) and 
Voluntary Disclosure (continued). 
 
 
 
 
Year Authors  
Sample Descriptions   
Statistical 
Method 
Test Variables 
Significant  Results 
Firm Year 
Dependent: 
Disclosure  
Independent :  
Corporate Governance Variables  
2012 Ntim et al. 
169 South African 
Firms  
2002 -06 OLS 
Voluntary 
Corporate 
Governance  
Disclosure 
Block Ownership 
Institutional  Ownership 
Government  Ownership 
Board Size 
Audit Firm 
Cross Listing 
Corporate Governance Committee 
Block Ownership (-) 
Institutional  Ownership (+) 
Government  Ownership (+) 
Board Size (+) 
Audit Firm (+) 
Cross Listing (+) 
Corporate Governance Committee 
(+) 
2012 Samaha et al. 
100 Egyptian 
Listed Firms.  
2009 
OLS 
Corporate 
Governance 
Disclosure 
Board Composition 
Board Size 
Ceo Duality 
Director Ownership 
Block Ownership 
Number of Shareholder 
Existence of Audit Committee  
Board Composition (+) 
Ceo Duality (-) 
Block Ownership (-) 
 
2013 
Allegrini & 
Greco 
177 non-financial 
Italian firms  
2007 
 
OLS 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Ownership Diffusion  
Board composition,  
Board size, 
CEO Duality, 
Lead independent director, 
Board committees, 
Board  meetings, 
Audit committee meetings  
Board size (+), 
CEO Duality (-), 
Board  meetings (+), 
Audit committee meetings (+) 
2013 Uyar et al. 
131 Turkish 
Firms 
2010 
 
OLS 
2SLS 
Voluntary  
Disclosure 
Proportion of Independent Directors 
Institutional Ownership  
Board Size  
Ownership Diffusion  
Proportion of Independent 
Directors (+) 
Institutional Ownership (+) 
Ownership Diffusion (-) 
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Appendix A: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries -Relationship between Corporate Governance Characteristics (determinant) and  
Voluntary Disclosure (continued). 
 
 
 
 
Year Authors  
Sample Descriptions 
  
Statistical 
Method 
Test Variables 
Significant  Results 
Firm Year 
Dependent: 
Disclosure  
Independent :  
Corporate Governance Variables  
2014 Madi et al. 
146 listed firm in 
Malaysia 
2009 
Multiple 
Regression 
Voluntary  
Disclosure 
Audit Committee Independence 
Financial Expertise in  Audit 
Committee 
Audit Committee Meetings 
Audit Committee Size 
Audit Committee Members Multiple 
Directorship 
Audit Committee Independence (+) 
Audit Committee Size (+) 
Audit Committee Members 
Multiple Directorship (+) 
 
2014 Othman et al. 
Top 94 Listed 
firms in Malaysia  
2011 
Multiple 
linear 
Regression Voluntary Ethics 
Disclosure 
Audit Committee Independence 
Expertise of   Audit Committee 
Audit Committee Meetings 
Audit Committee Size 
Audit Committee tenure Members 
Multiple Directorship 
Audit Committee tenure (+)  
Members Multiple Directorship (-) 
2014a Giannarakis 
100 firms from 
Fortune 500 
2011 
Multiple 
regression 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Disclosure 
Board composition 
Board commitment 
Ceo duality 
Board size 
Board meeting 
Board age 
Women on board  
Board commitment (+) 
 
2014b Giannarakis   
366 firms from 
Fortune 500 
2011 
Multiple 
regression Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Disclosure 
Ceo duality 
Board size 
Board meeting 
Board age 
Women on board 
Ceo duality (-) 
Board size (+) 
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Appendix A: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries – Relationship between corporate governance characteristics (determinant) and 
voluntary disclosure (continued). 
 
 
 
 
  
Year Authors 
Sample Descriptions 
 
Statistical 
Method 
Test Variables 
Significant Results 
Firm Year 
Dependent: 
Disclosure  
Independent:  
Corporate Governance 
Variables  
2015 Haji 
51 Malaysian 
listed firms 
2008-10 Panel 
Intellectual Capital 
Disclosures 
Audit Committee Size 
Audit Committee Independence  
Financial Expert in Audit Committee 
Audit Committee Meetings 
Board Size 
Board Independence 
Director Ownership 
Institutional Ownership  
Audit Committee Size (+) 
Audit Committee Independence (+) 
Financial Expert in Audit 
Committee (+) 
Audit Committee Meetings (+) 
Director Ownership (-)  
 
2017  
Appuhami & 
Tashakor 
300 listed firms in 
Australia 
2012-13 
Multiple 
Regression 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Disclosure 
 
Audit Committee Size 
Audit Committee Meetings 
Audit Committee Independence 
Audit Committee Gender Diversity  
Independent Audit Committee Chair  
Audit Committee’s Financial Expertise 
 
Audit Committee Size (+) 
Audit Committee Meetings (+) 
Audit Committee Independence (+) 
Audit Committee Gender Diversity 
(+) 
 
2017 Pisano et al 
150 European 
Firms  
2014  
Human Capital 
Disclosure  
Ownership concentration Ownership concentration (-) 
246 
 
Appendix B: Prior studies from Bangladesh – Relationship between corporate governance characteristics (determinant) and 
voluntary disclosure 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Authors 
Sample Descriptions 
 
Statistical 
Method 
Test Variables 
Significant Results 
Firm Year 
Dependent: 
Disclosure  
Independent:  
Corporate Governance 
Variables  
2006 Hossain et al. 
107 listen non-
financial firms 
2002-2003 
Multiple 
regression 
Corporate 
Social 
Environmental 
Disclosure 
International Link of Audit Firm  
2008 
Rashid & 
Lodh 
21 Bangladesh 
listed firms  
2003-04 to  
2006-07 
2SLS 
Social 
Disclosure 
Ownership Concentration,  
Board Composition,  
Directors Share Ownership , 
Institutional Share Ownership 
Director Ownership (-)               
Board Composition (+)  
 
2010 Khan 
30 listed Banks 
in Bangladesh 
2007-08 
Multiple 
regression 
Corporate 
Social 
Responsibility 
Disclosure 
Non-Executive Director 
Women Directors 
Foreign National on Board 
 
Non-Executive Director (+) 
Foreign National on Board 
(+) 
 
2011 
Rouf & Al 
Harun 
97 Bangladeshi 
listed firms  
2007 
Multiple 
regression 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Management Ownership 
Institutional Ownership 
Management Ownership (-) 
Institutional Ownership (+) 
2011 Rouf 
120 listed Non-
Financial firms 
in Dhaka Stock 
Exchange , 
Bangladesh  
2007 
Multiple 
regression 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Independent Director 
CEO Duality 
Audit Committee Existence 
Board Size 
Ownership Structure 
CEO Duality (+) 
Audit Committee Existence 
(+) 
Board Size (+) 
Ownership Structure (-) 
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Appendix B: Prior studies from Bangladesh – Relationship between corporate governance characteristics (determinant) and voluntary disclosure (continued)  
 
 
Year Authors 
Sample Descriptions 
 
Statistical 
Method 
Test Variables 
Significant Results 
Firm Year 
Dependent: 
Disclosure  
Independent:  
Corporate Governance 
Variables  
2013 Khan et al. 
116 
manufacturing 
listed firms in 
Bangladesh  
2005-09 
Multiple 
regression 
Corporate 
Social 
Responsibility 
Disclosure 
Managerial Ownership 
Public Ownership 
Foreign Ownership 
Independent Directors 
CEO Duality 
Audit Committee Existence 
Managerial Ownership (-) 
Public Ownership (+) 
Foreign Ownership (+) 
Independent Directors (+) 
Audit Committee Existence 
(+) 
2015  
Muttakin et 
al. 
116 listed firms 
in Bangladesh  
2005-09  
Intellectual 
Capital 
Disclosure 
Family Ownership 
Foreign Ownership 
Independent Director 
CEO Duality 
Family Duality 
Audit Committee Existence 
Family Ownership (+/-) 
Foreign Ownership(+) 
Independent Director(+) 
Family Duality (-) 
Audit Committee 
Existence(+) 
 
2016 
Muttakin et 
al. 
155 listed firms 
in Bangladesh 
2005-13 
Panel Least 
Square 
Corporate 
Social 
Responsibility 
Disclosure 
Board Capital  
CEO Power 
Board Independence 
Board Size 
Board Capital (+)  
CEO Power (-)  
Board Independence (+) 
Board Size (+) 
2017 
Bose et al. 
2017 
205 Sample 
Year  
2007-14 OLS 
green banking 
disclosure 
Board Size 
Board Independence 
Institutional Ownership 
Foreign Ownership 
CEO Pay 
Female Director 
Government Ownership 
Board Size (+) 
Institutional Ownership (+) 
Government Ownership (+) 
CEO Pay (-) 
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Appendix C: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries – Relationship between voluntary disclosure and 
firm performance (effects) 
 
 
 
  
Year Authors 
Sample Descriptions 
 
Statistical 
Method 
Test Variables 
Significant Results 
Firm Year 
Dependent:  
Firm Performance 
Indicators  
Independent:  
Disclosure  
2005 Abdolmohammadi 
58 Fortune 
500 firms 
1993-97 Regression Market Capitalization 
Intellectual Capital 
Disclosure  
A significant positive effect. 
2006 Murray et al. 
100 UK 
firms 
1988 to 97 Regression analysis 
Share Price  
 
Social Disclosure  
Social disclosure does not 
affect share price 
2007 Brine et al. 
277 listed 
Australian 
firms 
2005 
Cross sectional 
regression analysis 
and OLS 
ROA 
ROE 
ROS 
Social Responsibility 
(Sustainability Disclosure) 
 
Social responsibility does 
not have any effect on ROA 
ROE ROS  
2007 Montabon et al. 
 
45 US and 
internation
al firms 
  
ROI 
Sales Growth 
Environmental Disclosure 
 
Environmental disclosure 
positively affects ROI and 
sales growth 
2008 
Prado-Lorenzo et 
al. 
117 
Spanish 
listed 
Firms 
2004 for 
disclosure 
2004-05 for 
growth 
Multiple linear 
regression 
Sales Growth  Social Disclosure  
Social Disclosure positively 
affects Sales growth 
2009 
Chi 
 
208 listed 
Firm In 
Taiwan 
2004 disclosure 
2005 firm 
performance 
 Tobin’s Q 
Corporate Governance 
Disclosure 
Corporate governance 
disclosure positively affects 
Tobin’s Q 
2009 Hassan et al. 
80 
Egyptian 
firms 
1995 to 2002  
 
Panel data analysis 
Firm Value Voluntary Disclosure 
 
There was no significant 
impact from voluntary 
disclosure to market value 
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Appendix C: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries – Relationship between voluntary disclosure and firm performance (effects) (continued) 
 
 
 
 
  
Year Authors 
Sample Descriptions 
 
Statistical 
Method 
Test Variables 
Significant Results 
Firm Year 
Dependent:  
Firm Performance 
Indicators  
Independent:  
Disclosure  
2010 Aras et al. 
 
40 listed 
firms on the 
Istanbul 
Stock 
Exchange  
2006 
(Disclosure) 
2007 (Firm 
Performance) 
 
ROE 
ROA 
ROS 
Social Responsibility 
Disclosure  
Social responsibility 
disclosure does not affect  
ROE, ROA, ROS 
2010 Choi et al. 
1222 firms 
years From 
Korea 
2002-08 
Panel data 
analysis 
ROE 
ROA 
Tobin’s Q 
Social Responsibility 
Disclosure 
Social Responsibility 
Disclosure Positively affects 
ROE, ROA & Tobin’s Q 
2010 
Mishra & Suar 
 
 
150 Indian 
firms (101 
listed and 49 
non-listed) 
2003-04 to 
2005 to 06 
Hierarchical 
regression 
Industry Adjusted ROA 
Non-Financial Firm 
Performance (NFP) 
Social Reporting 
Social reporting positively 
affects industry adjusted 
ROA and NFP 
2010 
Veronica  & 
Bachtiar 
87 listed 
firms from 
Indonesia 
2003 Regression analysis 
Return on Equity for 
Next Year 
Stock Return for Next 
Year  
 
Social Disclosure  
Social disclosure positively 
affects return on equity and 
stock returns 
2011 Anam et al. 
91 listed 
firms in 
Malaysia 
2002 & 06 Multiple OLS Market Capitalization 
Intellectual Capital 
Disclosure 
A significant positive effect 
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Appendix C: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries - Relationship between Voluntary Disclosure and Firm performance (effects) 
(Continued) 
 
 
 
Year Authors  
Sample Descriptions   
Statistical 
Method 
Test Variables 
Significant  Results 
Firm Year 
Dependent: 
Disclosure  
Independent :  
Corporate Governance 
Variables  
2011 Kwanbo 
20 listed firms 
in Nigeria Stock 
Exchange 
2005-09 
Multiple Regression 
Analysis 
Earnings Per Share Social Disclosure 
Social Disclosure does not 
have any significant effect 
on earning per share. 
2011 Chen & Wang 
141 Chinese 
firms  
 
2007 for 
disclosure 
2008 for 
performance 
  
Multiple Regression 
ROA (next year) 
ROS (next year) 
Growth rate of sales 
(next year) 
Social Reporting  
Social Reporting positively 
effects   ROA (next year), 
ROS (next year),  Growth 
rate of sales (next year) 
2011 
 
Lima Crisóstomo 
et al. 
78 Brazilian 
firms 
2001-06 
 
Regression 
ROA 
Tobin’s Q 
Social Responsibility 
Disclosure  
Social Responsibility 
Disclosure negatively effects 
Tobin’s Q 
2011 Oeyono et al. 
Top 48 
Indonesian 
corporations 
2003-07 
 
Spearman’s rho 
correlation 
coefficient 
Profitability (EDITDA) 
Earnings Per Share 
Corporate Social Reporting 
Social Disclosure  effects 
positively Profitability 
(EDITDA) 
Earning Per Share in a weak 
form.  
2012 
Ribeiro Soriano et 
al. 
428 Listed 
firms in Taiwan  
2006 
(Disclosure) 
2007 (Firm 
Performance
) 
 
Hierarchical  
Regression 
Market to Book Ratio 
Return on Asset 
Human Capital Disclosure A significant positive effect. 
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Appendix C: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries - Relationship between Voluntary Disclosure and Firm performance (effects) 
(Continued) 
Year Authors  
Sample Descriptions   
Statistical 
Method 
Test Variables 
Significant  Results 
Firm Year 
Dependent: 
Disclosure  
Independent :  
Corporate Governance 
Variables  
2012 Uyar & Kılıç 
129 firms listed 
in the Istanbul 
Stock 
Exchange.  
2010 
Multiple Regression 
Analysis 
 
Market Capitalization 
 
Market Capitalization 
(after six months of 
year ending) 
 
Natural logarithm of 
market  value to book 
value of equity 
 
Natural logarithm of 
market  value to book 
value of equity (after 
six months of year 
ending) 
Voluntary  disclosure 
Voluntary  disclosure 
positively effects Market 
Capitalization and Market 
Capitalization (after six 
months of year ending) 
 
2012 Wibowo 
25 listed firms 
in Indonesia 
Stock Exchange 
(IDX) 
2005-10 
 
Multiple Regression 
Analysis 
ROA 
Social Responsibility 
Disclosure 
 Social Responsibility 
Disclosure  positively effects 
ROA 
2013 Garay et al. 
 
7 largest stock 
exchanges of 
latin America  
(Argentina, 
Brazil — 
Bovespa and 
Novomercado 
— Chile, 
Colombia, 
Mexico and 
Peru) 
2006,2008, 
2010 
 
 
Tobin’s Q  
ROA 
Internet-based corporate 
disclosure 
Internet-based corporate 
Disclosure positively effects 
Tobin’s Q and ROA.   
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Appendix C: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries - Relationship between Voluntary Disclosure and Firm performance (effects) 
 (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
Year Authors  
Sample Descriptions 
  
Statistical 
Method 
Test Variables 
Significant  Results 
Firm Year 
Dependent: 
Disclosure  
Independent :  
Corporate Governance 
Variables  
2013 Kim et al. 
162 Korean 
Firms 
2008 
 
Panel regression 
analysis  
Price to Book ratio 
Return on Asset  
Operating Profit 
Margin  
Firm transparency 
(Financial, Governance, 
Operational and Social 
disclosure) 
 
Firm transparency positively 
effects Return on Asset and 
Operating Profit Margin 
2013 Yusoff et al. 
30  Malaysian 
listed firms 
2009-11 
 
Multiple 
Regression 
Analysis 
(ROA+ROE+ROS) 
Next year 
Social Responsibility 
Disclosure 
 
Social Responsibility does 
not have any significant  
effect on ROA ROE ROS 
2014 Ahamed et al. 
3 Malaysian 
Listed Firms 
2007-11 OLS 
 
ROA 
ROE 
 
Social Responsibility 
Disclosure 
Social Responsibility 
Disclosure positively effects 
ROE and ROA 
2014 Qiu et al. 
152 firms from 
FTSE350 
2005-09 
Regression  
Analysis 
Stock Price  
Residual Income 
Environmental & Social 
Disclosure  
Environmental & Social 
Disclosure positively effects 
stock price and residual 
income. 
2015 Basah & Khairi 
72 Firms in 
Jordan 
2009-13 The Granger test ROA Voluntary Disclosure 
Voluntary Disclosure 
positively effects ROA 
2015 De Klerk et al. 89 UK Firms 2007-08 
Regression  
Analysis 
Share Price ( Market 
value of the equity) 
Social Disclosure 
Social Disclosure positively 
effects stock price  ( Market 
value of the equity) 
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Appendix C: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries - Relationship between Voluntary Disclosure and Firm performance (effects) 
 (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
Year Authors  
Sample Descriptions 
  
Statistical 
Method 
Test Variables 
Significant  Results 
Firm Year 
Dependent: 
Disclosure  
Independent :  
Corporate Governance 
Variables  
2015 Elzahar et al. 102 UK  firms. 2006-10 
OLS 
Market Value of the 
Equity 
Key performance indicators' 
disclosure 
Key performance indicators' 
disclosure positively effect  
Market Value of the Equity 
2015 Khlif et al. 
168 listed firm 
in South Africa  
2004-2009 
Multiple Regression 
Analysis Tobin’s Q 
Social and Environmental 
Disclosure 
Social and Environmental 
Disclosure Positively  effects 
Tobin’s Q 
2016 Chen et al. 
54 Engineering 
News Record 
firms 
2012 
Hierarchical 
stepwise regression 
 
ROA 
ROS 
Tobin’s Q 
Revenue Growth 
Various Categories of 
Environmental Disclosure   
Pollution related 
environmental disclosure 
negatively effects  ROA, 
ROS, Tobin’s Q, Revenue 
Growth 
 
Environmental governance 
related disclosure positively 
effects   ROA, 
ROS, Revenue Growth 
2016 Cheng et al. 
805 and 813 
Chinese firms  
 
2008-09 for 
disclosure 
2009-10 
for growth 
Regression Analysis 
ROA (next year) 
Market Return  (next 
year) 
Tobin’s Q (next 
year) 
Social Disclosure  
Social Responsibility 
Disclosure Positively  effects 
next year  ROA 
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Appendix C: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries - Relationship between Voluntary Disclosure and Firm performance (effects) 
 (Continued) 
 
 
Year Authors  
Sample Descriptions   
Statistical 
Method 
Test Variables 
Significant  Results 
Firm Year 
Dependent: 
Disclosure  
Independent :  
Corporate Governance 
Variables  
2016 Laskar & Maji 
28 listed Indian 
Firms 
2008-09 to 
2013-14 
Generalised least 
squares (GLS) 
Market to Book Ratio 
Corporate  Social 
Responsibility Disclosure 
Corporate  Social 
Responsibility Disclosure 
positively effects  Market to 
Book Ratio 
2016 Li et al. 
475 Chinese 
listed firm 
2013 and 14 
OLS 
ROA Environmental Disclosure 
Environmental Disclosure 
Negatively effects ROA 
2016 
Mathuva & 
Kiweu 
212 Kenyan 
Firms 
2008-13 
Panel OLS 
ROA 
ROE 
Social and Environmental 
Disclosure 
Social and Environmental 
Disclosure Negatively effects 
ROA & ROE 
2016 Nekhili et al. 
 
98 French Firms 
2000-04 
 
3SLS 
Market Value R&D narrative disclosure 
 
There no significant impact 
from  R&D narrative 
disclosure to Market value 
2016 Nor et al. 
100 Malaysian 
Firms 
2011 
Multiple Regression 
Analysis 
ROA  
ROE 
EPS 
Profit Margin 
Environmental Disclosure 
Environmental disclosure 
positively effects Profit 
Margin 
2016 
 
Platonova et al. 
24 Islamic banks 
in Gulf 
Cooperation 
Council (GCC - 9 
from Bahrain, 3 
from Qatar, 3 
from Kuwait, 4 
from Saudi 
Arabia and 5 
from UAE) 
2000-14 Panel data regression 
ROA 
ROA next year 
Social Disclosure 
Social Disclosure  positively 
effects  ROA, ROA next year 
255 
 
 
Appendix C: Prior studies from developed and other developing countries - Relationship between Voluntary Disclosure and Firm performance (effects) 
(Continued)  
 
Year Authors  
Sample Descriptions   
Statistical 
Method 
Test Variables 
Significant  Results 
Firm Year 
Dependent: 
Disclosure  
Independent :  
Corporate Governance 
Variables  
2016 Reverte 
35 firms from 
Spain 
2007-11 Multiple Regression  Share Price of a Firm Social Disclosure 
Social Disclosure positively 
effects  Share price 
2016 Verbeeten et al. 
130 German 
firms 
2005 -08 
Regression  Analysis 
Share Price  
Return Per Share 
Social Disclosure  
Social Disclosure positively 
effects  Share price and 
return Per Share 
Environmental disclosure 
negatively  effects  Share 
price and return Per Share. 
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Appendix D: Prior studies from Bangladesh – Relationship between voluntary disclosure and firm performance (effects) 
 
 
Year Authors  
Sample Descriptions   
Statistical Method 
Test Variables 
Significant Results 
Firm Year 
Dependent: 
Disclosure  
Independent:  
Corporate Governance 
Variables  
2012 Ahmed et al. 5 banks  Survey Social Reporting 
ROA 
EPS 
Price Earnings Ratio 
No significant effects 
2015 Hossain et al. 131 firms 2008-12 Regression analysis 
Corporate Social 
Disclosure  
ROE 
ROA 
Tobin’s Q 
ROE (+) 
ROA (+) 
 
2015 Ahmed & Habib 25 banks 2008-12 Regression analysis 
Corporate Social 
Reporting 
Net Profit After Tax 
(NPAT), 
No significant effects 
2016 Ahmed 30 banks 
2009-12 
2010-13 
Regression analysis 
Corporate Social 
Reporting 
ROE for next year 
ROA for next year 
Average Market Value of 
Share for next year 
No significant effects 
2016 Islam & Rahman 1 bank 2010-14 Regression analysis 
Corporate Social 
Reporting 
Dividends Per Share (DPS), 
Net Profit After Tax 
(NPAT), 
 Economic Value Added 
(EVA), 
 Market Value Added 
(MVA), 
 EPS,  
ROA, 
 ROE, 
 ROI 
Dividends Per Share (DPS), 
Net Profit After Tax 
(NPAT), 
 Economic Value Added 
(EVA), 
 Market Value Added 
(MVA), 
 EPS,  
ROA, 
 ROE, 
 ROI 
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Appendix E: Voluntary Disclosure Items  
Voluntary Disclosure Items 
 Main 
Category 
of 
Disclosure 
Sub-
category of 
Disclosure 
Disclosure Details 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Voluntary 
Disclosure  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social 
Disclosure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategic/ 
long term 
social 
disclosure  
1. Existence of committee for social affairs. 
2. Board takes care about social issues as a significant matter. 
3. Governance encompasses ethics, transparency and 
accountability. 
4. A commentary on behalf of the board about the key 
relationship with employee and other significant 
stakeholders.  
5. Firm policy to promote social welfare. 
6. Key person’s (CEO or chairman) views about social issues. 
7. CEO statement about considering social issues to the 
shareholders/ stakeholders.  
8. A statement that the firm maintains regular review of 
social factors. 
9. Firm has specific policy for maintaining human rights. 
10. Firm has a specific code of conduct to main non-
discrimination in regards to gender, race, religion or ethnic 
group.  
11. Firm activities are affiliated with International Labour 
Organization. 
12. Firm has a specific policy about child labour. 
13. Firm has a specific policy about working hour and 
overtime payment.  
14. Firm has specific and clear guideline about employee 
promotion 
15. Firm has faculties about staff training, education, 
prevention and control program to manage or avoid work-
related injuries. 
16. Firm has a budget for staff welfare.  
17. Amount spent on staff welfare has been disclosed. 
18. Firm has a clear guideline to handle complained about 
harassment or abuse of any employee at any form. 
19. Firm has a specific policy regarding security and 
employment of workers 
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Voluntary Disclosure Items (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
 Main 
Category of 
Disclosure 
Sub-category of 
Disclosure 
Disclosure Details 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Voluntary 
Disclosure  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social 
Disclosure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Current/ 
short term 
social 
disclosure  
20. Community involvement or donation on social 
issues. 
21. Firm has a policy to prioritize greater benefit for the 
welfare of their society.  
22. Firm has policies and procedure to about anti-
corruption. 
23. Firm has policy to provide a fair chance to work as a 
trainee to various education institute students.  
24. Firm has policy to maintain local and national culture 
and protection of personal information. 
25. Firm has a policy about disadvantage side of the 
society.  
26. Firm has a policy to sponsor regional of national 
educational, cultural event. 
27. A statement about product safety assurance. 
28. A statement about quality assurance in regards to 
service or product.  
General social 
disclosure 
29. Any moral statement for considering social issues. 
30. Any statement about social welfare for public 
awareness. 
 
 
 
Environmenta
l Disclosure 
 
 
 
Strategic/long 
term 
environmental 
disclosure  
1. Existence of environmental committee. 
2. Executive performance is associated with 
environmental performance. 
3. CEO statement about environmental performance to 
the shareholders/ stakeholders. 
4. Budget on environmental policy. 
5. Amount paid for developing environmental issue. 
6. Employee training on environmental management 
and operation. 
7. Internal environmental award. 
8. Key performance indicator for environmental issues 
is discussed. 
9. Environmental risk assessment process. 
10. Implementing environmental policy. 
11. Following any particular standard for guideline for 
environmental reporting. 
12. Referring any standard in the report. 
13. Any affiliation in regards to product or service 
providing. 
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Voluntary Disclosure Items (Continued) 
 
 Main Category of 
Disclosure 
Sub-category 
of Disclosure 
Disclosure Details 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Voluntary 
Disclosure  
 
 
 
 
Environmental 
Disclosure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Current/ 
short term 
environmental 
disclosure  
14. Community involvement or donation on 
environmental issues. 
15. Waste management. 
16. Any form of Pollution control process 
17. Recycling process. 
18. Conservation of natural resources. 
19. Energy savings. 
20. Direct energy usage. 
21. Indirect energy usage. 
22 Any award from local or national stakeholder. 
23. Any award or certification from international 
Stakeholders  
24. Any information about fine or non-
compliance. 
25. Any potential threat about environmental 
issues. 
General 
environmental 
disclosure 
26. Any general statement about environmental 
issues. 
27. Any moral statement about following 
environmental issues. 
28. Any statement about environment for public 
awareness.  
 
Intellectual 
Capital 
Disclosure 
 
Internal 
Capital 
1. Management process. 
2. Copyrights, patents and trademarks.  
3. Financial relations. 
4. Networking system. 
5. Innovative idea. 
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Voluntary Disclosure Items (Continued) 
 
 Main Category 
of Disclosure 
Sub-category 
of Disclosure 
Disclosure Details 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intellectual 
Capital 
Disclosure 
 
External 
Capital 
6. Brands. 
7. Customer loyalty. 
8. Focus on customer. 
9. Firm image and reputation. 
10. Distribution channel. 
11. Business collaborations. 
12. Franchising agreement. 
13. Research & development. 
14. Positive feedback from customers. 
Human 
Capital  
15. Employee education. 
16. Training. 
17. Work-related knowledge. 
18. Employee health & safety. 
19. Career development. 
20. Employee welfare. 
21. Entrepreneurial spirit, proactive and reactive 
abilities. 
22. Opportunity for diverse range of people. 
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Appendix F: Diagnostic test results for research model one 
 
a) Normality Test: P Plot 
 
 
Normality Test: Histogram 
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b) Heteroscedasticity Test: Scatter plot 
 
c) Endogeneity Test:  
CEO Duality_resid = 0 
    F( 1,  388) =  0.01 
      Prob > F =  0.9218 
________________________ 
Board Composition _resid = 0 
    F( 1,  388) =  0.24 
      Prob > F =  0.6210 
Board Size_resid = 0 
    F( 1,  387) =  0.04 
      Prob > F =  0.8351 
Sub-committee _resid = 0 
    F( 1,  387) =  1.01 
      Prob > F =  0.3166 
Audit Committee Composition _resid = 0 
    F( 1,  387) =  1.69 
      Prob > F =  0.1945 
Foreign Ownership _resid = 0 
    F( 1,  387) =  1.15 
      Prob > F =  0.2844 
Director ownership_resid = 0 
    F( 1,  387) =  2.33 
      Prob > F =  0.1281 
Institutional Ownership_resid = 0 
    F( 1,  387) =  1.27 
      Prob > F =  0.2601 
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Appendix G: Diagnostic test results for research model two 
 
a) Normality Test: P Plot 
Return on Asset (ROA) 
 
 
 
Return on Sales (ROS) 
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Market Capitalization (MCAP) 
 
 
 
 
Earnings per Share (EPS) 
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Tobin’s Q 
 
 
 
Normality Test: Histogram 
 Residual Test/Histogram–Normality Test 
 
Return on Asset (ROA) 
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Return on Sales (ROS) 
 
 
 
Market Capitalization (MCAP) 
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Earnings per Share (EPS) 
 
 
 
 
Tobin’s Q 
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b) Heteroscedasticity Test: Scatter plot 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
:I 
"0 
7.5-
·: 5.0 
0:: 
"0 
Gl 
N 
:;; 
:; 2.5-
"0 
c a 
c ·* 0.0 ., 
Gl ... .,. 
Gl 
0:: 
ii 
::> 
"0 
·;;; .. 
0:: 
"0 .. 
N 
:;; ... 
"' "0 c 
"' .. en 
c 
0 ·u; ., .. ... .,. .. 
a: 
·2.5" 
I 
. J 
·4 
Scatterplot 
Dependent Variable: ROA_N 
~ 
0 0 0 
0 
0 
I I 
·2 ·1 
0 
0 
0 
I 
1 
Regression Standardized Predicted Value 
Scatterplot 
Dependent Variable: ROS_N 
0 
·2 0 
0 
0 
0 
QID 
0 
0 
0 
Re gression Standardize d Predicted Value 
0 0 
i 
0 
O o 
0 
2 
269 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
:I 
"0 
·: 2 
0:: 
"0 
Gl 
N 
:;; ... 
"' -g 0 
a 
c 
0 ·;;; .. 
~ ·2 
1:11 
Gl 
0:: 
ii 
:I 
"0 
.4 
7.5 
·: 5.0 
0:: 
"0 
Gl 
N 
:;; 
:; 2.5 
"0 
c a 
c 
·* 0.0 .. 
Gl ... 
1:11 
Gl 
0:: 
·2.5 
0 
I I 
. J ·2 
Scatterplot 
Dependent Variable: MCAP _N 
0 
Regression Standardized Predicted Value 
Scatterplot 
Dependent Variable: EPS_N 
I 
·1 
0 
oo 
oo 
Regression Standardized Predicted Value 
0 
0 
0 
i 
0 
B 
0 
0 
oo 
0 
270 
 
 
 
 
c) Endogeneity tests:  
ROA 
( 1) FINAL_VDI_resid = 0 
 
    F( 1,  394) =  0.58 
      Prob > F =  0.4482 
 
ROS 
( 1) FINAL_VDI_resid = 0 
 
    F( 1,  394) =  7.60 
      Prob > F =  0.0061 
 
MCAP 
( 1) FINAL_VDI_resid = 0 
 
    F( 1,  394) =  1.52 
      Prob > F =  0.2188 
 
EPS 
( 1) FINAL_VDI_resid = 0 
 
    F( 1,  394) =  0.31 
      Prob > F =  0.5770 
 
Tobin’s Q 
( 1) FINAL_VDI_resid = 0 
 
    F( 1,  394) =  1.24 
      Prob > F =  0.2659 
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Appendix H: Robustness tests for research model one  
 
Relationship between corporate governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure 
from alternative measurement (2SLS) 
 
    
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
    
C -0.944365 -6.867343 0.000 
CEO Duality -0.075469 -2.027525 0.043** 
Board Size -0.007895 -0.416317 0.677 
Board Composition -0.009617 -0.852138 0.394 
Sub-committee 0.064751 3.410248 0.000*** 
Audit Committee Composition 0.024506 2.061069 0.040** 
Foreign Ownership 0.060906 2.092681 0.037** 
Director Ownership -0.031059 -3.137612 0.001*** 
Institutional Ownership -0.016852 -1.296618 0.195 
Firm Size 0.049618 7.279959 0.000*** 
Leverage 0.000262 0.383800 0.701 
Industry 0.049375 3.443685 0.000*** 
Firm Performance  0.003209 0.715547 0.474 
    
        
 
 
Appendix I: Results Robustness tests one for research model two 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.1 
Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Current Year ROA 0.757 8.797 0.00*** 
Current Year : VDI 0.061 2.507 0.01*** 
Firm Size -0.001 -1.098 0.27 
Leverage -0.000 -0.006 0.99 
Industry -0.018 -2.669 0.00*** 
CEO Duality -0.037 -1.681 0.09*** 
Board Composition 0.003 0.276 0.78 
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𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.2 
Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Current Year ROS 
0.777 8.284 0.00*** 
Current Year : VD 
0.158 2.196 0.02*** 
Firm Size 
-0.018 -2.569 0.01*** 
Leverage 
-0.000 -1.095 0.27 
Industry 
-0.019 -1.244 0.21 
CEO Duality 
-0.073 -2.439 0.01*** 
Board Composition 
-0.038 -0.878 0.38 
 
𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    + 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.3 
Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Current Year MCAP 0.937 29.158 0.00*** 
Current Year : VD 0.352 2.0965 0.03*** 
Firm Size -0.002 -0.108 0.91 
Leverage 0.003 1.145 0.25 
Industry -0.158 -4.322 0.00*** 
CEO Duality -0.147 -1.474 0.14 
Board Composition 0.639 3.011 0.00*** 
 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.4 
Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Current Year EPS 1.102 16.768 0.00*** 
Current Year : VD 6.111 1.631 0.01*** 
Firm Size -0.352 -1.533 0.12 
Leverage 0.005 0.622 0.53 
Industry -0.603 -1.225 0.22 
CEO Duality -4.807 -1.656 0.09*** 
Board Composition 1.287 0.877 0.38 
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𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    + 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.5 
Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Current Year Tobin’s Q 0.753 10.650 0.00*** 
Current Year : VD 0.650 2.052 0.04*** 
Firm Size -0.011 -0.318 0.75 
Leverage 0.002 0.955 0.34 
Industry -0.253 -2.880 0.00*** 
CEO Duality -0.316 -2.788 0.00*** 
Board Composition 0.672 2.758 0.00*** 
 
 
𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.6 
Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Current Year ROA 0.005 0.286 0.77 
Current Year : VD 1.001 93.753 0.00*** 
Firm Size -0.000 -0.100 0.91 
Leverage -0.000 -0.913 0.36 
Industry 0.008 2.789 0.00*** 
CEO Duality -0.003 -2.993 0.00*** 
Board Composition 0.006 0.758 0.44 
 
𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.7 
Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Current Year ROS 0.005 1.747 0.08** 
Current Year : VD 1.001 92.653 0.00*** 
Firm Size 0.000 0.046 0.96 
Leverage -0.0000 -1.021 0.30 
Industry 0.008 3.005 0.00*** 
CEO Duality -0.004 -3.210 0.00*** 
Board Composition 0.006 0.776 0.43 
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𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    + 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.8 
Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Current Year MCAP 0.001 0.648 0.51 
Current Year : VD 0.999 83.841 0.00*** 
Firm Size -0.000 -0.570 0.56 
Leverage -0.000 -0.361 0.71 
Industry 0.008 3.046 0.00*** 
CEO Duality -0.003 -2.924 0.00*** 
Board Composition 0.008 0.922 0.35 
 
𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.9 
Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Current Year EPS 0.000 0.515 0.60 
Current Year : VD 0.999 94.332 0.00*** 
Firm Size -0.000 -0.196 0.84 
Leverage -0.000 -0.952 0.34 
Industry 0.009 3.221 0.00*** 
CEO Duality -0.003 -2.712 0.00*** 
Board Composition 0.005 0.680 0.49 
 
𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    + 𝛽6𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … 𝑀2. 𝑅1.10 
Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Current Year Tobin’s Q 0.000 0.236 0.81 
Current Year : VD 1.001 92.420 0.00*** 
Firm Size -0.000 -0.020 0.98 
Leverage -0.000 -0.971 0.33 
Industry 0.008 2.779 0.00*** 
CEO Duality -0.003 -2.407 0.01*** 
Board Composition 0.006 0.765 0.44 
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Appendix J: Results Robustness tests two for research model two 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.1 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.2 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.3 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Social Disclosure 0.058 2.352 0.01*** 
Firm Size 0.003 1.411 0.15 
Leverage -0.000 -1.801 0.07* 
Industry -0.065 -13.087 0.00*** 
CEO Duality -0.041 -5.070 0.00*** 
Board Composition -0.014 -0.705 0.48 
 Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Social Disclosure 0.045 0.468 0.64 
Firm Size -0.030 -2.518 0.01*** 
Leverage -0.001 -0.926 0.35 
Industry -0.011 -0.478 0.63 
CEO Duality -0.062 -2.363 0.01*** 
Board Composition -0.090 -1.255 0.21 
 Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Social Disclosure 1.560 4.415 0.00*** 
Firm Size 0.518 15.600 0.00*** 
Leverage -0.019 -5.381 0.00*** 
Industry -0.169 -2.152 0.03*** 
CEO Duality -0.336 -1.296 0.19 
Board Composition -0.488 -1.567 0.11 
 Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Social Disclosure 20.262 2.950 0.00*** 
Firm Size 1.309 3.443 0.00*** 
Leverage -0.056 -0.744 0.45 
Industry -9.178 -6.693 0.00*** 
CEO Duality -4.036 -2.609 0.00*** 
Board Composition 2.246 0.592 0.55 
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𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.5 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.7 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Environmental  Disclosure 0.041 1.314 0.18 
Firm Size 0.004 2.018 0.04*** 
Leverage -0.001 -1.821 0.06*** 
Industry -0.063 -12.763 0.00*** 
CEO Duality -0.044 -4.972 0.00*** 
Board Composition -0.013 -0.692 0.48 
 Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Environmental  Disclosure 0.176 1.214 0.22 
Firm Size -0.035 -2.798 0.00*** 
Leverage -0.001 -1.008 0.31 
Industry -0.013 -0.557 0.57 
CEO Duality -0.053 -1.977 0.04*** 
Board Composition -0.092 -1.288 0.19 
 Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Social Disclosure 1.385 2.240 0.02*** 
Firm Size -0.163 -2.447 0.01*** 
Leverage -0.006 -1.587 0.11 
Industry -1.450 -13.285 0.00*** 
CEO Duality -1.039 -6.112 0.00*** 
Board Composition 0.026 0.053 0.95 
 Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Environmental  Disclosure 2.490 5.840 0.00*** 
Firm Size 0.487 16.529 0.00*** 
Leverage -0.020 -5.554 0.00*** 
Industry -0.154 -2.091 0.03*** 
CEO Duality -0.294 -1.044 0.29 
Board Composition -0.504 -1.675 0.09* 
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𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.10 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.11 
 
𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡   + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.12 
 
 
 
 
 Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Environmental  Disclosure 15.609 1.463 0.14 
Firm Size 1.669 4.398 0.00*** 
Leverage -0.070 -0.865 0.38 
Industry -8.571 -6.538 0.00*** 
CEO Duality -4.762 -2.775 0.00*** 
Board Composition 2.310 0.598 0.54 
 Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Environmental Disclosure 0.933 1.136 0.25 
Firm Size -0.132 -2.063 0.03*** 
Leverage -0.007 -1.741 0.08* 
Industry -1.405 -12.84 0.00*** 
CEO Duality -1.098 -6.367 0.00*** 
Board Composition 0.032 0.067 0.94 
 Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Intellectual Capital Disclosure 0.093 3.967 0.00*** 
Firm Size 0.000 0.523 0.60 
Leverage -0.000 -1.599 0.11 
Industry -0.067 -12.414 0.00*** 
CEO Duality -0.039 -5.959 0.00*** 
Board Composition -0.019 -1.029 0.30 
 Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Intellectual Capital  Disclosure 0.125 1.768 0.07* 
Firm Size -0.034 -3.534 0.00*** 
Leverage -0.001 -0.898 0.36 
Industry -0.015 -0.606 0.54 
CEO Duality -0.056 -2.115 0.03*** 
Board Composition -0.098 -1.365 0.17 
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+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.13 
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+ 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.14 
 
𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    
+ 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … . 𝑀2. 𝑅2.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Intellectual Capital  Disclosure 1.434 4.451 0.00*** 
Firm Size 0.519 17.678 0.00*** 
Leverage -0.018 -4.791 0.00*** 
Industry -0.160 -2.052 0.04*** 
CEO Duality -0.358 -1.422 0.15 
Board Composition -0.559 -1.887 0.05*** 
 Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Intellectual Capital  Disclosure 22.218 3.969 0.00*** 
Firm Size 1.119 2.831 0.00*** 
Leverage -0.048 -0.558 0.57 
Industry -9.224 -7.175 0.00*** 
CEO Duality -4.007 -2.507 0.01*** 
Board Composition 1.087 0.295 0.76 
 Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Intellectual Capital  Disclosure 2.099 4.118 0.00*** 
Firm Size -0.209 -3.846 0.00*** 
Leverage -0.005 -1.440 0.15 
Industry -1.480 -12.529 0.00*** 
CEO Duality -0.986 -6.561 0.00*** 
Board Composition -0.091 -0.192 0.84 
